Previous commit 38dc80654 carries this M3 title but its payload is an
unrelated apps/api/picture change — shared-.git-index race with a
parallel session (see feedback_git_workflow.md). This commit holds the
actual M3.b/c/d code. Leaving the misnamed commit for the user to
re-attribute / revert as they prefer.
Closes the M3 loop from docs/plans/mana-mcp-and-personas.md. The
runner picks up due personas, drives each through Claude + MCP for
one simulated turn, collects actions + ratings, persists through
service-key internal endpoints in mana-auth.
Internal endpoints (mana-auth, service-key-gated)
- GET /api/v1/internal/personas/due
Returns personas whose tickCadence + lastActiveAt say they're
due. Rules: hourly > 1h, daily > 24h, weekdays > 24h mon-fri.
NULLS FIRST so never-run personas go ahead of stale ones.
- POST /api/v1/internal/personas/:id/actions
Batch ≤ 500. Row ids are deterministic
`${tickId}-${i}-${toolName}` + ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING so the
runner can retry a tick without doubling audit rows. Also
bumps personas.last_active_at so the next /due call sees it.
- POST /api/v1/internal/personas/:id/feedback
Batch ≤ 100. Row id is `${tickId}-${module}` — natural key is
one rating per module per tick.
Runner tick pipeline (services/mana-persona-runner/src/runner/)
- claude-session.ts
Two phases per tick. runMainTurn feeds the persona's system
prompt + a German "simulate a day" user prompt to Claude Agent
SDK's query(), with mana-mcp wired in as a streamable-HTTP MCP
server. We iterate the returned AsyncGenerator and extract
tool_use blocks into ActionRows; a tool_result with
is_error=true flips the most recent action. runRatingTurn is a
fresh query() with tools:[] asking Claude in character to rate
each used module 1-5 as strict JSON. We parse with tolerance
for whitespace / fences. Unparseable output becomes a synthetic
'__parse' feedback row so operators see the failure.
- tick.ts
Orchestrator. Skips when config.paused. Fetches /due, processes
in batches of config.concurrency via Promise.allSettled so a
single persona failure never kills the batch. Returns
{due, ranSuccessfully, failed[], durationMs}.
- types.ts
ActionRow + FeedbackRow shapes shared between claude-session
and the internal client.
Runner bootstrap (src/index.ts)
- setInterval(config.tickIntervalMs) starts the tick loop on boot.
tickInFlight guards against overlap when Claude latency >
interval. If MANA_SERVICE_KEY or ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is missing,
loop is disabled with a warn line — /health + /diag/login still
work.
- POST /diag/tick (dev-only) fires one tick on demand, returns
the result. Avoids waiting a full interval during testing.
- Graceful SIGTERM/SIGINT shutdown clears the interval.
Client
- clients/mana-auth-internal.ts
X-Service-Key client for the three endpoints above.
Constructor throws on empty serviceKey — fail loud.
Boot smoke verified: /health returns ok, /diag/tick 500s with
descriptive messages when keys absent. Warning lines on boot when
keys are missing. Type-check green across mana-auth, tool-registry,
mcp, persona-runner.
M3 exit gate is the end-to-end smoke recipe (docker up → db:push →
seed:personas → diag/tick → psql) documented in
services/mana-persona-runner/CLAUDE.md.
M2.d (cross-space family/team memberships) still deferred.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Continuation of docs/plans/mana-mcp-and-personas.md. Personas are the
auto-test users the M3 runner will drive — they're real Mana users
(kind='persona', tier='founder'), registered through the same Better
Auth pipeline as humans, just stamped differently and metadata-tracked
so the persona-runner knows how to role-play them.
Schemas (auth namespace — personas are 1:1 with users, no reason for a
separate platform.* schema that the plan originally sketched)
- userKindEnum ('human' | 'persona' | 'system') + users.kind column,
wired into better-auth additionalFields so the JWT/user object carry
the flag. Default 'human' keeps every existing user untouched.
- auth.personas — 1:1 descriptor (archetype, systemPrompt, moduleMix
jsonb, tickCadence, lastActiveAt). CASCADE from users.id.
- auth.persona_actions — tick-grouped audit of every tool call the
runner makes (toolName, inputHash for dedup, result, latency).
- auth.persona_feedback — structured 1-5 ratings per module per tick,
plus free-text notes. This is where the runner writes the
self-reflection step at end of each tick.
Admin endpoints (/api/v1/admin/personas, admin-tier-gated)
- POST / create-or-update by email. Uses auth.api.signUpEmail
if the user's new, then stamps kind+tier+verified
and upserts the personas row. Idempotent — safe to
re-run after catalog edits.
- GET / list with 7-day action count per persona.
- GET /:id detail + recent 20 actions + per-module feedback
aggregate.
- DELETE /:id hard delete. Refuses non-persona users as
defense-in-depth: an admin typo here would cascade
through the full user-delete chain.
Catalog + seed pipeline (scripts/personas/)
- catalog.json 10 handwritten personas spanning 7 archetypes
(adhd-student, ceo-busy, creative-parent, solo-dev,
researcher, freelancer, overwhelmed-newbie).
Five pairs of personas that will later share
family/team spaces (cross-space setup is deferred
to M2.d per the plan).
- catalog.ts zod-validated loader. Refines email to require
@mana.test TLD — non-existent, no bounce risk.
- password.ts deterministic HMAC-SHA256(PERSONA_SEED_SECRET,
email). No stored per-persona credentials; the
runner re-derives on every login. Refuses the
dev-fallback secret in production.
- seed.ts POST /admin/personas per catalog entry. Flags:
--auth=, --jwt=, --dry-run.
- cleanup.ts Hard-delete every live persona. Warns when the
live set drifts from the catalog.
Root package.json:
pnpm seed:personas
pnpm seed:personas:cleanup
Extends the ESLint root-ignore list with `scripts/**` so Bun-typed
utility scripts don't fail the typed-parser check they weren't opted
into. Consistent with the rest of scripts/ being .mjs+.sh.
To go live (user action):
pnpm docker:up
cd services/mana-auth && bun run db:push
export MANA_ADMIN_JWT=...
pnpm seed:personas
M2.d deferred: cross-space (family/team/practice) memberships between
persona pairs. Better Auth's org-invite flow is multi-step and would
roughly double the M2 scope; the persona-runner (M3) can operate in
personal spaces first, shared-space tests land as their own milestone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the gap between "invite flow UI exists" and "two users in the
same space actually see each other's data". Three pieces land together
because they're meaningless without each other.
mana-auth — new internal endpoint:
GET /api/v1/internal/users/:userId/memberships
Returns [{organizationId, role}, ...] for the user. mana-sync uses
this to populate the multi-member RLS session config.
mana-sync — membership lookup:
new internal/memberships package with an HTTP client + 5 min
per-user cache, fail-open (empty list = pre-Spaces behavior).
Config gets MANA_AUTH_URL (default http://localhost:3001).
Handler.NewHandler takes the Lookup. Every Push/Pull/Stream call
now passes spaceIDsFor(userID) to Store methods.
GetChangesSince + GetAllChangesSince extend their WHERE clause:
WHERE (user_id = $1 OR space_id = ANY($memberSpaces))
so co-members see each other's rows, not just the author.
apps/web — encryption skip for shared-space records:
encryptRecord now checks record.spaceId:
- `_personal:<userId>` sentinel OR no active shared space → encrypt
with user master key (E2E as today).
- Active space resolves to non-personal type AND spaceId matches
that space → skip encryption; write lands plaintext.
decryptRecord is unchanged because its per-field isEncrypted() guard
already passes plaintext through.
Phase-1 compromise: shared-space data is protected by server RLS
only, not E2E. Phase 2 adds per-Space shared keys with per-member
wrap — tracked in docs/plans/spaces-foundation.md.
Plus docs/plans/shared-space-smoketest.md: step-by-step Zwei-User-Test
mit erwarteten Ergebnissen und Debugging-Hinweisen bei Problemen.
Build + go test + web check all green.
Plan: docs/plans/spaces-foundation.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 of the Mission Key-Grant rollout. Webapp can now request a
wrapped per-mission data key; mana-ai can unwrap and (Phase 2) use it.
mana-auth:
- POST /api/v1/me/ai-mission-grant — HKDF-derives MDK from the user
master key, RSA-OAEP-2048-wraps with the mana-ai public key, returns
{ wrappedKey, derivation, issuedAt, expiresAt }
- MissionGrantService refuses zero-knowledge users (409 ZK_ACTIVE) and
returns 503 GRANT_NOT_CONFIGURED when MANA_AI_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM is unset
- TTL clamped to [1h, 30d]
mana-ai:
- configureMissionGrantKey + unwrapMissionGrant with structured failure
reasons (not-configured / expired / malformed / wrap-rejected)
- mana_ai.decrypt_audit table + RLS policy scoped to
app.current_user_id — append-only row per server-side decrypt attempt
- MANA_AI_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM env slot; absent = grants silently disabled
No existing behaviour changes: missions without a grant run exactly as
before. Grant flow is wired end-to-end but unused until Phase 2 lands
the encrypted resolver.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-launch theme system audit found multiple parallel layers in themes.css
(--theme-X full hsl strings, --X partial shadcn aliases, --color-X populated
by runtime store with raw channels) plus dead-code companion files. The
inconsistency caused light-mode regressions when scoped-CSS consumers
wrote `var(--color-X)` standalone — the variable holds raw HSL channels
which is invalid as a color value, browser fell back to inherited (white).
Rewrite to one consistent layer:
- Source of truth: --color-X defined as raw HSL channels (e.g.
`0 0% 17%`) in :root, .dark, and all variant [data-theme="..."]
blocks. Matches the format the runtime store
(@mana/shared-theme/src/utils.ts) writes, eliminating the
static-fallback-vs-runtime mismatch and the corresponding flash
of unstyled content on hydration.
- @theme inline uses self-reference + Tailwind v4 <alpha-value>
placeholder so utility classes generate correctly AND opacity
modifiers work: `text-foreground/50` → `hsl(var(--color-foreground) / 0.5)`.
- @layer components (.btn-primary, .card, .badge, etc.) wraps
var(--color-X) refs with hsl() — they were broken in light mode
too for the same reason.
Convention going forward (also documented in the file header):
1. Markup: use Tailwind utility classes (text-foreground, bg-card, …)
2. Scoped CSS: hsl(var(--color-X)) — always wrap with hsl()
3. NEVER raw var(--color-X) in CSS — that's the bug pattern
Net file: 692 → 580 LOC. Single source layer, no indirection.
Also delete dead companion files (zero imports anywhere):
- tailwind-v4.css (had broken self-reference, never imported)
- theme-variables.css (legacy hex-based palette)
- components.css (legacy component utilities)
- index.js / preset.js / colors.js (Tailwind v3 preset format,
irrelevant under Tailwind v4)
package.json exports map shrinks accordingly to just `./themes.css`.
Consumers using `hsl(var(--color-X))` (~379 files across mana-web,
manavoxel-web, arcade-web) keep working unchanged — the public API
name `--color-X` is preserved. Only the broken pattern `var(--color-X)`
(~61 files) needs a follow-up sweep, handled in a separate commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the server side of the per-user encryption vault. Phase 1 shipped
the client foundation (no-op while every table is enabled:false). This
commit lets the client actually fetch a master key when Phase 3 flips
the registry switches.
Schema (Drizzle + raw SQL migration)
- auth.encryption_vaults: per-user wrapped MK + IV + format version +
kek_id stamp + created/rotated timestamps. PK = user_id, ON DELETE
CASCADE so account deletion wipes the vault.
- auth.encryption_vault_audit: append-only trail of init/fetch/rotate
actions with IP, user-agent, HTTP status, free-form context.
- sql/002_encryption_vaults.sql: idempotent CREATE TABLE + ENABLE +
FORCE row-level security with a `current_setting('app.current_user_id')`
policy on both tables. FORCE makes the policy apply to the table
owner too — no bypass via grants.
KEK loader (services/encryption-vault/kek.ts)
- Loads a 32-byte AES-256 KEK from the MANA_AUTH_KEK env var (base64).
- Production: missing or wrong-length input is fatal at boot.
- Development: 32-zero-byte fallback so contributors can run the
service without provisioning a secret. Logs a loud warning.
- wrapMasterKey / unwrapMasterKey use Web Crypto AES-GCM-256 over the
raw 32-byte MK with a fresh 12-byte IV per wrap. Returns base64
pair for storage.
- generateMasterKey + activeKekId helpers used by the service.
- Future migration to KMS / Vault: only loadKek() changes; the
kek_id stamp on each row tracks which KEK produced it.
EncryptionVaultService (services/encryption-vault/index.ts)
- init(userId): idempotent — returns existing MK or mints a new one.
- getMasterKey(userId): unwraps the stored MK; throws VaultNotFoundError
on no-row so the route can return 404 cleanly.
- rotate(userId): mints fresh MK, replaces wrap. Caller is on the
hook for re-encryption — destructive by design.
- withUserScope(userId, fn): wraps every read/write in a Drizzle
transaction with set_config('app.current_user_id', userId, true)
so the RLS policy admits only the matching row. Empty userId is
rejected up-front.
- writeAudit() appends a row to encryption_vault_audit on every
action including failures, so probing attempts leave a trail.
Routes (routes/encryption-vault.ts)
- POST /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/init — idempotent bootstrap
- GET /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/key — fetch the active MK
- POST /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/rotate — destructive rotation
- All return base64-encoded master key bytes plus formatVersion +
kekId. JWT-protected via the existing /api/v1/me/* middleware.
- readAuditContext() pulls X-Forwarded-For + User-Agent off the
request for the audit row.
Bootstrap (index.ts)
- loadKek() runs at top-level await before any route can fire so a
misconfigured KEK fails closed at boot, never at request time.
- encryptionVaultService is mounted under /api/v1/me/encryption-vault
so it inherits the existing JWT middleware and shows up next to the
GDPR self-service endpoints.
Tests (services/encryption-vault/kek.test.ts)
- 11 Bun-test cases covering: KEK load (happy path, wrong length,
idempotent, before-load guard), generateMasterKey randomness,
wrap/unwrap roundtrip, IV uniqueness across repeated wraps,
wrong-MK-length rejection, tampered-ciphertext rejection,
wrong-length IV rejection, wrong-KEK rejection.
- Service-level integration tests deferred — they need a real
Postgres for the RLS behaviour, set up via existing mana-sync
test pattern in CI.
Config + env
- .env.development gains MANA_AUTH_KEK= (empty → dev fallback)
with a comment explaining the production requirement.
- services/mana-auth/package.json gains "test": "bun test".
Verified: 11/11 KEK tests passing, 31/31 Phase 1 client tests still
passing, only pre-existing TS errors remain in mana-auth (auth.ts:281
forgetPassword + api-keys.ts:50 insert overload — both unrelated).
Phase 3: client wires the MemoryKeyProvider to GET /encryption-vault/key
on login, flips registry entries to enabled:true table by table, and
extends the Dexie hooks to call wrapValue/unwrapValue on configured
fields.
Phase 4: settings UI for lock state, key rotation, recovery code opt-in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The unified web app calls auth.mana.how/api/v1/settings to sync theme,
nav, locale, and device settings — but the endpoint was missing, causing
404 errors in production. Implements all 7 CRUD routes against the
existing auth.user_settings table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace direct Brevo SMTP sending with HTTP calls to mana-notify's
notification API. This centralizes all email configuration in one
service (mana-notify) and removes the nodemailer dependency from
mana-auth. SMTP provider is now swappable via a single env var.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract ~120 hardcoded German strings from 14 Svelte components into i18n locale
files using svelte-i18n $t() calls. Add new translation sections (taskForm, filters,
tags, subtasks, durationPicker, kanban, toolbar) across all 5 languages (de/en/fr/es/it).
Also add missing shared common translations for Spanish, French, and Italian
(150+ keys each) in packages/shared-i18n.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Introduces a tiered access control system so apps can be released
gradually (founder → alpha → beta → public) without extra infrastructure.
Users are gated at the AuthGate level based on their tier vs the app's
requiredTier. All apps remain deployed and reachable, but only users
with sufficient tier can enter.
- Add accessTier enum + column to users schema (default: 'public')
- Add tier claim to JWT payload in better-auth config
- Add requiredTier field to ManaApp interface + all 25 apps
- Add hasAppAccess(), getAccessibleManaApps(), ACCESS_TIER_LABELS
- Update AuthGate with tier check + access denied screen
- Update getPillAppItems + Home page to filter by user tier
- Update all 22 app layouts to pass user tier to PillNav
- Add admin API: GET/PUT /api/v1/admin/users/:id/tier
- Document access tier system in CLAUDE.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Route all AI workloads (Ollama, STT, TTS, Image Gen) to GPU server
(192.168.178.11) via LAN instead of host.docker.internal
- Upgrade default model to gemma3:12b and max concurrent to 5
- Add daily signup limit service (MAX_DAILY_SIGNUPS env var)
- Add GET /api/v1/auth/signup-status public endpoint
- Add k6 load test suite (web-apps, auth, sync-websocket, ollama)
- Add capacity planning documentation
- Fix: add eslint-config to sveltekit-base and calendar Dockerfiles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Complete the mana-auth Hono service with all remaining endpoints
from mana-core-auth.
Added:
- routes/auth.ts: Full auth flow (register, login, logout, validate,
password reset, profile, change-password, account deletion,
security events) with lockout + security event logging
- routes/guilds.ts: Guild CRUD, member management, invitations
(delegates to Better Auth org plugin + mana-credits for pools)
- routes/api-keys.ts: API key generation, listing, revocation,
validation (sk_live_* format, SHA-256 hashed)
- routes/me.ts: GDPR data export/delete (Articles 17 & 20)
- services/security.ts: SecurityEventsService (fire-and-forget audit)
+ AccountLockoutService (5 failures/15min → 30min lockout)
- services/api-keys.ts: Key generation, validation, scope checks
Updated:
- index.ts: Wire all routes with proper middleware (JWT, service auth)
Service now has ~1,900 LOC covering all functionality from the
original ~11,500 LOC NestJS mana-core-auth (83% reduction).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rewrite the central authentication service from NestJS to Hono + Bun.
Uses Better Auth's native fetch-based handler — no Express conversion.
Key architecture changes:
- Better Auth handler mounted directly on Hono (app.all('/api/auth/*'))
- No NestJS DI, modules, guards, decorators — plain TypeScript
- JWT validation via jose (same as extracted services)
- Email via nodemailer (simplified, German templates)
- ~1,400 LOC vs ~11,500 LOC in NestJS (88% reduction)
Service structure:
- auth/better-auth.config.ts — copied from mana-core-auth (framework-agnostic)
- auth/stores.ts — in-memory stores for email redirect URLs
- email/send.ts — nodemailer email functions
- middleware/ — JWT auth, service auth, error handler (shared pattern)
- db/schema/ — copied from mana-core-auth (Drizzle, framework-agnostic)
Port: 3001 (same as mana-core-auth — drop-in replacement)
Database: mana_auth (same DB, same schemas)
Better Auth plugins: Organization, JWT (EdDSA), OIDC Provider,
Two-Factor (TOTP), Magic Link
Note: This is the initial version. Guilds, API keys, Me (GDPR),
security (lockout/audit), and admin endpoints will be added
incrementally. The old mana-core-auth remains until fully replaced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
