managarten/services/mana-auth/CLAUDE.md
Till JS 142a65a22f docs: Phase 9 documentation roundup — close encryption-shaped doc gaps
Five documentation surfaces gained encryption awareness in this
sweep. Before this commit, the only place anyone could learn about
the at-rest encryption layer or the zero-knowledge opt-in was the
internal DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md. New contributors and self-hosters
would never discover one of the most important features of the
product just by reading the standard onboarding docs.

apps/docs/src/content/docs/architecture/security.mdx (NEW)
----------------------------------------------------------
First-class user-facing security page in the Starlight site,
slotted into the Architecture sidebar between Authentication and
Backend.

Sections:
  - What's encrypted (overview table of 27 modules + the
    intentional plaintext carve-outs)
  - Standard mode flow with ASCII diagram
  - "What Mana CAN see" trust statements per mode
  - Zero-knowledge mode setup walkthrough (Steps component)
  - Unlock flow on a new device
  - Recovery code rotation
  - Deployment requirements (the loud MANA_AUTH_KEK warning)
  - Audit trail action vocabulary
  - Threat model summary table
  - Implementation file references with paths

services/mana-auth/CLAUDE.md
----------------------------
New "Encryption Vault" section under Key Endpoints, listing all 7
routes (status, init, key, rotate, recovery-wrap GET+DELETE,
zero-knowledge) with their HTTP method, path, error codes, and a
description. Mentions the three CHECK constraints + RLS + audit
table. Points readers at DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md and the new
security.mdx for the deep dive.

Environment Variables block gains MANA_AUTH_KEK with a multi-line
comment explaining the openssl rand command + dev fallback warning.

apps/mana/CLAUDE.md
-------------------
Full rewrite. The existing file was from the Supabase era and
described things like @supabase/ssr, safeGetSession(), and a
five-table schema with users + organizations + teams that doesn't
exist any more. Replaced with the unified-app architecture:

  - Module system layout (collections.ts / queries.ts / stores/)
  - Mana Auth (Better Auth + EdDSA JWT) instead of Supabase
  - Local-first data layer with the full pipeline diagram
  - At-rest encryption section with the "when writing module code
    that touches sensitive fields" 4-step guide
  - Updated routing structure (no more separate /organizations,
    /teams routes)
  - Module store pattern code example
  - Reference document table at the bottom pointing at the audit,
    the new security.mdx, and the auth doc

Root CLAUDE.md
--------------
New "At-Rest Encryption (Phase 1–9)" subsection under the
Local-First Architecture section. Two-mode trust summary table,
production requirement for MANA_AUTH_KEK with the openssl command,
the "when writing module code" 4-step guide, and a reference
table. New contributors reading the root CLAUDE.md from top to
bottom now hit encryption naturally as part of the data layer
discussion.

.env.macmini.example
--------------------
MANA_AUTH_KEK was missing from the production env example
entirely — the macmini deployment would silently boot on the
32-zero-byte dev fallback if you copied this file. Added with a
multi-paragraph comment covering: how to generate, why it's
required, how to store securely (Docker secrets / KMS / Vault),
and the rotation caveat.

apps/docs/src/content/docs/deployment/self-hosting.mdx
------------------------------------------------------
Two changes:

  1. Added MANA_AUTH_KEK to the mana-auth service block in the
     Compose example with an inline comment pointing at the new
     section below.

  2. New "Encryption Vault Setup" H2 section with subsections:
     - Generating a KEK (with a fake example value labelled DO NOT
       USE — generate your own)
     - Securing the KEK (Docker secrets, KMS, systemd
       LoadCredential, anti-patterns)
     - "What if I lose the KEK?" — explains the data is
       unrecoverable by design and mitigation via zero-knowledge
       mode opt-in
     - KEK rotation — calls out the missing background re-wrap
       job as a known limitation

apps/docs/astro.config.mjs
--------------------------
Added "Security & Encryption" entry to the Architecture sidebar
between Authentication and Backend so the new page is reachable
from the docs nav.

Astro check: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 hints across 4 .astro files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 11:47:59 +02:00

6 KiB
Raw Blame History

mana-auth

Central authentication service for the Mana ecosystem. Rewritten from NestJS (mana-auth) to Hono + Bun.

Tech Stack

Layer Technology
Runtime Bun
Framework Hono
Auth Better Auth (native Hono handler)
Database PostgreSQL + Drizzle ORM
JWT EdDSA via Better Auth JWT plugin
Email Nodemailer + Brevo SMTP

Port: 3001 (same as mana-auth — drop-in replacement)

Better Auth Plugins

  1. Organization — B2B multi-tenant with RBAC
  2. JWT — EdDSA tokens with minimal claims (sub, email, role, sid)
  3. OIDC Provider — Matrix/Synapse SSO
  4. Two-Factor — TOTP with backup codes
  5. Magic Link — Passwordless email login

Key Endpoints

Better Auth Native (/api/auth/*)

Handled directly by Better Auth — includes sign-in, sign-up, session, 2FA, magic links, org management.

Custom Auth (/api/v1/auth/*)

Method Path Description
POST /register Register + init credits
POST /login Login (returns JWT + sets SSO cookie)
POST /logout Logout
POST /validate Validate JWT token
GET /session Get current session

OIDC (/.well-known/*, /api/auth/oauth2/*)

OpenID Connect provider for Matrix/Synapse SSO.

Me — GDPR Self-Service (/api/v1/me/*)

Method Path Description
GET /data Full user data summary (auth, credits, project entities)
GET /data/export Download all data as JSON file
DELETE /data Delete all user data across all services (right to be forgotten)

Aggregates data from 3 sources: auth DB (sessions, accounts, 2FA, passkeys), mana-credits (balance, transactions), mana-sync DB (entity counts per app).

Encryption Vault (/api/v1/me/encryption-vault/*)

Per-user master-key custody for the Mana data-layer encryption. The browser fetches its master key here on first login and re-fetches on each session start. The key itself never lives in the database — it's wrapped with the service-wide KEK (loaded from MANA_AUTH_KEK).

Method Path Description
GET /status Cheap metadata read: { vaultExists, hasRecoveryWrap, zeroKnowledge, recoverySetAt }. No decryption, no audit row. Used by the settings page on mount.
POST /init Idempotent vault initialisation. Mints + KEK-wraps a fresh master key on first call, returns the existing one on subsequent calls.
GET /key Hot path. Returns either { masterKey, formatVersion, kekId } (standard mode) or { requiresRecoveryCode: true, recoveryWrappedMk, recoveryIv } (zero-knowledge mode).
POST /rotate Mints a fresh master key. Old MK is gone — caller must re-encrypt or accept loss. Forbidden in zero-knowledge mode (409 ZK_ROTATE_FORBIDDEN).
POST /recovery-wrap Stores a client-built recovery wrap: { recoveryWrappedMk, recoveryIv }. The recovery secret itself NEVER touches the wire. Idempotent — replaces existing wrap.
DELETE /recovery-wrap Removes the recovery wrap. Forbidden in zero-knowledge mode (409 ZK_ACTIVE) — would lock the user out.
POST /zero-knowledge Toggles ZK mode. { enable: true } requires a recovery wrap to be set first (else 400 RECOVERY_WRAP_MISSING). { enable: false, masterKey: base64 } requires the freshly-unwrapped MK from the client so the server can KEK-re-wrap it.

All routes write to auth.encryption_vault_audit for security investigations. Three database CHECK constraints enforce vault consistency at the schema level (encryption_vaults_has_wrap, encryption_vaults_wrap_iv_pair, encryption_vaults_zk_consistency) so a code-level bug can't accidentally lock a user out.

Schema lives in src/db/schema/encryption-vaults.ts, service in src/services/encryption-vault/. Migration files: sql/002_encryption_vaults.sql (Phase 2: tables + RLS) and sql/003_recovery_wrap.sql (Phase 9: recovery columns + ZK constraints).

For the full architectural deep-dive, threat model, and rollout history (Phases 19 + backlog sweep), see apps/mana/apps/web/src/lib/data/DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md. User-facing docs at apps/docs/src/content/docs/architecture/security.mdx.

Admin (/api/v1/admin/*)

Method Path Description
GET /users Paginated user list with search (?page=1&limit=20&search=)
GET /users/:id/data Aggregated user data summary (same as /me/data)
DELETE /users/:id/data Delete all user data (admin)
GET /users/:id/tier Get user's access tier
PUT /users/:id/tier Update user's access tier

Internal (/api/v1/internal/*)

Method Path Description
GET /org/:orgId/member/:userId Check membership (for mana-credits)

Cross-Domain SSO

Session cookies shared across *.mana.how via COOKIE_DOMAIN=.mana.how.

Environment Variables

PORT=3001
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://...
SYNC_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://.../mana_sync  # mana-sync DB for entity counts (GDPR data view)
BASE_URL=https://auth.mana.how
COOKIE_DOMAIN=.mana.how
NODE_ENV=production
MANA_SERVICE_KEY=...
MANA_CREDITS_URL=http://mana-credits:3061
MANA_SUBSCRIPTIONS_URL=http://mana-subscriptions:3063
SMTP_HOST=smtp-relay.brevo.com
SMTP_PORT=587
SMTP_USER=...
SMTP_PASS=...
SYNAPSE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=...

# Encryption Vault — REQUIRED IN PRODUCTION
# Base64-encoded 32-byte AES-256 key. Generate with `openssl rand -base64 32`.
# The dev fallback is 32 zero bytes (prints a loud warning at startup).
# This key wraps every user's master key in auth.encryption_vaults — guard
# it like a database password. Provision via Docker secret / KMS / Vault.
MANA_AUTH_KEK=

Critical Rules

  • ALWAYS use Better Auth — no custom auth implementation
  • EdDSA algorithm only for JWT (Better Auth manages JWKS)
  • Minimal JWT claims — sub, email, role, sid only
  • jose library for JWT validation (NOT jsonwebtoken)