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Two interlocking fixes driven by a production lockout incident. ## Bug that motivated this A fresh schema-drift column (auth.users.onboarding_completed_at) made every Better Auth query crash with Postgres 42703. The /login wrapper swallowed the non-2xx and mapped it onto a generic "401 Invalid credentials" AND bumped the password lockout counter — so 5 legit login attempts against a broken DB would have locked every real user out of their own account. Same wrapper pattern on /register, /refresh, /reset-password etc. The 30-minute hunt ended in a one-off repro script that finally surfaced the real Postgres error. The user-facing passkey button additionally returned generic 404s on every login-page mount because the route wasn't registered (the DB schema existed, the Better Auth plugin wasn't wired). ## Phase 1 — Error classification (services/mana-auth/src/lib/auth-errors) - 19-code AuthErrorCode taxonomy (INVALID_CREDENTIALS, EMAIL_NOT_VERIFIED, ACCOUNT_LOCKED, SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, PASSKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED, …) - classifyFromResponse/classifyFromError handle: Better Auth APIError (duck-typed on `name === 'APIError'`), Postgres errors (23505 unique, 42703/08xxx → infra), ZodError, fetch/ECONNREFUSED network errors, bare Error, unknown. - respondWithError routes the structured response, logs at the right level, fires the correct security event, and CRITICALLY only bumps the lockout counter for actual credential failures — SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE and INTERNAL never touch lockout. - All 12 endpoints in routes/auth.ts refactored (/login, /register, /logout, /session-to-token, /refresh, /validate, /forgot-password, /reset-password, /resend-verification, /profile GET+POST, /change-email, /change-password, /account DELETE). - Fixed pre-existing auth.api.forgetPassword typo (→ requestPasswordReset). - shared-logger + requestLogger middleware wired in index.ts; all console.* calls in the service removed. ## Phase 2 — Passkey end-to-end (@better-auth/passkey 1.6+) - sql/007_passkey_bootstrap.sql: idempotent schema alignment — friendly_name→name, +aaguid, transports jsonb→text, +method column on login_attempts. - better-auth.config.ts: passkey plugin wired with rpID/rpName/origin from new webauthn config section. rpID defaults to mana.how in prod (from COOKIE_DOMAIN), localhost in dev. - routes/passkeys.ts: 7 wrapper endpoints (capability probe, register/options+verify, authenticate/options+verify with JWT mint, list, delete, rename). Each routes errors through the classifier; authenticate/verify promotes generic INVALID_CREDENTIALS to PASSKEY_VERIFICATION_FAILED. - PasskeyRateLimitService: in-memory per-IP (options: 20/min) and per-credential (verify: 10 failures/min → 5 min cooldown) buckets. Deliberately separate from the password lockout — different factor, different blast radius. - Client: authService.getPasskeyCapability() async probe, memoised per session. authStore.passkeyAvailable reactive state. LoginPage gates on === true so a slow probe doesn't flash the button in. - AuthResult grew a code: AuthErrorCode field; handleAuthError in shared-auth prefers the server envelope over the legacy message heuristics. ## Tests - 30 unit tests for the classifier covering every branch (including the exact Postgres 42703 shape that started this). - 9 unit tests for the rate limiter. - 14 integration tests for the auth routes — the regression test explicitly asserts "upstream 500 → 503 + zero lockout bumps". - 101 tests pass, 0 fail, 30 pre-existing skips unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
108 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
108 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
export interface Config {
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port: number;
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databaseUrl: string;
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syncDatabaseUrl: string;
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baseUrl: string;
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cookieDomain: string;
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nodeEnv: string;
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serviceKey: string;
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cors: { origins: string[] };
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manaNotifyUrl: string;
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manaCreditsUrl: string;
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manaSubscriptionsUrl: string;
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manaMailUrl: string;
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/** Base64-encoded 32-byte AES-256 key encryption key (KEK). Wraps each
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* user's master key in auth.encryption_vaults. Required in production
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* — in development a deterministic dev KEK is auto-generated so the
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* service still boots, with a loud warning. */
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encryptionKek: string;
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/**
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* PEM-encoded RSA-OAEP-2048 public key for the mana-ai Mission
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* Grant runner. The `/me/ai-mission-grant` endpoint wraps per-
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* mission data keys with this public key so only mana-ai (holder
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* of the paired private key) can unwrap them. Optional at boot:
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* when absent, the endpoint returns 503 so the UI can degrade
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* to foreground-only execution.
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*/
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missionGrantPublicKeyPem?: string;
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/** WebAuthn passkey settings. `rpId` is the effective domain the
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* authenticator binds credentials to — `mana.how` in prod (scopes
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* passkeys across all subdomains) and `localhost` in dev. `origin`
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* is the URL where the browser made the WebAuthn call; mismatches
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* cause the verification step to fail with `invalid origin`. `name`
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* is shown to the user in the authenticator prompt ("Register a
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* passkey for Mana"). */
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webauthn: {
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rpId: string;
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rpName: string;
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origin: string | string[];
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};
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}
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export function loadConfig(): Config {
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const env = (key: string, fallback?: string) => process.env[key] || fallback || '';
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const nodeEnv = env('NODE_ENV', 'development');
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// Encryption KEK: in production a missing/short value is fatal — the
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// vault service refuses to mint or unwrap any master keys without a
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// real KEK. In development we auto-fill with a deterministic dev key
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// so contributors can run the service without setting up a secret.
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let encryptionKek = env('MANA_AUTH_KEK');
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if (!encryptionKek) {
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if (nodeEnv === 'production') {
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throw new Error(
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'mana-auth: MANA_AUTH_KEK env var is required in production. ' +
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'Set it to a base64-encoded 32-byte random value: ' +
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'`openssl rand -base64 32`'
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);
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}
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// 32 zero bytes — deterministic, obviously not for production. The
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// vault service logs a loud warning at startup when it sees this.
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encryptionKek = 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=';
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}
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const corsOrigins = env('CORS_ORIGINS', 'http://localhost:5173').split(',');
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// WebAuthn: derive sensible defaults from the auth service's
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// BASE_URL + COOKIE_DOMAIN so a dev never has to set three extra
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// env vars. In prod, override explicitly.
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//
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// rpId must be the bare effective domain (no protocol, no port).
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// A mismatch between rpId and the client's origin hostname causes
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// SecurityError at registration time. Deriving rpId from
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// COOKIE_DOMAIN (already stripped of its leading dot for the shared
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// cookie) keeps it honest — `.mana.how` → `mana.how` — and falls
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// back to the hostname of BASE_URL.
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const cookieDomain = env('COOKIE_DOMAIN');
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const defaultRpId = cookieDomain
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? cookieDomain.replace(/^\./, '')
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: new URL(env('BASE_URL', 'http://localhost:3001')).hostname;
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return {
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port: parseInt(env('PORT', '3001'), 10),
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databaseUrl: env('DATABASE_URL', 'postgresql://mana:devpassword@localhost:5432/mana_platform'),
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syncDatabaseUrl: env(
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'SYNC_DATABASE_URL',
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'postgresql://mana:devpassword@localhost:5432/mana_sync'
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),
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baseUrl: env('BASE_URL', 'http://localhost:3001'),
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cookieDomain,
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nodeEnv,
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serviceKey: env('MANA_SERVICE_KEY', 'dev-service-key'),
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cors: { origins: corsOrigins },
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manaNotifyUrl: env('MANA_NOTIFY_URL', 'http://localhost:3013'),
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manaCreditsUrl: env('MANA_CREDITS_URL', 'http://localhost:3061'),
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manaSubscriptionsUrl: env('MANA_SUBSCRIPTIONS_URL', 'http://localhost:3063'),
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manaMailUrl: env('MANA_MAIL_URL', 'http://localhost:3042'),
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encryptionKek,
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missionGrantPublicKeyPem: env('MANA_AI_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM') || undefined,
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webauthn: {
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rpId: env('WEBAUTHN_RP_ID', defaultRpId),
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rpName: env('WEBAUTHN_RP_NAME', 'Mana'),
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// Pass every CORS origin as allowed WebAuthn origin by default
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// so the same passkey works from any app subdomain. Override
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// with WEBAUTHN_ORIGIN to restrict further.
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origin: env('WEBAUTHN_ORIGIN') ? env('WEBAUTHN_ORIGIN').split(',') : corsOrigins,
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},
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};
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}
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