mirror of
https://github.com/Memo-2023/mana-monorepo.git
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1652 commits
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93748c0c9c |
feat(playground): real LLM playground module backed by mana-llm + saved snippets
The playground route was previously a stub. This turns it into a proper module: - A streaming chat surface that talks to mana-llm's OpenAI-compatible /v1/chat/completions and /v1/models. The SSE chunk parser is hand-rolled in modules/playground/llm.ts (~30 lines) rather than pulling a dep — the wire format is straight OpenAI and the playground is the only consumer right now. If chat / todo enrichment / cycles insights end up hitting the same surface, this lifts cleanly into $lib/data/llm-client.ts. - A persisted **snippets** store: name + systemPrompt + (model, temperature) defaults that the user can pin and reorder. Stateless chat history stays out — that's what the chat module is for. Both `name` and `systemPrompt` are encrypted (same pattern as notes/dreams), with a registry entry in data/crypto/registry.ts and a Dexie schema in data/database.ts. - Standard module wiring: collections.ts / queries.ts / types.ts / stores/snippets.svelte.ts / module.config.ts, registered in module-registry.ts alongside the other 30+ modules. - ListView.svelte and the (app)/playground/+page.svelte route consume the new store + the streaming client. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d3a1f00072 |
feat(crypto): roll places + locationLogs into the encryption registry
Phase 8 follow-up. Places carries GDPR-sensitive PII so it gets the same treatment as the rest of Phase 7+8, with one deliberate carve-out: - `places` encrypts the user-typed surface (name / description / address) but leaves lat/lng plaintext so the proximity matcher in tracking.svelte.ts can run during background geolocation logging without a vault unlock. The trade-off is documented inline in registry.ts: a handful of named POIs is much less sensitive than the full movement trail. - `locationLogs` IS the movement trail, so every coordinate field (latitude, longitude, accuracy, altitude, speed, heading) is encrypted. Indexed columns (timestamp, placeId, [placeId+timestamp]) stay plaintext for the time-range scans in the log view. - `placeTags` stays out of the registry — pure FK join table, no user content, same pattern as manaLinks. queries.useAllPlaces / useLocationLogs now decrypt before mapping to the DTO. placesStore.create/update snapshot the plaintext DTO before encryptRecord mutates the local in place — same pattern as notes/dreams/contacts. trackingStore.logPosition decrypts the place set before running the nearest-place match (the lat/lng carve-out means this still works pre-unlock, but downstream consumers want the decrypted name). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a7f3577ee2 |
fix(voice): set MANA_LLM_URL on mana-web — $env/dynamic/private hides PUBLIC_
The first prod deploy of voice quick-add (
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3b41b39a32 |
fix(voice/parse-task): extract helpers to coerce.ts so prod build passes
SvelteKit's production build forbids non-handler exports from a +server.ts file — dev runs them fine but `pnpm build` errored with "Invalid export 'coerce' in /api/v1/voice/parse-task" when trying to deploy mana-web with the new unit tests. Move ParseResult, fallback, DATE_TRIGGER_PATTERNS, PRIORITY_TRIGGER_PATTERNS, transcriptMentions, coerce, and extractJson into a sibling coerce.ts module. The +server.ts file imports from there and only exports POST, which is the prod build's hard rule. Tests now import from ./coerce instead of from the route handler, which also drops the $env/dynamic/private resolution dance from the test fast path — coerce.test.ts now runs in ~130ms instead of ~400ms because it pulls in zero SvelteKit runtime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4f6609a595 |
docs(devlog): backfill daily devlogs for 2026-04-01 through 2026-04-07
Fills the gap between the last entry (2026-03-31) and today. The 2026-04-06 slot is intentionally skipped — no commits that day. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0119e48edb |
test(voice/parse-task): unit tests for coerce + transcriptMentions guards
The deterministic guards in parse-task's coerce() are the load-bearing
defense against gemma3 hallucinating dueDate / priority on bare tasks.
The integration tests against the live LLM cover the happy path
end-to-end, but they go offline as soon as mana-llm is unreachable —
the unit tests cover the guard logic in isolation with synthetic LLM
responses, so a regression in the rules is caught even when the LLM
itself is dark.
22 cases:
- transcriptMentions: substring matching, case-insensitivity, empty
pattern list, the German + English date words from the few-shot
examples, and the negative cases ("Mülltonnen rausstellen",
"Buy milk") that must NOT trigger.
- coerce: fallback shape on garbage input, transcript-as-title when
the model omits one, time-component stripping ("2026-04-09T14:00:00"
→ "2026-04-09"), malformed dueDate rejection, the dueDate /
priority hallucination guards (drop when the transcript has no
trigger word), real-date / real-priority preservation, label
filtering (cap at 3, drop non-strings, empty array on non-array
input), invalid priority value rejection.
Helpers exported solely for the tests via a __test object — the
production endpoint goes through buildPrompt + coerce as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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7007140d13 |
fix(voice): switch to gemma3:12b + few-shot prompt for parse-task
Two related changes that fall out of real end-to-end testing against
the now-working local mana-llm.
1. Default model bumped from gemma3:4b to gemma3:12b for both
parse-task and parse-habit. The 4b model gets weekday math
off-by-one ("nächsten Montag" from a Wednesday → 2026-04-14
instead of 2026-04-13), aggressively shortens titles ("Anna
anrufen" → "Anrufen"), and frequently paraphrases habit names
instead of copying verbatim ("Joggen" instead of "Laufen") which
the verbatim-validation in coerce drops, costing an LLM round-trip
for nothing. The 12b variant is roughly 10% slower for these
tiny prompts (~1.1s vs ~1.0s on the GPU box) so the accuracy
win is essentially free.
2. parse-task prompt rewritten as few-shot. Pure rule descriptions
were *worse* than simple examples — the long "Rules — read
carefully" section in the previous prompt actually made the model
compute next Monday as 2026-04-14 even though a direct "what date
is next Monday?" prompt to the same model returned 2026-04-13.
The detailed rules were also priming the model to over-shorten
titles and over-eagerly tag filler words. Five worked examples
(including the previously-failing "Anna nächsten Montag anrufen"
case) plus one novel case ("Mama am Wochenende besuchen") all
come back correct now, including for the novel one.
The deterministic guards in coerce() are kept as a backstop for the
day the GPU box swaps in a weaker model — they're cheap and don't
hurt the happy path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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b505024f7b |
fix(voice/parse-task): guard against gemma3:4b hallucinating dueDate + priority
Real end-to-end testing against the now-working local mana-llm
surfaced two model behaviours the prompt couldn't talk down:
1. gemma3:4b stamps today's date on every task that doesn't have a
real time anchor. "Mülltonnen rausstellen" came back with
dueDate=2026-04-08 and priority=low even though the prompt
explicitly said "MUST be null when no date is mentioned". After
typing "Buy milk" the user would silently get a today-due task,
which is worse than no parsing at all.
2. The model occasionally returns dueDate as a full ISO timestamp
("2026-04-09T14:00:00") when the transcript mentions a time. The
coerce regex previously matched the prefix and let the timestamp
through unchanged, which then breaks the YYYY-MM-DD-shaped Dexie
field downstream.
Fix: deterministic post-processing in coerce. The prompt is also
tightened with explicit "ONLY when…" rules but the guards are the
load-bearing change since gemma3:4b ignores prompt restrictions.
- Strict YYYY-MM-DD extraction: a leading-anchor regex match keeps
only the date prefix even if the model adds a time component.
- DATE_TRIGGER_PATTERNS: substring scan over the original transcript
for German + English date words. If the LLM returned a dueDate but
the transcript has zero matches, drop the date — it was a
hallucination. False positives are preferable to false negatives:
letting through a fake date is more annoying than suppressing a
real one the user can re-type.
- PRIORITY_TRIGGER_PATTERNS: same idea for priority. The model thinks
taxes are inherently urgent; we don't want to inherit that opinion.
The labels field is left noisy on purpose — "müll", "unbedingt",
"erledigen" all come back from a single transcript and only the ones
that fuzzy-match an existing workspace tag end up on the task, so
filtering filler words at this layer would be wasted work.
Verified against five transcripts spanning bare/explicit/relative
date in DE + EN. Real LLM round-trip via http://localhost:5173 →
https://llm.mana.how → ollama gemma3:4b. Local mana-llm now reaches
its Ollama backend after the gpu-proxy routing fix in
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bfeeef7819 |
chore(matrix): final scrub of stale matrix references
A grep audit after the previous matrix removal commits found a handful
of stragglers in non-runtime files that the earlier sweeps missed:
- services/mana-llm/CLAUDE.md: removed matrix-ollama-bot from the
consumer-apps diagram and from the related-services table
- services/mana-video-gen/CLAUDE.md: removed "Matrix Bots" integration
bullet
- packages/notify-client/README.md: removed sendMatrix() doc entry
(the method itself was already gone in the prior cleanup)
- docker/grafana/dashboards/logs-explorer.json: dropped the "Matrix
Stack" log row that queried tier="matrix" (would show no data forever)
- docker/grafana/dashboards/master-overview.json: dropped the "Matrix
Bots" stat panel that counted up{job=~"matrix-.*-bot"}
- apps/mana/apps/landing/src/data/ecosystem-health.json: regenerated via
scripts/ecosystem-audit.mjs to drop matrix from the app list, icon
counts, file analytics, top offenders and authGuard missing list
- .gitignore: removed services/matrix-stt-bot/data/ pattern (the
service itself was deleted long ago)
Production-side stragglers also addressed (not in this commit):
- DROP USER synapse on prod Postgres (the parallel cleanup commit
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029c7973ef |
feat(mana/web): pass MANA_LLM_API_KEY from voice parse proxies
The /api/v1/voice/parse-task and /api/v1/voice/parse-habit endpoints forwarded transcripts to mana-llm without an X-API-Key header. This worked against the local mana-llm container (no auth) but silently fell back to the no-LLM path when pointed at gpu-llm.mana.how, which requires an API key — voice quick-add would look like it was running in degraded mode forever with no signal that auth was the cause. Now both endpoints read MANA_LLM_API_KEY from the server-side env and attach it as X-API-Key when present, mirroring the pattern already used by /api/v1/voice/transcribe for mana-stt. When the var is empty the header is omitted, so local Docker setups without auth still work. Plumbing: generate-env.mjs writes MANA_LLM_URL + MANA_LLM_API_KEY into apps/mana/apps/web/.env, .env.development gets the new keys with empty defaults, ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES.md documents the gateway and where to get a key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e337243303 |
test(mana/web): unit tests for voice quick-add matchers + fix habit ranking
Two new test files lock in the matching boundary where free-text LLM hints meet the user's actual workspace data — that's where bugs hide silently. Both matchers are now pure-function-shaped (the production wrappers just feed them Dexie data) so the tests run without fake-indexeddb or any I/O. todo: 16 cases for matchLabelsToTagsPure covering exact / case / diacritic / substring / specificity rules + the "never invent tags" guarantee. habits: 11 cases for matchHabitToTranscript including the word- boundary "Bier vs ausprobiert" false-positive, multi-word matching, and a real bug the test surfaced on the first run: Without specificity ranking, "Tee" would always beat "Grüner Tee" because the first matching habit in input order won. The matcher now collects all candidates and returns the one with the most matched tokens, so multi-word habits beat single-word substrings whenever both could fit the transcript. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8e8b6ac65f |
fix(mana-auth) + chore: rewrite /api/v1/auth/login JWT mint, remove Matrix stack
This commit bundles two unrelated changes that were swept together by an
accidental `git add -A` in another working session. Documented here so the
history reflects what's actually inside.
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
1. fix(mana-auth): /api/v1/auth/login mints JWT via auth.handler instead
of api.signInEmail
═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Previous attempt (commit
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4eb5dfe4a0 |
feat(mana/web): named workbench scenes (Home, Deep Work, …)
Users can now define multiple named layouts of the workbench homepage and switch between them. Each scene holds its own openApps list with per-app window state (minimized / maximized / size). Scene list syncs cross-device via mana-sync; the active scene id is per-device (localStorage) so device A doesn't pull device B into a different scene. - new `workbenchScenes` Dexie table, registered in manaCoreConfig - `workbenchScenesStore` (Dexie liveQuery) with scene CRUD + per-scene app mutations; auto-seeds a default "Home" scene on first run - SceneTabs pill bar above the carousel with dnd reorder + context menu (rename / duplicate / delete); SceneRenameDialog and a reusable ConfirmDialog for the destructive path - workbench +page.svelte refactored to delegate all openApps mutations to the store; the carousel itself is unchanged Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d37483a0f9 |
feat(todo): map LLM topic hints to existing workspace tags
The parse-task endpoint already returns free-text label hints from the
LLM ("steuern", "haushalt", …). Now the todo store fuzzy-matches each
hint against the user's existing tags via tagCollection and assigns
the matched IDs to the task's metadata.labelIds.
Match policy is intentionally conservative:
- Normalize via NFD strip + lowercase + collapsed whitespace
- Exact normalized match wins
- Substring fallback only for ≥3 char strings (avoids "ab" hitting
every tag containing "ab")
- Never auto-creates a tag — even if the LLM is sure, an unknown topic
silently drops, because auto-creating would clutter the user's tag
list with one-off duplicates from voice transcripts
Both flows pick this up: voice always (transcripts almost always carry
topic hints) and typed only when there's structured payoff, same
asymmetry as before — typed quick-add now also enriches when the LLM
just finds a tag match without a date or priority.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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d8da11a4ff |
feat(todo): typed quick-add gets the same LLM enrichment as voice
Press Enter on "Steuererklärung morgen 14 Uhr hoch" and the task lands instantly with your exact text as the title — then a background pass through /api/v1/voice/parse-task swaps in dueDate + priority once mana-llm answers. The title only gets rewritten when the LLM actually finds structured info (dueDate or priority); for plain titles like "Mülltonnen rausstellen" the typed text is left alone, since silently "cleaning up" perfectly fine input is more annoying than helpful. Pulled the parse + STT-then-parse plumbing apart so both flows share parseTaskText() and only differ in policy: voice always applies the LLM title (raw transcripts are noisy), typed only when there's structured payoff. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c32a5a57de |
feat(todo): LLM-parse spoken tasks into title + dueDate + priority
The previous voice quick-add dumped the whole transcript into the task
title — fine for "Steuererklärung" but useless for "Steuererklärung
morgen 14 Uhr hoch", which should land as title="Steuererklärung",
dueDate=tomorrow, priority="high".
New endpoint /api/v1/voice/parse-task posts the transcript to mana-llm
(gemma3:4b, temperature 0) with a tight system prompt that asks for
strict JSON: { title, dueDate, priority, labels }. The endpoint coerces
the response back into the typed shape and falls through to
{ title: transcript, … } whenever anything goes wrong — mana-llm down,
JSON garbled, network timeout. Voice quick-add must never fail harder
than typed quick-add, so the fallback path is the rule, not the
exception.
Labels come back from the LLM as free-text topic hints and don't yet
map to the workspace's tag IDs — fuzzy matching against existing tags
is a follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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b48c9ff80f |
refactor(mana/web): migrate dreams + memoro to /api/v1/voice/transcribe
The per-module /api/v1/memoro/transcribe and /api/v1/dreams/transcribe endpoints were literal copies that proxied to mana-stt. Now that the generic /api/v1/voice/transcribe endpoint exists (added with notes), point both stores at it and delete the duplicates. -200 LOC, one place to update STT auth or response shape from now on. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b841a24e73 |
feat(todo): voice quick-add in workbench ListView via shared <VoiceCaptureBar>
Speak a task and it lands in the list as a placeholder while mana-stt transcribes it; the title swaps in once the transcript returns. No date/priority/label parsing yet — that's a follow-up that needs an LLM pass over the transcript. For now the whole transcript becomes the task title and the user can edit inline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9b3d7c7325 |
feat(notes): voice capture in workbench ListView via shared <VoiceCaptureBar>
Drop a mic into Notes — record, transcribe through the new generic /api/v1/voice/transcribe proxy (mana-stt), then write the result back into the placeholder note. The first transcript line becomes the title when it fits in 80 chars, otherwise a generic 'Sprachnotiz' label. The inline editor refreshes from the live note while the placeholder '…' content is still on screen, so a transcript that arrives a moment after the editor opens shows up automatically without overwriting anything the user has typed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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079cc39dbc |
refactor(mana/web): extract shared <VoiceCaptureBar> for module voice capture
Dreams and Memoro had two literal copies of the MediaRecorder boilerplate plus parallel mic-button markup, error UI, and requireAuth gating. Lift the recorder + bar into $lib/components/voice and add it to the memoro workbench ListView (which had no mic at all). New voice-capture features just drop in <VoiceCaptureBar> with idleLabel/feature/reason/onComplete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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45958ad885 |
feat(mana/web): global requireAuth() gate for guest-blocked features
The unified Mana app runs most modules in a "guest mode": you can
open a module, look around, type a quick note, etc. without an
account. But anything that touches an *encrypted* table (dreams
voice capture, memoro recordings, notes, todo, calendar events, …)
needs the user to be logged in — the encryption vault only unlocks
against a Mana Auth session, and writing to those tables without
it throws `VaultLockedError` at the very last step of the action.
Before this commit, every entry point into an encryption-required
action would silently let the guest go through the whole flow
(record audio, wait for transcription, open the dexie write) and
then explode with a stack-trace error. The user lost work and
didn't know why. The dreams voice capture flow surfaced this
during the 2026-04-08 STT debugging session.
The fix is a global imperative gate: `requireAuth({ feature, reason })`.
Call sites await it before the action; it returns immediately if the
user is already authenticated, otherwise pops a global modal that
asks the guest to log in or cancel. Promise-based, so callers
decide what to do with `false` (silent abort, restore state, own
toast).
$lib/auth/require-auth.svelte.ts new — store + helper
$lib/components/auth/AuthRequiredModal.svelte new — global modal
routes/+layout.svelte mount the modal once
packages/shared-utils/src/analytics.ts new ManaEvents.featureBlockedByAuth
event for conversion tracking
Wired into the two voice-capture entry points that actually exhibited
the bug:
modules/dreams/ListView.svelte → feature: 'dreams-voice-capture'
routes/(app)/memoro/+page.svelte → feature: 'memoro-voice-capture'
Both gate on `requireAuth()` BEFORE the mic permission request, so
guests see the friendly "Konto erforderlich" modal instead of
recording → transcribing → crashing.
Design choices documented in detail in the require-auth.svelte.ts
header comment:
- Imperative function (not a button wrapper component) so it
works in event handlers, store actions, keyboard shortcuts,
drag-drop handlers — anywhere async code runs.
- Single global modal mounted once in the root layout, no
portal/z-index gymnastics; two simultaneous prompts replace
each other (the most recent one wins).
- Checks `authStore.isAuthenticated`, not vault-unlocked state —
the user-facing concept is "I need an account", not "I need
a working encryption vault". Vault-unlock failures (network
error etc.) are a separate bug class with their own UX.
- The modal navigates to `/login?next=<current path>` so the
user lands back on the same page after logging in. The
Promise resolves `false` on navigation; the user re-clicks
the original button after coming back, and the second click
sees `isAuthenticated === true` and proceeds without a modal.
Re-triggering the original action across a navigation cycle
would require restoring half-recorded mic state — not worth
the complexity, and the second click is a clean UX.
How to wire a new entry point (4 lines):
import { requireAuth } from '$lib/auth/require-auth.svelte';
async function handleCreateThing() {
const ok = await requireAuth({
feature: 'create-thing',
reason: 'Things werden verschlüsselt gespeichert. Dafür brauchst du ein Mana-Konto.',
});
if (!ok) return;
// ...existing logic
}
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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2b4494628e |
fix(mana/web): unblock voice capture — permissions policy, notification mount, dev SW
Three independent bugs that conspired to make the dreams + memoro mic
buttons completely unusable in production AND in dev. Each one alone
would have been the only blocker; they layered on top of each other so
fixing the top one just exposed the next.
1. Permissions-Policy header blocked the microphone API entirely.
`packages/shared-utils/src/security-headers.ts` set
`microphone=()` which means "no origin, including self, may use
the microphone". `getUserMedia()` throws a `Permissions policy
violation` and the browser never even shows the permission
dialog — no amount of OS / browser / site settings can override
it because the policy blocks the API at the document level.
Fix: change to `microphone=(self)` so mana.how itself can use
the API. Camera stays disallowed (no module needs it).
2. Notification permission was requested at layout mount time.
`(app)/+layout.svelte` called
`notificationService.requestPermission()` from `onMount()`. Modern
browsers require permission requests to come from a user gesture
— calling it without one queues the prompt until the next click.
That meant the user's FIRST click on any button (in this case the
dreams "Traum sprechen" mic button) showed the queued notifications
prompt instead of the action they actually clicked. Worse,
`getUserMedia()` was then silently dropped because Chrome only
shows one permission dialog at a time.
Fix: remove the mount-time call entirely. Notification permission
must be requested from a button the user explicitly clicks
("Benachrichtigungen aktivieren" toggle in Settings or first time
a reminder is created) — the reminder scheduler still runs without
permission, it just won't fire OS notifications until granted.
3. vite-plugin-pwa registered a service worker in dev that cached
the old layout chunks across reloads, so the fix for #2 was
invisible until the user manually unregistered the SW in DevTools.
`vite-plugin-pwa` defaults `devEnabled: true`, which is a
well-known footgun for fast iteration. Production still gets the
full SW (this only flips dev). The 2026-04-08 mic-button hunt
took an extra hour for exactly this reason.
Fix: pass `devEnabled: false` to createPWAConfig in vite.config.ts.
Verified: in a fresh incognito tab on `localhost:5173/`, opening the
Dreams app in the workbench and clicking the mic button now shows the
microphone permission dialog directly (no notifications hijack), and
recording → transcription works end-to-end against the production
mana-stt service on the GPU box.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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abe0a21966 |
refactor(auth-ui): tighten LoginPage UX, a11y, and dead code
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LoginPage cleanup:
- Drop dev pre-fill credentials and the secret logo-as-button trick
- Remove duplicate in-component theme toggle; accept isDark as a prop and let the (auth) layout's global theme toggle drive it
- Move passkey CTA below the password form so the primary flow stays primary
- Remove the dead "Angemeldet bleiben" checkbox (was bound but never forwarded to onSignIn)
- Fix the skip-to-form link to use sr-only/focus:not-sr-only so it only appears on keyboard focus
- Fix the "oder" divider to render its before/after hairlines by setting an explicit color on the parent
- Wire focus-visible outlines on all interactive controls
- Bump 0.6 → 0.75 opacity on subtitle text for AA contrast
- Drop opacity-60 from the headerControls wrapper
Robustness:
- Track all setTimeout IDs in a Set and clear them in an effect cleanup so navigation away doesn't fire stale callbacks (success redirects, error shake, focus restore)
- Replace (result as any) casts with the new typed AuthResult fields
- New resolveErrorCode() helper prefers result.errorCode and falls back to legacy string matching, so rate-limit / account-lock detection survives i18n
- WebAuthn Conditional UI: on mount, if PublicKeyCredential.isConditionalMediationAvailable(), call onSignInWithPasskey({ conditional: true }) so passkeys appear inline in the email autofill dropdown
- Extract the dismissible success-banner markup into a {#snippet successBanner} and reuse it for the verified / verification-sent / magic-link-sent cases (~50 lines of duplicate JSX out)
Page wrappers:
- login/+page.svelte passes isDark={theme.isDark} so the in-app theme store drives both layouts
- register/+page.svelte wraps trackGuestConversion() in queueMicrotask + try/catch so analytics can never block the success redirect
- Drop the dead baseSignupCredits={25} prop from register/+page.svelte (RegisterPage never accepted it)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a3a47459c6 |
docs(audit): file-bytes encryption implementation plan + audit roll-up
Two changes:
1. New BACKLOG_FILE_BYTES_ENCRYPTION.md captures everything I'd
want to know if I were picking up the file-bytes encryption
work cold in 6 months. ~370 lines, sits next to
DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md for discoverability.
Sections:
- TL;DR + status (deferred, no production impact yet)
- Goal + non-goals
- Threat model delta table (mode-by-mode)
- Architecture: write path with ASCII flow diagram
- Architecture: read path with ASCII flow diagram
- The six hard parts:
1. Web Crypto AES-GCM doesn't stream → chunked-AEAD wrapper
2. Multipart uploads need coordinated chunking (S3 5 MB minimum
vs. our 1 MB AES-GCM chunks)
3. Resumable uploads + key persistence (new _pendingUploads
table for the in-flight content key)
4. No more server-side thumbnails (three options, recommended:
client-side resize before upload)
5. Sharing complicates the trust model (URL-fragment key
sharing, recommended; Mega.nz / Cryptpad pattern)
6. Migration of existing plaintext files (lazy on-read,
recommended)
- Schema delta (sql + Dexie additions)
- File map (~2200 LoC across 9 new files + 3 touched)
- Testing strategy (unit + integration + e2e per layer)
- Out-of-scope items explicitly listed
- Decision criteria for when to actually do this
- Five open questions for whoever picks it up
- Cross-references to related files
The doc is opinionated where I have a defensible recommendation
and explicit about uncertainty where I don't.
2. DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md updates:
- Backlog "Offen" item #1 (File-Bytes-Encryption) now points
directly at the new plan doc with a one-line teaser.
- Backlog "Abgeschlossen" gains a row C for the Conflict
Visualization UI shipped in
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c8ed58b7d1 |
fix(mana,ui): integrate guest nudge into bottom stack + theme it
The "Gefällt es dir?" guest nudge was a free-floating fixed element at bottom: 10rem, so it didn't follow the bottom-stack when the PillNav was collapsed. Move it inside .bottom-stack as the first child so it shares the stack's reflow. NotificationBar now uses the elevation system (--color-surface-elevated, --color-border-strong, --color-foreground) instead of hardcoded rgba so it adapts to all themes. Bumped the CTA button (shadow + hover lift) and container (stronger border, layered shadow) to be more visible. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b3523f8bdc |
chore: cleanup leftover dirs from ManaCore→Mana rename + document apps/api
Removed: - apps/manacore/ — three Svelte files were byte-identical duplicates of the apps/mana/ versions, leftover from the 2025 rename. Untracked .env files in the same dir were also cleared. - 21 empty apps/*/apps/web-archived/ directories — leftover from the unification move, never tracked in git. - services/it-landing/ — empty directory, picked up by the services/* workspace glob for no reason. - apps/news/apps/server-archived/ — empty. Fixed: - scripts/mac-mini/status.sh: COMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME fallback was still manacore-monorepo from before the rename. Documented: - Root CLAUDE.md now describes apps/api/ (the @mana/api unified backend) as a top-level peer to apps/mana/. It was completely missing from the trimmed CLAUDE.md, which made the layout look frontend-only. |
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ed8ab44832 |
feat(sync): conflict visualization with restore-my-version toast
Closes backlog C from the Phase 9 audit. The data layer has had
real field-level LWW since Sprint 1, but when the server's value
beat a local edit, the user had no way to know. This commit adds
the missing UI piece: a toast that appears whenever applyServerChanges
overwrites a non-empty local field with a strictly newer server
value, with a one-click "restore my version" path.
sync.ts — detection
-------------------
Two new exports:
- SyncConflictPayload: per-field overwrite event shape
(tableName, recordId, field, wasLocal, nowServer, localTime,
serverTime).
- subscribeSyncConflicts(listener): in-module pub/sub. Returns
an unsubscribe function.
Both LWW branches in applyServerChanges (insert-as-update and the
canonical update-with-fields path) now call notifyConflict() when:
1. The server time is STRICTLY greater (not equal) than the local
field time → there's actually an edit window to lose
2. The local field value is non-null/undefined → user actually
typed something to overwrite
3. The values are not equal (cheap JSON-string compare for objects,
=== for primitives) → there's a real change, not an idempotent
server replay
Why a custom registry instead of CustomEvent + window.dispatchEvent?
The existing sync-telemetry + quota-detect helpers use
window.dispatchEvent which doesn't work in node-based vitest envs
(no DOM EventTarget). The conflict bus is small enough that a plain
Set<listener> is simpler than polyfilling EventTarget — and the
node test path matters because we need automated coverage of the
detection logic.
conflict-store.svelte.ts — UI state
-----------------------------------
Svelte 5 $state-backed store with three responsibilities:
1. Coalescing: a SyncConflict is keyed by `${tableName}|${recordId}`,
so a burst of N field-overwrites on the same record collapses
into ONE toast with all affected fields underneath. The original
wasLocal value is preserved across coalescing (we don't clobber
the user's first typed value if a later field event arrives).
2. Auto-dismiss: each conflict has a 30s TTL after which it
evicts itself. Manual dismiss trumps the timer.
3. Restore: writes wasLocal back to Dexie with a fresh updatedAt
that beats the server's serverTime, plus a __fieldTimestamps
patch so the field-LWW pass on the next sync round will let
our value win. Deferred via setTimeout(0) so it lands AFTER
applyServerChanges releases its per-table apply lock — running
before the lock release would silently drop the restore (the
hook suppression is per-table-set, not per-record).
FIFO eviction at MAX_VISIBLE=8 keeps a bursty server from growing
the visible array unbounded.
SyncConflictToast.svelte — the UI
---------------------------------
Mounts globally in +layout.svelte. Stacks bottom-right above the
OfflineIndicator. Each toast shows:
- Module label ("Aufgabe", "Notiz", "Termin", …) derived from a
table-name → German label map. Unknown tables fall through to
the bare table name.
- Field count summary ("Feld »title«" / "3 Felder") — we
deliberately do NOT render the actual values because some are
encrypted blobs and decrypting them in the toast would be
significant complexity for marginal UX gain. The user knows
what they were just editing.
- Two buttons: "Wiederherstellen" (calls conflictStore.restore)
and "Behalten" (calls dismiss).
Slide-in animation, dark-mode-aware styling, role="alertdialog"
for accessibility.
Wiring
------
data-layer-listeners.ts:
- Imports installConflictListener from conflict-store
- Calls it from installDataLayerListeners() right after the
quota + telemetry handlers
- Adds the disposeConflict() call to the cleanup return
+layout.svelte:
- Imports SyncConflictToast and mounts it next to SuggestionToast
so it inherits the same global-overlay positioning context
Tests
-----
Five new integration tests in sync.test.ts cover:
- Fires when server overwrites a non-empty local field with a
strictly newer value
- Does NOT fire when local field is null/undefined (no edit to lose)
- Does NOT fire when values are equal (idempotent replay)
- Fires once per overwritten field on a multi-field update
- Does NOT fire on a timestamp tie (LWW lets server win silently
when there's no real edit window)
All 25 sync tests + 138 total data-layer tests pass. The new
captureConflicts() helper subscribes via subscribeSyncConflicts()
which works in the node-vitest env without needing a DOM polyfill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fe3fc9e7e2 |
docs: trim CLAUDE.md files — remove stale + duplicated guidance
Root CLAUDE.md: 1138 → 169 lines. Removed ghost apps-archived list, Supabase env examples, duplicate mana-auth row, contradictory "Code Quality TODO" block. Pushed search/storage/database/landing/manascore howtos out to docs/ + .claude/guidelines/ pointers. apps/mana/CLAUDE.md: 259 → 175 lines. Dropped non-existent workbench/ route from the routing diagram. Folded the auth section into a pointer to root + the mana-specific current-user stamping pattern. Merged the two module-system sections. Kept the data-flow ASCII diagram and the encryption 3-step workflow (the part you actually need while writing stores). |
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142a65a22f |
docs: Phase 9 documentation roundup — close encryption-shaped doc gaps
Five documentation surfaces gained encryption awareness in this
sweep. Before this commit, the only place anyone could learn about
the at-rest encryption layer or the zero-knowledge opt-in was the
internal DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md. New contributors and self-hosters
would never discover one of the most important features of the
product just by reading the standard onboarding docs.
apps/docs/src/content/docs/architecture/security.mdx (NEW)
----------------------------------------------------------
First-class user-facing security page in the Starlight site,
slotted into the Architecture sidebar between Authentication and
Backend.
Sections:
- What's encrypted (overview table of 27 modules + the
intentional plaintext carve-outs)
- Standard mode flow with ASCII diagram
- "What Mana CAN see" trust statements per mode
- Zero-knowledge mode setup walkthrough (Steps component)
- Unlock flow on a new device
- Recovery code rotation
- Deployment requirements (the loud MANA_AUTH_KEK warning)
- Audit trail action vocabulary
- Threat model summary table
- Implementation file references with paths
services/mana-auth/CLAUDE.md
----------------------------
New "Encryption Vault" section under Key Endpoints, listing all 7
routes (status, init, key, rotate, recovery-wrap GET+DELETE,
zero-knowledge) with their HTTP method, path, error codes, and a
description. Mentions the three CHECK constraints + RLS + audit
table. Points readers at DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md and the new
security.mdx for the deep dive.
Environment Variables block gains MANA_AUTH_KEK with a multi-line
comment explaining the openssl rand command + dev fallback warning.
apps/mana/CLAUDE.md
-------------------
Full rewrite. The existing file was from the Supabase era and
described things like @supabase/ssr, safeGetSession(), and a
five-table schema with users + organizations + teams that doesn't
exist any more. Replaced with the unified-app architecture:
- Module system layout (collections.ts / queries.ts / stores/)
- Mana Auth (Better Auth + EdDSA JWT) instead of Supabase
- Local-first data layer with the full pipeline diagram
- At-rest encryption section with the "when writing module code
that touches sensitive fields" 4-step guide
- Updated routing structure (no more separate /organizations,
/teams routes)
- Module store pattern code example
- Reference document table at the bottom pointing at the audit,
the new security.mdx, and the auth doc
Root CLAUDE.md
--------------
New "At-Rest Encryption (Phase 1–9)" subsection under the
Local-First Architecture section. Two-mode trust summary table,
production requirement for MANA_AUTH_KEK with the openssl command,
the "when writing module code" 4-step guide, and a reference
table. New contributors reading the root CLAUDE.md from top to
bottom now hit encryption naturally as part of the data layer
discussion.
.env.macmini.example
--------------------
MANA_AUTH_KEK was missing from the production env example
entirely — the macmini deployment would silently boot on the
32-zero-byte dev fallback if you copied this file. Added with a
multi-paragraph comment covering: how to generate, why it's
required, how to store securely (Docker secrets / KMS / Vault),
and the rotation caveat.
apps/docs/src/content/docs/deployment/self-hosting.mdx
------------------------------------------------------
Two changes:
1. Added MANA_AUTH_KEK to the mana-auth service block in the
Compose example with an inline comment pointing at the new
section below.
2. New "Encryption Vault Setup" H2 section with subsections:
- Generating a KEK (with a fake example value labelled DO NOT
USE — generate your own)
- Securing the KEK (Docker secrets, KMS, systemd
LoadCredential, anti-patterns)
- "What if I lose the KEK?" — explains the data is
unrecoverable by design and mitigation via zero-knowledge
mode opt-in
- KEK rotation — calls out the missing background re-wrap
job as a known limitation
apps/docs/astro.config.mjs
--------------------------
Added "Security & Encryption" entry to the Architecture sidebar
between Authentication and Backend so the new page is reachable
from the docs nav.
Astro check: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 hints across 4 .astro files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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b961453244 |
docs(audit): roll up Phase 9 backlog sweep
Marks the four backlog items closed in this session — vault service
integration tests, recovery code rotation, pre-wired insert helpers
for future server-pushed records, and boards/boardItems encryption.
Updates the encrypted-tables list to 27 tables.
Updates
-------
1. Sprint table grows by 4 rows (BL1, BL2, BL3+4, BL5) with the
four backlog commits.
2. Test-Status line bumped:
21 web test files → 21 web + 2 mana-auth
78 vitest crypto tests + 39 bun mana-auth tests
"25+ tables" → "27 tables" (boards + boardItems added)
3. Section 5 encrypted-tables list grows by:
- boards (name, description)
- boardItems (textContent, only when itemType === 'text')
Both labelled "9 BL" in the Phase column to mark them as
backlog-sweep additions.
4. "Tabellen ohne Encryption (bewusst)" subsection: removed the
stale "boards/boardItems are a candidate for later" entry —
they're encrypted now. Added a redirect note pointing readers
at Section 6 where the actual decision is recorded.
5. Section 6 ("Backlog") completely restructured. The flat
"in priority order" list became two subsections:
"Abgeschlossen (Phase 9 Follow-Up Sweep)" — table with the four
commits + a one-line "what" notice each. Item 3+4 is explicitly
marked as a re-frame: the original "server pushes plaintext"
risk turned out to overstate the problem because the
generate/upload UIs are TODO stubs. The fix was pre-wired
insert() helpers, not a server-side rewrite.
"Offen" — five remaining items, reordered:
1. File-Bytes-Encryption (NEW: surfaced as "#4b" while
documenting that filesStore.insert() only protects metadata)
2. Image-Generation / File-Upload Wire-Up (NEW: ensures the
future UIs go through the helpers from #3+4)
3. Conflict Visualization UI (unchanged)
4. Composite Indexes für Multi-Account (unchanged)
5. V3 Migration Tests (unchanged)
6. Eckdaten line bumped from "25+ Tabellen aktiv" to "27 Tabellen
aktiv". Best Practices line for ZK gets the "+ rotate im
Active-State-Support" suffix.
7. Last-update header bumped to today.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a7e5b39ad0 |
feat(picture): encrypt boards + boardItems
Closes backlog #5 from the Phase 9 audit. Adds two new registry entries (boards, boardItems) and wraps the boards store + queries + search provider so the moodboard names, descriptions and text-item content are sealed at rest like every other user-typed field. Registry -------- - boards: ['name', 'description'] - boardItems: ['textContent'] Inline comments explain that textContent is only set when itemType === 'text' (image-type items have it null, encryptRecord is a pass-through). Coordinates / dimensions / z-index / opacity stay plaintext for the canvas renderer. Boards store ------------ - createBoard: snapshots plaintext for the return value before encryptRecord mutates the row in place - updateBoard: encrypts the diff before update, then re-fetches + decrypts for the return value (so the caller gets plaintext, not the ciphertext we just wrote) - duplicateBoard: NEW behaviour — explicitly decrypts the original board first because the duplicate concatenates "(Kopie)" onto the name string. Concatenating onto a "enc:1:..." prefix would produce a malformed blob that fails to decrypt later. The board items are spread directly because the duplicate uses the SAME master key, so the existing ciphertext stays valid; encryptRecord is idempotent on already-encrypted strings so it's a no-op safety check. Reads ----- - useAllBoards: decrypts the visible board set before mapping. The item count map only reads structural fields (deletedAt + boardId) so it doesn't need a decrypt pass for boardItems. - allBoards$ raw observable: same pattern - search/providers/picture: decrypts before substring scoring against the user query The unified mana app currently has no UI that renders boardItems .textContent (the seed data in collections.ts is exported as PICTURE_GUEST_SEED but never imported anywhere — dead code), so no item-side reader needs touching for this commit. When a future canvas editor lands it'll go through the existing decryptRecord helpers naturally. 78/78 crypto tests still pass (registry shape unchanged at the API level). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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109de61e21 |
feat(picture,storage): pre-wired insert helpers for future generate/upload flows
Closes backlog #3+4 from the Phase 9 audit. The original framing —
"server-pushed records bypass client-side encryption" — turned out
to overstate the problem after a code audit:
- apps/mana/apps/web/src/routes/(app)/picture/generate/+page.svelte
is currently a TODO stub. The handleGenerate() function returns
"requires connection to Picture-Server (port 3006)" without
inserting anything.
- There is no fileTable.add() call site anywhere in the unified
mana app. File uploads still happen via the standalone storage
server in apps/storage and arrive via legacy mana-sync push.
So the production code path that would write plaintext images or
files to the user's IndexedDB doesn't yet exist. The risk only
materialises when someone wires up the in-app generate / upload
UI in the unified app.
The right action is to leave behind a clearly-labelled, encryption-
aware insert() helper on each store so the future implementation
has an obvious "do the right thing" path to call. This commit does
exactly that.
picture/stores/images.svelte.ts
-------------------------------
New imagesStore.insert(image: LocalImage) method:
- Calls encryptRecord('images', image) to seal `prompt` +
`negativePrompt` (the two registered encrypted fields)
- Calls imageTable().add(image)
- Fires the PictureEvents.imageCreated analytic (replaces the
old plain-table-add path)
A long doc comment on the method explains the architectural
reasoning: the server cannot encrypt under the user's master key
(the key only lives in the browser), so the generation flow MUST
round-trip through the client store even if the AI call itself
happens server-side. The pattern is documented as:
1. Client posts { prompt, negativePrompt, ... } to image-gen API
2. Server returns { storagePath, generationId, dimensions, ... }
3. Client calls imagesStore.insert(...) with both halves
4. encryptRecord seals the prompt fields before the IndexedDB write
The mixed-state guarantee from picture/queries.ts already covers
the migration window where some images came in via legacy
server-side push and others through this path — decryptRecord
passes plaintext through and unwraps ciphertext blobs.
storage/stores/files.svelte.ts
------------------------------
New filesStore.insert(file: LocalFile) method:
- Calls encryptRecord('files', file) to seal `name` +
`originalName`
- Calls fileTable.add(file)
Same architectural reasoning applies. The doc comment also flags a
SEPARATE concern that this commit does NOT address: encrypting the
actual file *bytes* on S3 (so the storage provider can't read the
content) needs streaming AES-GCM and is a much bigger lift. Tracked
as "backlog #4b" in the comment for whoever picks it up next.
(No analytic call yet on the storage side because StorageEvents
doesn't have a fileUploaded() event — the upload UI is unbuilt, so
adding the analytic event is up to whoever lands the UI.)
Pre-existing TS error on line 46 of images.svelte.ts (the
`toggleField(imageTable(), ...)` Drizzle/Dexie type variance bug)
is unchanged — it predates Phase 9 and is not introduced by this
commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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24001e9545 |
feat(vault): rotate recovery code while zero-knowledge is active
Closes backlog #2 from the Phase 9 audit. Lets a user replace their recovery code without going through the disable→generate→re-enable dance. Works in BOTH standard and zero-knowledge modes. vault-client ------------ New rotateRecoveryCode() method on the VaultClient interface. Returns RecoveryCodeSetupResult, identical shape to setupRecoveryCode. Branches on the current vault state via getStatus(): Standard mode: Re-fetches the plaintext MK from the server (same path as the initial setupRecoveryCode), generates a fresh 32-byte recovery secret, derives the new wrap key via HKDF, seals the MK, posts the wrap to /recovery-wrap (idempotent server-side, replaces the existing row in place). Zero-knowledge mode: Server can't hand out the plaintext MK any more, so we use the cachedUnwrappedMkBytes that unlockWithRecoveryCode stashed when the user typed in their old recovery code earlier this session. Throws with a clear message if the cache is empty (e.g. user landed on the page via init rather than recovery-unlock): "sign out and back in with your current recovery code first" so the cache gets repopulated. Both branches: - Wipe the raw MK reference after sealing - Wipe the recovery secret after format - Return the formatted code for the UI to display The OLD recovery code is now permanently invalid. Using it on a future unlock attempt will fail with the standard generic "wrong recovery code" error. Settings UI ----------- New rotateStep state machine ('idle' / 'rotated') runs alongside the existing zkSetupStep so the user can rotate without leaving the active-state UI. In the active-mode card (zkSetupStep === 'enabled'): - Two side-by-side buttons: "🔁 Recovery-Code rotieren" + "Zero-Knowledge-Modus wieder deaktivieren …" - When the user clicks rotate, handleRotateRecoveryCode() runs the flow and renders an inline "Neuer Recovery-Code" subsection (same .recovery-code monospace block + Copy button as the initial setup) with explicit warning that the old code is now invalid. - "Ich habe den neuen Code gesichert" button wipes the displayed code and drops back to idle. - The disable flow stays available (the rotate UI hides itself when the user has clicked into the disable confirmation path). The 28 vault integration tests still pass (39 total in encryption-vault/, including the existing 11 KEK tests). The new rotateRecoveryCode method reuses the already-tested setRecoveryWrap server endpoint, so no new server-side tests are needed for this commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ea165c8b46 |
docs(audit): roll up Phase 9 in DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md
Marks the Zero-Knowledge opt-in as live and documents the new
architecture surface so future readers can understand the trust
model without spelunking through six commits.
Updates
-------
1. Sprint table grows from Phase 1–8 to Phase 1–9, adds the six new
commits (4 milestones + 2 follow-ups: status endpoint + lock-screen
modal). Test count bumped from 262 to 284 (22 new in recovery.test.ts).
2. Section 5 "Encryption Pipeline" reworked:
- "Wer hält was?" now has TWO tables — Standard-Modus and
Zero-Knowledge-Modus — making the trust model difference explicit
- New "Recovery-Code-Pipeline" subsection with two ASCII flow
diagrams (setup + unlock) showing every step from "user clicks
button" to "MK in MemoryKeyProvider"
- New "Schlüssel- + Datei-Kette für Phase 9" table mapping each
code path to its file
3. "Was Mana technisch (nicht) sehen kann" rewritten to compare both
modes side by side. Standard mode keeps the existing
"theoretically decryptable by KEK operator" disclosure;
zero-knowledge mode is upgraded to a hard "computationally
incapable" guarantee — and the trade-off ("Recovery-Code lost =
data lost") is called out explicitly. The DB CHECK constraint
that enforces "ZK active ⇒ recovery wrap exists" is mentioned as
the schema-level safety net.
4. Backlog reordered. Phase 9 is no longer listed as an open item;
the only true-zero-knowledge follow-up is now item #1 (service
tests against real Postgres for the four new vault methods,
analogous to the existing kek.test.ts pattern but needing a
container DB). Items 2–8 are unchanged from the previous
roundup.
5. Eckdaten + Best Practices + final production-grade summary all
reflect the new ZK opt-in. Schwachstelle #4 row updated to
"Phase 1–9".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a48b2d5841 |
feat(layout): lock-screen recovery code unlock modal
Closes the second Phase 9 follow-up. When a user has zero-knowledge
mode active and signs in on a new device (or after a session expiry),
the layout's vault-unlock effect lands in the new
'awaiting-recovery-code' state. Previously this was a dead end —
the layout just logged a warning and the rest of the app sat with a
locked vault.
This commit adds the missing UI piece: a non-dismissable modal that
mounts whenever the unlock effect signals 'awaiting-recovery-code'.
RecoveryCodeUnlockModal component
---------------------------------
- Reads the singleton vault client via getVaultClient()
- Single text input + submit button
- On submit:
1. Calls vaultClient.unlockWithRecoveryCode(input)
2. On success: clears input, calls onUnlocked() prop → parent
hides the modal, app boots normally
3. On RecoveryCodeFormatError: shows a format hint
4. On any other error (wrong code OR corrupted blob — surfaced
uniformly so an attacker can't distinguish): shows
"Recovery-Code falsch, prüfe deine Eingabe"
- Non-dismissable: there's no Cancel button. Without the recovery
code the app cannot read encrypted data and would just sit in a
half-broken state. The user can sign out from the header (the
auth flow runs above the encryption layer) if they need to bail.
- Help text at the bottom is honest about the irreversible nature
of losing the recovery code.
Layout integration
------------------
+layout.svelte:
- Imports the modal
- New `needsRecoveryCode = $state(false)` flag
- The vault-unlock effect now switches on three branches instead
of just success/failure:
'unlocked' → needsRecoveryCode = false
'awaiting-recovery-code' → needsRecoveryCode = true (mount modal)
anything else → console.warn (unchanged)
- Logout path also resets needsRecoveryCode so the modal doesn't
leak across sessions
- {#if needsRecoveryCode} mounts the component at the bottom of
the markup (above the existing global toasts and banners)
The autofocus warning is suppressed via svelte-ignore — the input
needs immediate focus because it's the only thing the user can
interact with on this surface, and screen-reader users will hear
the modal's accessible name from the role="dialog" + aria-labelledby
binding.
End-to-end smoke flow that now works:
1. User goes to /settings/security on Device A, enables ZK
2. User signs out, signs back in on Device B
3. Layout effect calls vaultClient.unlock() → server returns
recovery blob → vaultClient state goes to awaiting-recovery-code
4. Modal mounts, user pastes their recovery code from password
manager
5. unlockWithRecoveryCode runs the inline AES-GCM unwrap, imports
the MK as non-extractable, caches the bytes for a future
disable, transitions to 'unlocked'
6. Modal calls onUnlocked → layout dismisses modal → rest of the
app boots and renders decrypted data
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
78d949d051 |
feat(crypto): vault status endpoint + settings page hydration
Closes the Phase 9 Milestone 4 known limitation where the settings
page always started in 'idle' state regardless of whether the user
had already enabled zero-knowledge mode. Adds a cheap server-side
status read + hydrates the page on mount.
Server side
-----------
New VaultStatus interface and getStatus(userId) method on
EncryptionVaultService — single SELECT against encryption_vaults,
no decryption, no audit logging (this gets called on every settings
page mount and we don't want to flood the audit log with read-only
metadata fetches). Returns sane defaults when the vault row doesn't
exist yet so the client can avoid a 404 dance.
GET /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/status →
{
vaultExists: boolean,
hasRecoveryWrap: boolean,
zeroKnowledge: boolean,
recoverySetAt: string | null
}
Client side
-----------
vault-client.ts gains a `getStatus()` method that bypasses the
fetchVault retry helper (status reads should be cheap and one-shot;
if they fail we let the caller fall back to defaults). Re-exports
VaultStatus + RecoveryCodeSetupResult from the crypto barrel.
settings/security/+page.svelte
------------------------------
onMount kicks off a getStatus() call. Two things change based on
the response:
1. If the server says zero_knowledge=true, jump zkSetupStep to
'enabled' so the page renders the active-state UI directly
instead of the setup flow.
2. New `hasRecoveryWrap` state tracks whether a wrap is stored,
even if ZK isn't active yet. The idle branch now has TWO
variants:
- hasRecoveryWrap=false: original "Recovery-Code einrichten"
single button (unchanged from milestone 4)
- hasRecoveryWrap=true: amber notice "you have a code stored
but ZK isn't active" with three buttons:
* "Zero-Knowledge jetzt aktivieren" (jumps straight to the
enable call)
* "Neuen Recovery-Code generieren" (rotates the wrap)
* "Recovery-Code entfernen" (with two-click confirmation,
calls DELETE /recovery-wrap)
This handles the previously-orphaned state where a user generated a
code, copied it to their password manager, but never confirmed the
final activation step. Without this branch, after a reload the
settings page would show "Setup" again and the call would fail
with "vault is already in zero-knowledge mode" — except it wouldn't,
because the vault wasn't actually in ZK yet, just had a recovery wrap
stored. Either way the state was confusing.
handleSetupRecoveryCode + handleClearRecoveryCode now keep
hasRecoveryWrap in sync after the round trip.
Fail-quiet on getStatus error: if the network/auth/server-side fetch
fails, the page stays at the idle default. The user can still run
the setup flow, and any inconsistencies surface via the usual
server-side error responses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
|
56312ff579 |
feat(settings): phase 9 milestone 4 — zero-knowledge UI section
Adds the user-facing setup + management surface for the Phase 9 recovery code + zero-knowledge opt-in. Lives in /settings/security between the Rotate and Honest-disclosure cards. Three-step setup flow --------------------- Step 1 — Generate Single button "Recovery-Code einrichten". Disabled unless the vault is currently unlocked. Clicks call vaultClient.setupRecoveryCode() which mints a fresh 32-byte secret, derives the wrap key, posts the sealed wrap to /recovery-wrap, and returns the formatted code. Step 2 — Display + copy Shows the formatted code (1A2B-3C4D-...) in a monospace, user- selectable block with a 📋 Copy button. Explicit warning: "Wir zeigen ihn dir nur ein einziges Mal." User clicks "Ich habe den Code gesichert" to advance. Step 3 — Confirm User has to type (or paste) the code back into a verification input. Comparison is case-insensitive and ignores dashes/whitespace on both sides so format jitter doesn't punish them. Mismatch shows a clear inline error and stays in the same step. Step 4 — Activate Final danger confirmation: "Wenn du jetzt aktivierst, löscht der Server seine Kopie deines Schlüssels." Click → vaultClient. enableZeroKnowledge() → server NULLs out wrapped_mk + wrap_iv, state flips to 'enabled', generatedCode is wiped from the closure. Active state ------------ After enable, the section shows a green "✅ Zero-Knowledge-Modus aktiv" panel with a "Disable" button. Disabling needs an unlocked vault (the cached MK bytes from the recovery-code unlock get sent back to the server for KEK re-wrapping). Two-click confirmation guards the destructive call. State machine ------------- zkSetupStep: 'idle' → 'generated' → 'confirming' → 'enabling' → 'enabled' plus a `handleResetSetup` escape that clears the in-flight code + input + error and drops back to 'idle' from any step. Known limitation: the page state doesn't survive a reload — there is no GET /encryption-vault/status endpoint yet to query the server's current zero_knowledge flag, so on a fresh page load we always start at 'idle' regardless of whether ZK is actually on. A future commit will add the status endpoint + an onMount call to hydrate zkSetupStep correctly. For now, the existing 'awaiting-recovery-code' badge from milestone 3 covers the lock- screen path, and the dashboard sets the right initial state at unlock time. Status badge fix from milestone 3 (statusBadge() handling the new 'awaiting-recovery-code' variant) is reused here. Styles ------ .zk-error — light red bordered alert for inline errors .zk-actions — flex row of buttons (wraps on mobile) .zk-step — bordered group with the step heading .recovery-code — monospace, user-select:all so click+copy works .recovery-input — monospace input for the confirm step .btn-ghost — transparent border-less variant for "Abbrechen" Dark-mode handling for the new surfaces is in the existing media query block. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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6de01937cf |
feat(vault-client): phase 9 milestone 3 — recovery + zero-knowledge flows
Extends the browser-side vault client with five new methods that
mirror the server-side Phase 9 routes, plus a new
`awaiting-recovery-code` state that pauses the unlock mid-flow
when the server is in zero-knowledge mode.
VaultUnlockState gains a fourth variant
---------------------------------------
| { status: 'awaiting-recovery-code' }
This is the state the client sits in between calling unlock()
(which received a recovery blob from GET /key) and the user typing
their recovery code into the UI. The settings page status badge
got updated to render this case as "🔑 Recovery-Code erforderlich".
New closure state inside createVaultClient
------------------------------------------
- pendingRecoveryBlob: stash for the recovery wrap returned by
GET /key in zero-knowledge mode. unlockWithRecoveryCode reads
from here so the second round of input doesn't need a re-fetch.
- cachedUnwrappedMkBytes: kept ONLY when the vault was unlocked
via the recovery code path AND the user might want to disable
zero-knowledge later (which needs to hand the MK back to the
server for KEK re-wrapping). The standard unlock path leaves
this null because the server already has the KEK wrap. Wiped
on lock(), on disable success, and on any state transition
that destroys the master key.
Modified existing methods
-------------------------
- unlock(): branches on the response shape. If the server returns
a recovery blob (zero-knowledge mode), stash it via
awaitRecoveryCode() and return state='awaiting-recovery-code'.
Otherwise unwrap as before. Same fork applies to the /init
fallback path.
- rotate(): if the server somehow returned a ZK shape (it should
never — rotate is forbidden in ZK mode server-side), bail with
a server error instead of silently misinterpreting bytes.
- lock(): also clears pendingRecoveryBlob + wipes
cachedUnwrappedMkBytes.
New methods (all wired into the returned VaultClient)
-----------------------------------------------------
- setupRecoveryCode(): generates a fresh 32-byte recovery secret,
derives the wrap key, re-fetches the active master key in
extractable form, seals it, posts to /recovery-wrap, returns
the formatted recovery code for the UI to display. Wipes both
raw byte references after the seal. Caller is responsible for
clearing the formatted string from memory once the user has
confirmed they backed it up.
- clearRecoveryCode(): DELETE /recovery-wrap. Server enforces the
"not while ZK is active" rule.
- enableZeroKnowledge(): POST /zero-knowledge { enable: true }.
Maps RECOVERY_WRAP_MISSING server response to a clear "set up
a recovery code first" client error.
- disableZeroKnowledge(): POST /zero-knowledge { enable: false,
masterKey: base64 }. Reads the cached MK bytes, base64-encodes,
sends. Wipes the cache after success.
- unlockWithRecoveryCode(code): completes the flow that started
in unlock(). Parses the user-typed code (RecoveryCodeFormatError
bubbles up if the shape is wrong), derives the wrap key, runs a
single inline AES-GCM decrypt on the stashed blob (yields both
the raw bytes for the cache AND a non-extractable runtime key
for the provider), wipes raw bytes, transitions to 'unlocked'.
Generic error message on failure ("wrong recovery code or
corrupted vault") so an attacker can't distinguish wrong-code
from tampered-blob. Stays in 'awaiting-recovery-code' on
failure so the user can retry without a re-fetch.
Drive-by stale test fix
-----------------------
aes.test.ts had an assertion from Phase 1 that `tasks` and `events`
return null because they were on enabled:false. Phase 7.1 flipped
both tables on, so the assertion has been failing since that
commit. Replaced the test with a stable negative case
(non-existent table name) that doesn't shift with each rollout
phase.
Test results: 78/78 crypto tests pass after the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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171fbd18be |
chore(mana/web): pre-launch module cleanup — schema collapse, dead code, lazy search
Six independent pre-launch tidy-ups bundled because they all touch
the same module-layer surface and the larger commit reads more
clearly than six adjacent two-line PRs.
1. database.ts schema v1–v10 collapsed into a single canonical
db.version(1). The system has no live users yet, so dropping the
versioned migration history is the cheapest moment to do it.
The post-collapse Dexie table set is provably identical to the
pre-collapse state (asserted by module-registry.test.ts).
Removed: EMOJI_TO_ICON map + v2 upgrade, v3 timeBlocks data
migration (~250 LOC of one-shot code), versions 4-10.
Also dropped the @deprecated `setApplyingServerChanges()` shim
(replaced by `beginApplyingTables()` weeks ago, no callers).
2. LocalLabel @deprecated alias renamed to TaskTag in the todo
module and all 11 consumers (board-views, ListView, DetailView,
QuickAddTask, +page.svelte). The alias was annotated @deprecated
but had eleven live consumers — exactly the worst kind of dead
code, the one that grows accidental new consumers via autocomplete
the longer it stays. Renamed to TaskTag rather than `Tag` to
avoid colliding with the `Tag` icon from `@mana/shared-icons`.
3. labelsStore backward-compat alias deleted from todo/stores —
pure dead code with zero consumers.
4. EMOJI_TO_ICON_MAP fallback in habits/queries removed. The
constant only existed as the in-memory equivalent of the v2
schema migration that was just deleted; once no record can have
the old `emoji` field, the fallback can never fire.
5. useAllEvents() in calendar/queries removed. JSDoc itself called
it out as "for backward compatibility with calendar-specific
views" — zero external consumers, only the barrel referenced it.
6. $lib/stores/tags.svelte.ts re-export shim deleted. It was a
20-line pure re-export from @mana/shared-stores with the explicit
header "for backward compatibility with existing imports".
Thirteen importers (todo/calendar/contacts/places/zitare ListView
+ DetailView, plus +layout.svelte and the calendar/contacts/tags
route +page.svelte files) rewritten to import directly.
7. SearchRegistry got `registerLazy(appId, loader)` and the eleven
per-app providers now register via dynamic `import()`. Spotlight
search is opened on demand, so the eleven provider chunks stay
out of the initial JS bundle until the user actually searches.
Sister benefit: a search filtered to a single appId only loads
that one provider.
The structural backbone for all of this — the per-module
`module.config.ts` files plus `module-registry.{ts,test.ts}` — was
committed earlier in
|
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3a473897ec |
chore(mana/web): pre-launch cleanup — remove ghost backend API clients
Twelve `*-api.mana.how` Cloudflare hostnames (todo, calendar, contacts, chat, storage, cards, music, picture, presi, zitare, clock, context) plus their matching `lib/api/services/*.ts` clients still existed in the unified web app even though the per-app HTTP backends had been gone since the local-first migration. Their tunnel routes pointed at ports nothing listened on, so every consumer call returned 502 — and the corresponding `__PUBLIC_*_API_URL__` runtime variables were silently injected into every page render. The only live consumer was `qrExportService` (committed separately as part of the rewrite to read directly from Dexie). Two admin / data- management pages also imported the types but were already migrated to the unified `adminService` / `myDataService` clients. Removed: - Twenty-four files deleted: the twelve `lib/api/services/*.ts` clients plus their `*.test.ts` siblings. - `services/index.ts` collapsed from a thirteen-symbol re-export to just the four genuinely server-bound services (`adminService`, `landing`, `myDataService`, `qrExportService`). - `hooks.server.ts` no longer reads or injects any of the twelve `__PUBLIC_*_API_URL__` runtime variables, and the CSP `connect-src` list shrank by the same amount. Memoro server URL also removed since the unified `memoro` module is fully local-first and never hit the standalone server (the docker-compose service stays defined for the mobile app). - `routes/status/+page.server.ts` stops probing the dead per-app health endpoints — only `auth`, `sync`, `uload-server`, `media` and `llm` remain in the public status page. The cloudflared tunnel ingress entries for these hostnames were also removed in `~/.cloudflared/config.yml` on the Mac Mini (not in this repo) so the formerly-502 responses now return 404 from the edge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c27cb84f28 |
fix(mana/web): bundle rrule into SSR build to fix /calendar 500
`rrule@2.8.1` ships dual CJS/ESM builds but its `package.json` has no
`exports` field, so the SvelteKit Node adapter resolves it to the CJS
bundle at runtime. The named import `import { RRule } from 'rrule'`
then throws `SyntaxError: Named export 'RRule' not found` whenever
`/calendar` SSRs, which crashed every render of the route in production.
Adding `'rrule'` to `ssr.noExternal` forces Vite to bundle rrule into
the server output, where its CJS↔ESM interop layer handles the named
import correctly. The source files using rrule (`time-blocks/recurrence.ts`
and `calendar/components/CustomRecurrenceBuilder.svelte`) need no change.
Surfaced via the rebuilt `health-check.sh` ingress walk after a
postgres restart cycle pushed mana-app-web into a 500 state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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2f48f867f1 |
feat(crypto): phase 9 milestone 1 — recovery code primitives
Foundation for the zero-knowledge opt-in. New crypto/recovery.ts
provides the user-held secret half of the Phase 9 design:
- generateRecoverySecret() — 32 random bytes (256 bits) from Web
Crypto CSPRNG
- formatRecoveryCode() — renders raw bytes as 16 dash-separated
groups of 4 uppercase hex chars: "1A2B-3C4D-5E6F-..." (79 chars
total). Copy-pasteable, password-manager-friendly, no language
dependency.
- parseRecoveryCode() — tolerant inverse: strips whitespace + any
dash placement, accepts mixed case, throws RecoveryCodeFormatError
on wrong length / non-hex (no position-leaking errors)
- deriveRecoveryWrapKey() — HKDF-SHA256 with empty salt + versioned
info "mana-recovery-v1" → non-extractable AES-GCM-256 wrap key.
HKDF (not PBKDF2/scrypt) because the input already has full 256
bits of entropy — no slow KDF needed.
- wrapMasterKeyWithRecovery() — exports the master key bytes,
AES-GCM-encrypts with the recovery wrap key, returns base64
ciphertext + IV ready for the server. Wipes the raw MK reference
immediately after sealing.
- unwrapMasterKeyWithRecovery() — inverse, returns a non-extractable
CryptoKey. Throws uniformly on wrong code / tampered ciphertext —
the UI maps both to "wrong recovery code" so an attacker gets no
side-channel signal about which check failed.
Why hex over BIP-39?
- No 2048-word wordlist to bundle (~17 KB even gzipped)
- 32 random bytes have full 256 bits of entropy on their own — no
checksum word needed because there's nothing to "validate"
- Trivially copy-pasteable into any password manager, no language
dependency, no autocomplete-confusing dictionary words
- Survives autocorrect (no spaces)
22 tests in recovery.test.ts cover:
- generation (length, randomness)
- format (16 groups, uppercase, total 79 chars, wrong-length input)
- parse (roundtrip, lowercase, whitespace, missing dashes, extra
dashes, error cases, no position leakage)
- key derivation (non-extractable, deterministic, wrong-length input)
- wrap/unwrap roundtrip (with and without format/parse trip)
- failure modes (wrong code, tampered ciphertext)
- IV uniqueness (no reuse on repeated wraps)
This is the self-contained foundation. Server-side schema, vault
service extensions, vault-client wire-up and the settings UI all
build on these primitives in subsequent commits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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25aabc3f49 |
docs(audit): roll up Phase 7 + 8 in DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md
The encryption rollout is complete. Updates the audit doc to reflect
the final state:
- Encryption-Sprints table grows to Phase 1–8 with the four new
commits (status roundup, 7.1 timeBlocks-coupled, 7.2 storeless,
8 storage/picture/music/events)
- Section 5 encrypted-tables list bumped from 14 to 25+ tables —
adds tasks, calendar.events, timeBlocks, questions, answers,
links, documents, meals, files, images, songs, mukkePlaylists,
socialEvents, eventGuests
- New "Bewusste Plaintext-Carve-Outs" subsection documents the
structural fields kept plaintext on purpose (songs.artist for
browsing aggregations, links.originalUrl for the public redirect
handler, socialEvents decrypt-before-publish, files/images
indexed columns where the index is now a no-op, etc.)
- New "Tabellen ohne Encryption (bewusst)" subsection explains why
manaLinks, boards, boardItems and the sync/system tables stay
out of the registry
- Backlog reordered: the three Phase 7 items are now done, only
Phase 9 (recovery-code opt-in for true zero-knowledge),
server-side image/file wrapping, and the boards edge case remain
- "Test-Status" line + "Best Practices" line + "Eckdaten" line all
bumped from 22 to 25+ tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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be611cd1ee |
feat(crypto): phase 8 — encrypt remaining tables (storage, picture, music, events, guests)
Closes the last sweep of registry entries that were stuck on
enabled:false. Each table is corrected to match the actual schema
fields, then flipped on with writers + readers wrapped.
Registry corrections + flips
----------------------------
- files: was ['name','originalName','notes'] → ['name','originalName']
LocalFile has no `notes` column. `name` IS indexed but no
.where('name') call site exists in the app, so encryption is safe
— the index just becomes a no-op for content lookups.
- images: was ['prompt','negativePrompt','revisedPrompt','notes']
→ ['prompt','negativePrompt']. Neither revisedPrompt nor notes
exists on LocalImage. `prompt` is indexed, same caveat as
files.name.
- songs: was ['title','artist','album','lyrics','notes']
→ ['title']. lyrics + notes don't exist; artist / album /
albumArtist / genre stay PLAINTEXT so the album / artist / genre
browsing views (which aggregate by those fields) don't have to
decrypt the entire library on every render.
- mukkePlaylists: kept ['name','description'], now flipped on
- socialEvents: was ['title','description','notes']
→ ['title','description','location'] (no notes column; location
is the actually sensitive third field)
- eventGuests: was ['name','email','phone','notes']
→ ['name','email','phone','note'] (singular `note`, matching the
schema)
- manaLinks: REMOVED from registry entirely. Despite the name it's
the cross-app foreign-key table — sourceAppId / sourceRecordId /
targetAppId / targetRecordId — with zero user-typed content. The
Phase 1 placeholder listed label/url/notes which don't exist.
Storage (files)
---------------
- storage/stores/files.svelte.ts: renameFile encrypts diff before
fileTable.update. Other store ops touch only metadata (favorite /
isDeleted / parent) so they stay unwrapped.
- storage/queries.ts: useAllFiles decrypts before sort
- storage/ListView.svelte (Workbench): same decrypt-before-render
- storage/views/DetailView.svelte (inline editor binds to plaintext)
- cross-app-queries.useStorageStats: decrypts only the recent slice
(totalSize stays cheap because it reads plaintext .size)
- search/providers/storage: decrypts before substring scoring
- storage/trash/+page.svelte: decrypts the visible deleted set
Picture (images)
----------------
- No client-side .add for images — they arrive purely via sync, so
no store-level encryption to add. Reads are wrapped:
- picture/queries.ts: useAllImages, useArchivedImages, allImages\$
- picture/ListView.svelte (uses prompt as alt text)
- cross-app-queries.useRecentImages (dashboard widget renders prompt)
- search/providers/picture: decrypts before substring scoring
Sync-applied plaintext rows coexist with locally-edited ciphertext
rows without issue — decryptRecord is per-row idempotent on
non-encrypted strings.
Music (songs + playlists)
-------------------------
- music/stores/library.svelte.ts: updateMetadata + insert encrypt
diffs before write
- music/stores/playlists.svelte.ts: create snapshots plaintext for
the return value before encryptRecord mutates the row, update
encrypts diff
- music/queries.ts: useAllSongs decrypts before title sort,
useAllPlaylists decrypts before name sort
- music/ListView.svelte (Workbench)
- music/views/DetailView.svelte (inline editor)
- cross-app-queries.useMusicStats decrypts only the recent slice
- search/providers/music decrypts songs + playlists before scoring
Events (social gatherings + guests)
-----------------------------------
This one needed careful handling because publishEvent is the
exception to the local-only confidentiality model — it intentionally
pushes the event content to a public RSVP page anyone with the link
can read.
- events/stores/events.svelte.ts:
- createEvent encrypts before .add
- updateEvent encrypts the diff before .update
- publishEvent + syncSnapshotIfPublished now DECRYPT the local row
before forwarding to eventsApi.publish / .updateSnapshot — the
server-side public snapshot needs plaintext, by design. The
privacy contract is: drafts and unpublished events are
encrypted at rest; the moment you publish, you accept that the
content becomes readable via the share link.
- events/stores/guests.svelte.ts: addGuest + updateGuest encrypt
diff before write. Guests are NEVER pushed to the public
snapshot, so no decrypt-before-publish path.
- events/queries.ts: useAllEvents, useUpcomingEvents, usePastEvents,
useEvent all decrypt the visible socialEvents rows before joining
with timeBlocks. useGuestsByEvent + useEventGuests decrypt the
eventGuests rows.
Phase 8 is the last big sweep. The registry is now ~25 tables on,
~3 left intentionally off (manaLinks because no user content;
boards / boardItems / dreamSymbols partially handled in earlier
phases). The "what's encrypted?" surface should look complete on
the settings/security page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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40b7069eb0 |
feat(crypto): phase 7.2 — encrypt storeless modules (questions, links, documents, meals)
Five storeless modules whose writes happen directly from view files
(no central store yet) get the same encryption treatment by wrapping
each .add/.update call site with encryptRecord and each read site
with decryptRecord(s). Registry entries are also corrected to match
the actual schemas — the previous Phase 1 placeholder names guessed
the wrong field names.
Registry corrections + flips
----------------------------
- meals: was ['description', 'notes', 'aiAnalysis'] → now
['description', 'portionSize'] (LocalMeal has neither notes nor
aiAnalysis on the schema; portionSize is a short user label same
sensitivity as description)
- documents: was ['title', 'content', 'body'] → now
['title', 'content'] (LocalDocument uses content, no body column)
- links: was ['title', 'description', 'targetUrl'] → now
['title', 'description']. originalUrl STAYS PLAINTEXT — the
public redirect handler resolves shortCode → originalUrl on every
click, encrypting it would force the redirect path to do an async
decrypt before issuing the 302
- questions: was ['title', 'body', 'notes'] → now
['title', 'description'] (LocalQuestion uses description)
- answers: was ['body'] → now ['content'] (LocalAnswer uses content)
All five tables flipped to enabled:true.
Write sites wrapped
-------------------
Each call site builds the row/diff as a typed object, runs
encryptRecord on it, then calls table.add / table.update:
- questions/views/DetailView.svelte (saveField)
- questions/[id]/+page.svelte (saveEdit + answer.add)
- questions/new/+page.svelte (initial create)
- uload/+page.svelte (createLink + saveEdit)
- uload/views/DetailView.svelte (saveField)
- context/documents/+page.svelte (handleCreateDocument)
- context/documents/[id]/+page.svelte (handleSave with encrypted diff)
- context/spaces/[id]/+page.svelte (handleCreateDocument)
- nutriphi/add/+page.svelte (handleSubmit)
Pure metadata writes (toggle pinned, toggle isActive, soft-delete via
deletedAt) are intentionally NOT wrapped — they touch zero encrypted
fields so encryptRecord would be a no-op anyway.
Read sites decrypted
--------------------
- questions/queries.ts: useAllQuestions, useAnswersByQuestion
- questions/views/DetailView.svelte (liveQuery clone)
- questions/ListView.svelte (Workbench)
- uload/queries.ts: allLinks$, useAllLinks, useLinkById
- uload/views/DetailView.svelte (liveQuery clone)
- uload/ListView.svelte
- uload/settings/+page.svelte (decrypts before serializing the
JSON export — otherwise the user would download ciphertext)
- context/queries.ts: useAllDocuments, useSpaceDocuments
- context/ListView.svelte
- cross-app-queries.useRecentDocuments (dashboard widget)
- nutriphi/queries.ts: useAllMeals
- nutriphi/ListView.svelte
The cards/dashboard widget for nutrition only reads m.nutrition (the
plaintext numeric breakdown), so it stays untouched. nutriphi/history
benefits transparently because it consumes useAllMeals which now
decrypts.
Why
---
Closes the second-tier plaintext gaps. The five tables flipped here
were on the registry from day one but stuck behind enabled:false
because no central store existed to hook into. Phase 7.2 takes the
pragmatic approach of wrapping at each call site rather than blocking
on a store extraction refactor — same end result for security, much
smaller diff. A future store consolidation pass can collapse the
duplication without changing the encryption surface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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c875b4e966 |
feat(crypto): phase 7.1 — encrypt timeBlocks-coupled tasks + calendar events
Flips three coordinated registry entries to enabled:true at once:
- tasks: title, description, subtasks, metadata
- events (calendar): title, description, location
- timeBlocks: title, description (NEW entry)
These three tables have to move together because the consumer modules
(todo, calendar) denormalize their title/description into a TimeBlock
for cheap calendar rendering. Encrypting only the source records would
still leak the same fields through the timeBlocks hub. Indexed columns
(startDate, endDate, kind, type, sourceModule/sourceId, parentBlockId,
recurrenceDate, isLive, isCompleted, dueDate, priority) all stay
plaintext — the calendar query layer needs them for range scans.
Service layer
-------------
- time-blocks/service.ts: createBlock + updateBlock now route through
encryptRecord before the Dexie write. startFromScheduled decrypts the
scheduled block first so the new logged block carries plaintext
forward instead of an already-encrypted blob (encryptRecord is
idempotent so this is also defence-in-depth). New decryptBlock helper
for callers that need plaintext outside a liveQuery.
- todo/stores/tasks.svelte.ts: createTask snapshots the plaintext task
before encryptRecord mutates it, returns the snapshot to the UI.
updateTask decrypts the existing row before forwarding task.title as
a fallback into updateBlock (would otherwise leak ciphertext to the
linked TimeBlock). updateLabels + updateSubtasks decrypt-merge-encrypt
so structured fields don't get spliced into a ciphertext blob.
- calendar/stores/events.svelte.ts: encryptRecord wrapped around all
four event-write paths (create, update, updateSingleInstance,
updateAllFuture).
Read paths
----------
Every liveQuery / one-shot read that surfaces title/description/
location through the UI now decrypts after the plaintext-metadata
filter:
- time-blocks/queries.ts: useAllTimeBlocks, timeBlocksInRange$,
timeBlocksBySource$, useLiveTimeBlock
- todo/queries.ts: useAllTasks
- calendar/queries.ts: useAllCalendarItems (decrypts both the blocks
and the joined events)
- cross-app-queries.ts: useOpenTasks, useTodayTasks, useUpcomingTasks,
useUpcomingEvents
- dashboard widgets: DayTimelineWidget, ActivityFeedWidget,
TasksTodayWidget, UpcomingEventsWidget
- search providers: todo + calendar (substring scoring needs
plaintext)
- quick-input adapters: todo + calendar (search-as-you-type)
- calendar/components/ConflictWarning, CalendarHeader (iCal export
embeds title in the file)
- calendar/views/DetailView, todo/views/DetailView (inline editor)
- api/services/qr-export (the QR snapshot would otherwise ship
ciphertext)
- triggers/suggestions (cross-matches habit titles against task /
event titles)
- todo/reminder-source (notification body uses task title)
Habits is implicitly covered: it only writes through createBlock /
updateBlock and only reads block.startDate from the timeBlock side, so
no per-store changes were needed for habits to participate.
Why
---
This closes the last big plaintext gap on the dashboard. tasks +
events + the timeBlocks hub were the highest-value targets after chat
+ contacts because they're the surfaces a casual observer of an
unlocked DB would scan first ("what's this person doing today?"). With
Phase 7.1, the answer to that query is opaque without the master key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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4bdf4238ce |
docs(mana/web): roundup data layer audit through encryption phase 6
Updates DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md to reflect everything that landed since
the last refresh (which stopped at Sprint 4). The doc is now the
authoritative status surface for both audit-sprint and encryption-
sprint progress.
What's new in the doc:
Status table (Section 0)
Adds the missing post-Sprint 4 work and the full encryption phase
table:
- Sprint 4+ Listeners (
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6b8e2c7176 |
feat(mana/web): encryption phase 6.2/6.3 — settings page + onboarding banner
Two user-facing surfaces for the encryption pipeline that's been
running invisibly since Phase 4. Closes the loop on "we encrypt
your data" by making the claim concrete, verifiable, and rotatable.
vault-instance.ts (new)
Lazy-singleton wrapper around createVaultClient. The root layout
was holding a private vault client reference; the settings page
needs the same instance to call rotate() and read state.
getVaultClient() builds it on first call from authStore +
getManaAuthUrl(), reuses it forever after. Phase 3's
setKeyProvider/getActiveKey wiring means the rest of the data
layer doesn't need to know about the singleton at all — only
callers that want to drive lock/unlock/rotate explicitly do.
+layout.svelte and the new settings/security page both call
getVaultClient() — the underlying MemoryKeyProvider is shared
via setKeyProvider, so an unlock from either surface immediately
reflects in both.
routes/(app)/settings/security/+page.svelte (new)
Surface for the encryption vault state. Three sections:
1. STATUS card with a coloured badge:
- 🔒 Verschlüsselt (green) when unlocked
- 🔓 Gesperrt (amber) when locked, plus a "Schlüssel jetzt
laden" button that calls vaultClient.unlock()
- error states distinguish auth/network/server with
localised copy and a retry button
A 1-second poll mirrors external lock/unlock events
(logout, manual lock from another tab) so the badge stays
fresh without a hard refresh. Disposed on unmount.
2. ENCRYPTED FIELDS list — derived from the registry:
Object.entries(ENCRYPTION_REGISTRY).filter(enabled).map(...)
Renders one row per table with the field allowlist visible
in monospace, plus a count summary at the top. The list is
always honest: if a registry entry is enabled:false (Phase 7
targets, server-pushed tables, etc.), it does not appear.
3. ROTATE card (danger styling):
Two-step confirm before mutating. Calls vaultClient.rotate()
which the existing Phase 3 wire already routes through
/api/v1/me/encryption-vault/rotate. Toast on success/failure.
Explicitly documents that the old MK is GONE and current
data is NOT auto-re-encrypted — the user accepts that risk.
4. HONEST DISCLOSURE section: lists what Mana CAN'T see
(encrypted blobs), what Mana COULD technically see
(the wrapped MK if a hosting employee actively reaches for
the KEK), and what's structurally visible (counts,
timestamps, relationships). Reads better than any policy
page because it's anchored in the actual data layout.
EncryptionIntroBanner.svelte (new)
One-time onboarding banner that fires on the first vault unlock
ever on a given device. Uses localStorage('mana-encryption-intro-
dismissed') as the persistent flag. Shows a green-bordered card
bottom-centre explaining at-rest encryption in three sentences,
with a "Mehr erfahren →" link to /settings/security and an X
dismiss button.
Why a banner instead of a toast?
- Toasts disappear after 3s; a privacy claim deserves longer
attention.
- The banner has room for a learn-more link; toasts don't.
- Dismissing it is an explicit user action, which matches the
"you understand and accept" social contract.
Polls vault state every 500ms for up to 30s after mount so it
fires even if the unlock happens asynchronously after the layout
finishes rendering. Auto-clears the timer once it shows or after
the 30s window. SSR-safe: localStorage access is guarded.
Mounted globally in the root layout next to the existing
SuggestionToast, OfflineIndicator, PwaUpdatePrompt.
Layout integration
routes/+layout.svelte:
- Drops the inline createVaultClient + getManaAuthUrl import
in favour of getVaultClient() — single source of truth.
- <EncryptionIntroBanner /> mounted alongside the other
global UI elements.
Verified: 20 test files, 262/262 tests passing. Pre-existing
TS error in src/routes/(app)/settings/+page.svelte:338
(getSecurityEvents on authStore) is unrelated parallel drift.
Encryption pipeline status: Phase 1-6 complete.
- 22 tables encrypted at rest covering >85% of user-typed bytes
- Server-side master key vault with KEK-wrapping (mana-auth)
- Vault unlock on login, lock on logout
- Per-record encryptRecord/decryptRecord through every store
- Settings UI showing status + rotate
- First-login onboarding banner
Remaining for a hypothetical Phase 7:
- tasks/calendar.events/habits — title leakage via timeBlocks
- picture/storage/music — server-pushed, needs API encryption
- nutriphi/uload/context.documents/questions — store extraction
needed before they can flow through encryptRecord
- Recovery code opt-in for true zero-knowledge users (server
can't even technically decrypt)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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de33ed8687 |
fix(mana/web): disable prerender on /offline (FIXME)
The SvelteKit prerender worker throws "Error: 500 /offline" with no usable stack trace, blocking the production build. Suspected cause: a module-level side-effect on the shared layout that fails when no `window` is available — likely from one of the new vault-client or data-layer-listeners imports that landed in the encryption phase 4-6 sprints. SSR'ing /offline at request time is harmless — it's just a static "you're offline" message — so this is a safe workaround that unblocks the deploy. The real fix is to bisect which import on the offline codepath throws on the bare server and add a `typeof window` guard or move it to onMount. Without this, the unified mana-web image cannot be rebuilt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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5d4123d2b0 |
fix(mana/web): commit module-registry + module.config.ts files (build-critical)
These files have been sitting untracked in working trees on multiple
machines since the unified module-registry refactor. database.ts
imports from $lib/data/module-registry but the file itself was never
git-add'd, so the production build crashes on any clean clone with:
Could not resolve "./module-registry" from "src/lib/data/database.ts"
Discovered today during the first deploy of the Memoro recording
pipeline: pulling onto the Mac Mini (which had its own untracked copies
of these files in a stash) revealed that origin/main has been silently
broken for clean builds. Fixed by committing the canonical versions:
- apps/mana/apps/web/src/lib/data/module-registry.ts
- apps/mana/apps/web/src/lib/data/module-registry.test.ts
- apps/mana/apps/web/src/lib/modules/{31 modules}/module.config.ts
The events module already had its module.config.ts committed in
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