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b8f2d8f694
Adds a "Local Login & Dev Users" section to docs/LOCAL_DEVELOPMENT.md and a short pointer in services/mana-auth/CLAUDE.md so the next dev finds the script without first hitting the "why can't I log in?" wall: - Why it exists (no admin seed, requireEmailVerification + no SMTP) - The 3 default accounts + password - Single-account form + env overrides (TIER, AUTH_URL, …) - Idempotency promise - Prereqs (Postgres + mana-auth on :3001) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
133 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
133 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
# mana-auth
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Central authentication service for the Mana ecosystem. Hono + Bun + Better Auth.
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## Tech Stack
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| Layer | Technology |
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|-------|------------|
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| **Runtime** | Bun |
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| **Framework** | Hono |
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| **Auth** | Better Auth (native Hono handler) |
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| **Database** | PostgreSQL + Drizzle ORM |
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| **JWT** | EdDSA via Better Auth JWT plugin |
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| **Email** | Nodemailer → self-hosted Stalwart SMTP (`docs/MAIL_SERVER.md`) |
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## Port: 3001
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## Better Auth Plugins
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1. **Organization** — B2B multi-tenant with RBAC
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2. **JWT** — EdDSA tokens with minimal claims (sub, email, role, sid)
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3. **Two-Factor** — TOTP with backup codes
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4. **Magic Link** — Passwordless email login
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## Key Endpoints
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### Better Auth Native (`/api/auth/*`)
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Handled directly by Better Auth — includes sign-in, sign-up, session, 2FA, magic links, org management.
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### Custom Auth (`/api/v1/auth/*`)
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| POST | `/register` | Register + init credits |
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| POST | `/login` | Login (returns JWT + sets SSO cookie) |
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| POST | `/logout` | Logout |
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| POST | `/validate` | Validate JWT token |
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| GET | `/session` | Get current session |
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### Me — GDPR Self-Service (`/api/v1/me/*`)
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| GET | `/data` | Full user data summary (auth, credits, project entities) |
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| GET | `/data/export` | Download all data as JSON file |
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| DELETE | `/data` | Delete all user data across all services (right to be forgotten) |
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Aggregates data from 3 sources: auth DB (sessions, accounts, 2FA, passkeys), mana-credits (balance, transactions), mana-sync DB (entity counts per app).
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### Encryption Vault (`/api/v1/me/encryption-vault/*`)
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Per-user master-key custody for the Mana data-layer encryption. The browser fetches its master key here on first login and re-fetches on each session start. The key itself never lives in the database — it's wrapped with the service-wide KEK (loaded from `MANA_AUTH_KEK`).
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| GET | `/status` | Cheap metadata read: `{ vaultExists, hasRecoveryWrap, zeroKnowledge, recoverySetAt }`. No decryption, no audit row. Used by the settings page on mount. |
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| POST | `/init` | Idempotent vault initialisation. Mints + KEK-wraps a fresh master key on first call, returns the existing one on subsequent calls. |
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| GET | `/key` | Hot path. Returns either `{ masterKey, formatVersion, kekId }` (standard mode) or `{ requiresRecoveryCode: true, recoveryWrappedMk, recoveryIv }` (zero-knowledge mode). |
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| POST | `/rotate` | Mints a fresh master key. Old MK is gone — caller must re-encrypt or accept loss. **Forbidden in zero-knowledge mode** (`409 ZK_ROTATE_FORBIDDEN`). |
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| POST | `/recovery-wrap` | Stores a client-built recovery wrap: `{ recoveryWrappedMk, recoveryIv }`. The recovery secret itself NEVER touches the wire. Idempotent — replaces existing wrap. |
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| DELETE | `/recovery-wrap` | Removes the recovery wrap. **Forbidden in zero-knowledge mode** (`409 ZK_ACTIVE`) — would lock the user out. |
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| POST | `/zero-knowledge` | Toggles ZK mode. `{ enable: true }` requires a recovery wrap to be set first (else `400 RECOVERY_WRAP_MISSING`). `{ enable: false, masterKey: base64 }` requires the freshly-unwrapped MK from the client so the server can KEK-re-wrap it. |
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All routes write to `auth.encryption_vault_audit` for security investigations. Three database CHECK constraints enforce vault consistency at the schema level (`encryption_vaults_has_wrap`, `encryption_vaults_wrap_iv_pair`, `encryption_vaults_zk_consistency`) so a code-level bug can't accidentally lock a user out.
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Schema lives in `src/db/schema/encryption-vaults.ts`, service in `src/services/encryption-vault/`. Migration files: `sql/002_encryption_vaults.sql` (Phase 2: tables + RLS) and `sql/003_recovery_wrap.sql` (Phase 9: recovery columns + ZK constraints).
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For the full architectural deep-dive, threat model, and rollout history (Phases 1–9 + backlog sweep), see `apps/mana/apps/web/src/lib/data/DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md`. User-facing docs at `apps/docs/src/content/docs/architecture/security.mdx`.
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### Admin (`/api/v1/admin/*`)
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| GET | `/users` | Paginated user list with search (`?page=1&limit=20&search=`) |
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| GET | `/users/:id/data` | Aggregated user data summary (same as /me/data) |
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| DELETE | `/users/:id/data` | Delete all user data (admin) |
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| GET | `/users/:id/tier` | Get user's access tier |
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| PUT | `/users/:id/tier` | Update user's access tier |
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### Internal (`/api/v1/internal/*`)
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| Method | Path | Description |
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|--------|------|-------------|
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| GET | `/org/:orgId/member/:userId` | Check membership (for mana-credits) |
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## Local Dev Login
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There is **no built-in admin seed** and **no auth-bypass env var**, and
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the local stack runs with `requireEmailVerification: true` against no
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real SMTP. Use the convenience script instead of hand-crafting SQL:
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```bash
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pnpm setup:dev-user # 3 founder accounts
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./scripts/dev/setup-dev-user.sh foo@x.de pass # single account
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```
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Defaults to `tills95@gmail.com` / `tilljkb@gmail.com` / `rajiehq@gmail.com`,
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all with password `Aa-123456789` and `access_tier = founder`. The script
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calls `POST /api/v1/auth/register` (so Better Auth handles hashing),
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then runs an idempotent SQL `UPDATE auth.users SET email_verified = true,
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access_tier = 'founder'`. Full docs in `docs/LOCAL_DEVELOPMENT.md`.
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## Cross-Domain SSO
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Session cookies shared across `*.mana.how` via `COOKIE_DOMAIN=.mana.how`.
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## Environment Variables
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```env
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PORT=3001
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DATABASE_URL=postgresql://...
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SYNC_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://.../mana_sync # mana-sync DB for entity counts (GDPR data view)
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BASE_URL=https://auth.mana.how
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COOKIE_DOMAIN=.mana.how
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NODE_ENV=production
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MANA_SERVICE_KEY=...
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MANA_CREDITS_URL=http://mana-credits:3061
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MANA_SUBSCRIPTIONS_URL=http://mana-subscriptions:3063
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SMTP_HOST=stalwart # self-hosted on Mac Mini, see docs/MAIL_SERVER.md
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SMTP_PORT=587
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SMTP_USER=...
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SMTP_PASS=...
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# Encryption Vault — REQUIRED IN PRODUCTION
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# Base64-encoded 32-byte AES-256 key. Generate with `openssl rand -base64 32`.
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# The dev fallback is 32 zero bytes (prints a loud warning at startup).
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# This key wraps every user's master key in auth.encryption_vaults — guard
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# it like a database password. Provision via Docker secret / KMS / Vault.
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MANA_AUTH_KEK=
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```
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## Critical Rules
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- **ALWAYS use Better Auth** — no custom auth implementation
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- **EdDSA algorithm only** for JWT (Better Auth manages JWKS)
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- **Minimal JWT claims** — sub, email, role, sid only
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- **jose library** for JWT validation (NOT jsonwebtoken)
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