managarten/scripts/personas/password.ts
Till JS 493db0c3b2 feat(personas): M2.a-c — persona schemas + admin endpoints + seed pipeline
Continuation of docs/plans/mana-mcp-and-personas.md. Personas are the
auto-test users the M3 runner will drive — they're real Mana users
(kind='persona', tier='founder'), registered through the same Better
Auth pipeline as humans, just stamped differently and metadata-tracked
so the persona-runner knows how to role-play them.

Schemas (auth namespace — personas are 1:1 with users, no reason for a
separate platform.* schema that the plan originally sketched)

- userKindEnum ('human' | 'persona' | 'system') + users.kind column,
  wired into better-auth additionalFields so the JWT/user object carry
  the flag. Default 'human' keeps every existing user untouched.
- auth.personas — 1:1 descriptor (archetype, systemPrompt, moduleMix
  jsonb, tickCadence, lastActiveAt). CASCADE from users.id.
- auth.persona_actions — tick-grouped audit of every tool call the
  runner makes (toolName, inputHash for dedup, result, latency).
- auth.persona_feedback — structured 1-5 ratings per module per tick,
  plus free-text notes. This is where the runner writes the
  self-reflection step at end of each tick.

Admin endpoints (/api/v1/admin/personas, admin-tier-gated)

- POST /            create-or-update by email. Uses auth.api.signUpEmail
                    if the user's new, then stamps kind+tier+verified
                    and upserts the personas row. Idempotent — safe to
                    re-run after catalog edits.
- GET  /            list with 7-day action count per persona.
- GET  /:id         detail + recent 20 actions + per-module feedback
                    aggregate.
- DELETE /:id       hard delete. Refuses non-persona users as
                    defense-in-depth: an admin typo here would cascade
                    through the full user-delete chain.

Catalog + seed pipeline (scripts/personas/)

- catalog.json      10 handwritten personas spanning 7 archetypes
                    (adhd-student, ceo-busy, creative-parent, solo-dev,
                    researcher, freelancer, overwhelmed-newbie).
                    Five pairs of personas that will later share
                    family/team spaces (cross-space setup is deferred
                    to M2.d per the plan).
- catalog.ts        zod-validated loader. Refines email to require
                    @mana.test TLD — non-existent, no bounce risk.
- password.ts       deterministic HMAC-SHA256(PERSONA_SEED_SECRET,
                    email). No stored per-persona credentials; the
                    runner re-derives on every login. Refuses the
                    dev-fallback secret in production.
- seed.ts           POST /admin/personas per catalog entry. Flags:
                    --auth=, --jwt=, --dry-run.
- cleanup.ts        Hard-delete every live persona. Warns when the
                    live set drifts from the catalog.

Root package.json:
  pnpm seed:personas
  pnpm seed:personas:cleanup

Extends the ESLint root-ignore list with `scripts/**` so Bun-typed
utility scripts don't fail the typed-parser check they weren't opted
into. Consistent with the rest of scripts/ being .mjs+.sh.

To go live (user action):
  pnpm docker:up
  cd services/mana-auth && bun run db:push
  export MANA_ADMIN_JWT=...
  pnpm seed:personas

M2.d deferred: cross-space (family/team/practice) memberships between
persona pairs. Better Auth's org-invite flow is multi-step and would
roughly double the M2 scope; the persona-runner (M3) can operate in
personal spaces first, shared-space tests land as their own milestone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-23 13:55:14 +02:00

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/**
* Deterministic per-persona password.
*
* HMAC-SHA256(PERSONA_SEED_SECRET, persona.email) → base64 → trim to 32
* chars. Long enough for Better Auth's 8128 range, identical every run
* so seed/login are repeatable, but only knowable to whoever holds the
* env secret.
*
* Why not random + storage: storing per-persona passwords means another
* place to encrypt and audit. The runner needs to log in as the persona
* many times — looking up a stored cred per call is wasteful when the
* same HMAC gives us the same answer in O(1).
*/
import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto';
const DEV_FALLBACK_SECRET = 'dev-persona-seed-secret-rotate-in-prod';
export function personaPassword(email: string): string {
const secret = process.env.PERSONA_SEED_SECRET ?? DEV_FALLBACK_SECRET;
if (secret === DEV_FALLBACK_SECRET && process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production') {
throw new Error(
'PERSONA_SEED_SECRET must be set in production — refusing to derive persona passwords from the dev fallback.'
);
}
const hmac = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(email).digest('base64');
// Strip non-alphanumerics so the result is safe in CLI quotes,
// keep at least one digit + one letter for password-policy compliance.
const cleaned = hmac.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, '');
return cleaned.slice(0, 32);
}