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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Till JS	e9915428cb	feat(mana-auth): encryption vault — phase 2 (server-side master key custody) ... Adds the server side of the per-user encryption vault. Phase 1 shipped the client foundation (no-op while every table is enabled:false). This commit lets the client actually fetch a master key when Phase 3 flips the registry switches. Schema (Drizzle + raw SQL migration) - auth.encryption_vaults: per-user wrapped MK + IV + format version + kek_id stamp + created/rotated timestamps. PK = user_id, ON DELETE CASCADE so account deletion wipes the vault. - auth.encryption_vault_audit: append-only trail of init/fetch/rotate actions with IP, user-agent, HTTP status, free-form context. - sql/002_encryption_vaults.sql: idempotent CREATE TABLE + ENABLE + FORCE row-level security with a `current_setting('app.current_user_id')` policy on both tables. FORCE makes the policy apply to the table owner too — no bypass via grants. KEK loader (services/encryption-vault/kek.ts) - Loads a 32-byte AES-256 KEK from the MANA_AUTH_KEK env var (base64). - Production: missing or wrong-length input is fatal at boot. - Development: 32-zero-byte fallback so contributors can run the service without provisioning a secret. Logs a loud warning. - wrapMasterKey / unwrapMasterKey use Web Crypto AES-GCM-256 over the raw 32-byte MK with a fresh 12-byte IV per wrap. Returns base64 pair for storage. - generateMasterKey + activeKekId helpers used by the service. - Future migration to KMS / Vault: only loadKek() changes; the kek_id stamp on each row tracks which KEK produced it. EncryptionVaultService (services/encryption-vault/index.ts) - init(userId): idempotent — returns existing MK or mints a new one. - getMasterKey(userId): unwraps the stored MK; throws VaultNotFoundError on no-row so the route can return 404 cleanly. - rotate(userId): mints fresh MK, replaces wrap. Caller is on the hook for re-encryption — destructive by design. - withUserScope(userId, fn): wraps every read/write in a Drizzle transaction with set_config('app.current_user_id', userId, true) so the RLS policy admits only the matching row. Empty userId is rejected up-front. - writeAudit() appends a row to encryption_vault_audit on every action including failures, so probing attempts leave a trail. Routes (routes/encryption-vault.ts) - POST /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/init — idempotent bootstrap - GET /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/key — fetch the active MK - POST /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/rotate — destructive rotation - All return base64-encoded master key bytes plus formatVersion + kekId. JWT-protected via the existing /api/v1/me/* middleware. - readAuditContext() pulls X-Forwarded-For + User-Agent off the request for the audit row. Bootstrap (index.ts) - loadKek() runs at top-level await before any route can fire so a misconfigured KEK fails closed at boot, never at request time. - encryptionVaultService is mounted under /api/v1/me/encryption-vault so it inherits the existing JWT middleware and shows up next to the GDPR self-service endpoints. Tests (services/encryption-vault/kek.test.ts) - 11 Bun-test cases covering: KEK load (happy path, wrong length, idempotent, before-load guard), generateMasterKey randomness, wrap/unwrap roundtrip, IV uniqueness across repeated wraps, wrong-MK-length rejection, tampered-ciphertext rejection, wrong-length IV rejection, wrong-KEK rejection. - Service-level integration tests deferred — they need a real Postgres for the RLS behaviour, set up via existing mana-sync test pattern in CI. Config + env - .env.development gains MANA_AUTH_KEK= (empty → dev fallback) with a comment explaining the production requirement. - services/mana-auth/package.json gains "test": "bun test". Verified: 11/11 KEK tests passing, 31/31 Phase 1 client tests still passing, only pre-existing TS errors remain in mana-auth (auth.ts:281 forgetPassword + api-keys.ts:50 insert overload — both unrelated). Phase 3: client wires the MemoryKeyProvider to GET /encryption-vault/key on login, flips registry entries to enabled:true table by table, and extends the Dexie hooks to call wrapValue/unwrapValue on configured fields. Phase 4: settings UI for lock state, key rotation, recovery code opt-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-07 18:38:09 +02:00