Five documentation surfaces gained encryption awareness in this
sweep. Before this commit, the only place anyone could learn about
the at-rest encryption layer or the zero-knowledge opt-in was the
internal DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md. New contributors and self-hosters
would never discover one of the most important features of the
product just by reading the standard onboarding docs.
apps/docs/src/content/docs/architecture/security.mdx (NEW)
----------------------------------------------------------
First-class user-facing security page in the Starlight site,
slotted into the Architecture sidebar between Authentication and
Backend.
Sections:
- What's encrypted (overview table of 27 modules + the
intentional plaintext carve-outs)
- Standard mode flow with ASCII diagram
- "What Mana CAN see" trust statements per mode
- Zero-knowledge mode setup walkthrough (Steps component)
- Unlock flow on a new device
- Recovery code rotation
- Deployment requirements (the loud MANA_AUTH_KEK warning)
- Audit trail action vocabulary
- Threat model summary table
- Implementation file references with paths
services/mana-auth/CLAUDE.md
----------------------------
New "Encryption Vault" section under Key Endpoints, listing all 7
routes (status, init, key, rotate, recovery-wrap GET+DELETE,
zero-knowledge) with their HTTP method, path, error codes, and a
description. Mentions the three CHECK constraints + RLS + audit
table. Points readers at DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md and the new
security.mdx for the deep dive.
Environment Variables block gains MANA_AUTH_KEK with a multi-line
comment explaining the openssl rand command + dev fallback warning.
apps/mana/CLAUDE.md
-------------------
Full rewrite. The existing file was from the Supabase era and
described things like @supabase/ssr, safeGetSession(), and a
five-table schema with users + organizations + teams that doesn't
exist any more. Replaced with the unified-app architecture:
- Module system layout (collections.ts / queries.ts / stores/)
- Mana Auth (Better Auth + EdDSA JWT) instead of Supabase
- Local-first data layer with the full pipeline diagram
- At-rest encryption section with the "when writing module code
that touches sensitive fields" 4-step guide
- Updated routing structure (no more separate /organizations,
/teams routes)
- Module store pattern code example
- Reference document table at the bottom pointing at the audit,
the new security.mdx, and the auth doc
Root CLAUDE.md
--------------
New "At-Rest Encryption (Phase 1–9)" subsection under the
Local-First Architecture section. Two-mode trust summary table,
production requirement for MANA_AUTH_KEK with the openssl command,
the "when writing module code" 4-step guide, and a reference
table. New contributors reading the root CLAUDE.md from top to
bottom now hit encryption naturally as part of the data layer
discussion.
.env.macmini.example
--------------------
MANA_AUTH_KEK was missing from the production env example
entirely — the macmini deployment would silently boot on the
32-zero-byte dev fallback if you copied this file. Added with a
multi-paragraph comment covering: how to generate, why it's
required, how to store securely (Docker secrets / KMS / Vault),
and the rotation caveat.
apps/docs/src/content/docs/deployment/self-hosting.mdx
------------------------------------------------------
Two changes:
1. Added MANA_AUTH_KEK to the mana-auth service block in the
Compose example with an inline comment pointing at the new
section below.
2. New "Encryption Vault Setup" H2 section with subsections:
- Generating a KEK (with a fake example value labelled DO NOT
USE — generate your own)
- Securing the KEK (Docker secrets, KMS, systemd
LoadCredential, anti-patterns)
- "What if I lose the KEK?" — explains the data is
unrecoverable by design and mitigation via zero-knowledge
mode opt-in
- KEK rotation — calls out the missing background re-wrap
job as a known limitation
apps/docs/astro.config.mjs
--------------------------
Added "Security & Encryption" entry to the Architecture sidebar
between Authentication and Backend so the new page is reachable
from the docs nav.
Astro check: 0 errors, 0 warnings, 0 hints across 4 .astro files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Marks the four backlog items closed in this session — vault service
integration tests, recovery code rotation, pre-wired insert helpers
for future server-pushed records, and boards/boardItems encryption.
Updates the encrypted-tables list to 27 tables.
Updates
-------
1. Sprint table grows by 4 rows (BL1, BL2, BL3+4, BL5) with the
four backlog commits.
2. Test-Status line bumped:
21 web test files → 21 web + 2 mana-auth
78 vitest crypto tests + 39 bun mana-auth tests
"25+ tables" → "27 tables" (boards + boardItems added)
3. Section 5 encrypted-tables list grows by:
- boards (name, description)
- boardItems (textContent, only when itemType === 'text')
Both labelled "9 BL" in the Phase column to mark them as
backlog-sweep additions.
4. "Tabellen ohne Encryption (bewusst)" subsection: removed the
stale "boards/boardItems are a candidate for later" entry —
they're encrypted now. Added a redirect note pointing readers
at Section 6 where the actual decision is recorded.
5. Section 6 ("Backlog") completely restructured. The flat
"in priority order" list became two subsections:
"Abgeschlossen (Phase 9 Follow-Up Sweep)" — table with the four
commits + a one-line "what" notice each. Item 3+4 is explicitly
marked as a re-frame: the original "server pushes plaintext"
risk turned out to overstate the problem because the
generate/upload UIs are TODO stubs. The fix was pre-wired
insert() helpers, not a server-side rewrite.
"Offen" — five remaining items, reordered:
1. File-Bytes-Encryption (NEW: surfaced as "#4b" while
documenting that filesStore.insert() only protects metadata)
2. Image-Generation / File-Upload Wire-Up (NEW: ensures the
future UIs go through the helpers from #3+4)
3. Conflict Visualization UI (unchanged)
4. Composite Indexes für Multi-Account (unchanged)
5. V3 Migration Tests (unchanged)
6. Eckdaten line bumped from "25+ Tabellen aktiv" to "27 Tabellen
aktiv". Best Practices line for ZK gets the "+ rotate im
Active-State-Support" suffix.
7. Last-update header bumped to today.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes backlog #5 from the Phase 9 audit. Adds two new registry
entries (boards, boardItems) and wraps the boards store + queries
+ search provider so the moodboard names, descriptions and
text-item content are sealed at rest like every other user-typed
field.
Registry
--------
- boards: ['name', 'description']
- boardItems: ['textContent']
Inline comments explain that textContent is only set when
itemType === 'text' (image-type items have it null, encryptRecord
is a pass-through). Coordinates / dimensions / z-index / opacity
stay plaintext for the canvas renderer.
Boards store
------------
- createBoard: snapshots plaintext for the return value before
encryptRecord mutates the row in place
- updateBoard: encrypts the diff before update, then re-fetches +
decrypts for the return value (so the caller gets plaintext,
not the ciphertext we just wrote)
- duplicateBoard: NEW behaviour — explicitly decrypts the
original board first because the duplicate concatenates "(Kopie)"
onto the name string. Concatenating onto a "enc:1:..." prefix
would produce a malformed blob that fails to decrypt later.
The board items are spread directly because the duplicate
uses the SAME master key, so the existing ciphertext stays
valid; encryptRecord is idempotent on already-encrypted strings
so it's a no-op safety check.
Reads
-----
- useAllBoards: decrypts the visible board set before mapping. The
item count map only reads structural fields (deletedAt + boardId)
so it doesn't need a decrypt pass for boardItems.
- allBoards$ raw observable: same pattern
- search/providers/picture: decrypts before substring scoring
against the user query
The unified mana app currently has no UI that renders boardItems
.textContent (the seed data in collections.ts is exported as
PICTURE_GUEST_SEED but never imported anywhere — dead code), so
no item-side reader needs touching for this commit. When a future
canvas editor lands it'll go through the existing decryptRecord
helpers naturally.
78/78 crypto tests still pass (registry shape unchanged at the API
level).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes backlog #3+4 from the Phase 9 audit. The original framing —
"server-pushed records bypass client-side encryption" — turned out
to overstate the problem after a code audit:
- apps/mana/apps/web/src/routes/(app)/picture/generate/+page.svelte
is currently a TODO stub. The handleGenerate() function returns
"requires connection to Picture-Server (port 3006)" without
inserting anything.
- There is no fileTable.add() call site anywhere in the unified
mana app. File uploads still happen via the standalone storage
server in apps/storage and arrive via legacy mana-sync push.
So the production code path that would write plaintext images or
files to the user's IndexedDB doesn't yet exist. The risk only
materialises when someone wires up the in-app generate / upload
UI in the unified app.
The right action is to leave behind a clearly-labelled, encryption-
aware insert() helper on each store so the future implementation
has an obvious "do the right thing" path to call. This commit does
exactly that.
picture/stores/images.svelte.ts
-------------------------------
New imagesStore.insert(image: LocalImage) method:
- Calls encryptRecord('images', image) to seal `prompt` +
`negativePrompt` (the two registered encrypted fields)
- Calls imageTable().add(image)
- Fires the PictureEvents.imageCreated analytic (replaces the
old plain-table-add path)
A long doc comment on the method explains the architectural
reasoning: the server cannot encrypt under the user's master key
(the key only lives in the browser), so the generation flow MUST
round-trip through the client store even if the AI call itself
happens server-side. The pattern is documented as:
1. Client posts { prompt, negativePrompt, ... } to image-gen API
2. Server returns { storagePath, generationId, dimensions, ... }
3. Client calls imagesStore.insert(...) with both halves
4. encryptRecord seals the prompt fields before the IndexedDB write
The mixed-state guarantee from picture/queries.ts already covers
the migration window where some images came in via legacy
server-side push and others through this path — decryptRecord
passes plaintext through and unwraps ciphertext blobs.
storage/stores/files.svelte.ts
------------------------------
New filesStore.insert(file: LocalFile) method:
- Calls encryptRecord('files', file) to seal `name` +
`originalName`
- Calls fileTable.add(file)
Same architectural reasoning applies. The doc comment also flags a
SEPARATE concern that this commit does NOT address: encrypting the
actual file *bytes* on S3 (so the storage provider can't read the
content) needs streaming AES-GCM and is a much bigger lift. Tracked
as "backlog #4b" in the comment for whoever picks it up next.
(No analytic call yet on the storage side because StorageEvents
doesn't have a fileUploaded() event — the upload UI is unbuilt, so
adding the analytic event is up to whoever lands the UI.)
Pre-existing TS error on line 46 of images.svelte.ts (the
`toggleField(imageTable(), ...)` Drizzle/Dexie type variance bug)
is unchanged — it predates Phase 9 and is not introduced by this
commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes backlog #2 from the Phase 9 audit. Lets a user replace their
recovery code without going through the disable→generate→re-enable
dance. Works in BOTH standard and zero-knowledge modes.
vault-client
------------
New rotateRecoveryCode() method on the VaultClient interface.
Returns RecoveryCodeSetupResult, identical shape to setupRecoveryCode.
Branches on the current vault state via getStatus():
Standard mode:
Re-fetches the plaintext MK from the server (same path as the
initial setupRecoveryCode), generates a fresh 32-byte recovery
secret, derives the new wrap key via HKDF, seals the MK, posts
the wrap to /recovery-wrap (idempotent server-side, replaces
the existing row in place).
Zero-knowledge mode:
Server can't hand out the plaintext MK any more, so we use the
cachedUnwrappedMkBytes that unlockWithRecoveryCode stashed when
the user typed in their old recovery code earlier this session.
Throws with a clear message if the cache is empty (e.g. user
landed on the page via init rather than recovery-unlock):
"sign out and back in with your current recovery code first"
so the cache gets repopulated.
Both branches:
- Wipe the raw MK reference after sealing
- Wipe the recovery secret after format
- Return the formatted code for the UI to display
The OLD recovery code is now permanently invalid. Using it on a
future unlock attempt will fail with the standard generic
"wrong recovery code" error.
Settings UI
-----------
New rotateStep state machine ('idle' / 'rotated') runs alongside
the existing zkSetupStep so the user can rotate without leaving the
active-state UI.
In the active-mode card (zkSetupStep === 'enabled'):
- Two side-by-side buttons:
"🔁 Recovery-Code rotieren" + "Zero-Knowledge-Modus wieder deaktivieren …"
- When the user clicks rotate, handleRotateRecoveryCode() runs the
flow and renders an inline "Neuer Recovery-Code" subsection
(same .recovery-code monospace block + Copy button as the
initial setup) with explicit warning that the old code is now
invalid.
- "Ich habe den neuen Code gesichert" button wipes the displayed
code and drops back to idle.
- The disable flow stays available (the rotate UI hides itself
when the user has clicked into the disable confirmation path).
The 28 vault integration tests still pass (39 total in
encryption-vault/, including the existing 11 KEK tests). The new
rotateRecoveryCode method reuses the already-tested
setRecoveryWrap server endpoint, so no new server-side tests are
needed for this commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Marks the Zero-Knowledge opt-in as live and documents the new
architecture surface so future readers can understand the trust
model without spelunking through six commits.
Updates
-------
1. Sprint table grows from Phase 1–8 to Phase 1–9, adds the six new
commits (4 milestones + 2 follow-ups: status endpoint + lock-screen
modal). Test count bumped from 262 to 284 (22 new in recovery.test.ts).
2. Section 5 "Encryption Pipeline" reworked:
- "Wer hält was?" now has TWO tables — Standard-Modus and
Zero-Knowledge-Modus — making the trust model difference explicit
- New "Recovery-Code-Pipeline" subsection with two ASCII flow
diagrams (setup + unlock) showing every step from "user clicks
button" to "MK in MemoryKeyProvider"
- New "Schlüssel- + Datei-Kette für Phase 9" table mapping each
code path to its file
3. "Was Mana technisch (nicht) sehen kann" rewritten to compare both
modes side by side. Standard mode keeps the existing
"theoretically decryptable by KEK operator" disclosure;
zero-knowledge mode is upgraded to a hard "computationally
incapable" guarantee — and the trade-off ("Recovery-Code lost =
data lost") is called out explicitly. The DB CHECK constraint
that enforces "ZK active ⇒ recovery wrap exists" is mentioned as
the schema-level safety net.
4. Backlog reordered. Phase 9 is no longer listed as an open item;
the only true-zero-knowledge follow-up is now item #1 (service
tests against real Postgres for the four new vault methods,
analogous to the existing kek.test.ts pattern but needing a
container DB). Items 2–8 are unchanged from the previous
roundup.
5. Eckdaten + Best Practices + final production-grade summary all
reflect the new ZK opt-in. Schwachstelle #4 row updated to
"Phase 1–9".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the second Phase 9 follow-up. When a user has zero-knowledge
mode active and signs in on a new device (or after a session expiry),
the layout's vault-unlock effect lands in the new
'awaiting-recovery-code' state. Previously this was a dead end —
the layout just logged a warning and the rest of the app sat with a
locked vault.
This commit adds the missing UI piece: a non-dismissable modal that
mounts whenever the unlock effect signals 'awaiting-recovery-code'.
RecoveryCodeUnlockModal component
---------------------------------
- Reads the singleton vault client via getVaultClient()
- Single text input + submit button
- On submit:
1. Calls vaultClient.unlockWithRecoveryCode(input)
2. On success: clears input, calls onUnlocked() prop → parent
hides the modal, app boots normally
3. On RecoveryCodeFormatError: shows a format hint
4. On any other error (wrong code OR corrupted blob — surfaced
uniformly so an attacker can't distinguish): shows
"Recovery-Code falsch, prüfe deine Eingabe"
- Non-dismissable: there's no Cancel button. Without the recovery
code the app cannot read encrypted data and would just sit in a
half-broken state. The user can sign out from the header (the
auth flow runs above the encryption layer) if they need to bail.
- Help text at the bottom is honest about the irreversible nature
of losing the recovery code.
Layout integration
------------------
+layout.svelte:
- Imports the modal
- New `needsRecoveryCode = $state(false)` flag
- The vault-unlock effect now switches on three branches instead
of just success/failure:
'unlocked' → needsRecoveryCode = false
'awaiting-recovery-code' → needsRecoveryCode = true (mount modal)
anything else → console.warn (unchanged)
- Logout path also resets needsRecoveryCode so the modal doesn't
leak across sessions
- {#if needsRecoveryCode} mounts the component at the bottom of
the markup (above the existing global toasts and banners)
The autofocus warning is suppressed via svelte-ignore — the input
needs immediate focus because it's the only thing the user can
interact with on this surface, and screen-reader users will hear
the modal's accessible name from the role="dialog" + aria-labelledby
binding.
End-to-end smoke flow that now works:
1. User goes to /settings/security on Device A, enables ZK
2. User signs out, signs back in on Device B
3. Layout effect calls vaultClient.unlock() → server returns
recovery blob → vaultClient state goes to awaiting-recovery-code
4. Modal mounts, user pastes their recovery code from password
manager
5. unlockWithRecoveryCode runs the inline AES-GCM unwrap, imports
the MK as non-extractable, caches the bytes for a future
disable, transitions to 'unlocked'
6. Modal calls onUnlocked → layout dismisses modal → rest of the
app boots and renders decrypted data
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the Phase 9 Milestone 4 known limitation where the settings
page always started in 'idle' state regardless of whether the user
had already enabled zero-knowledge mode. Adds a cheap server-side
status read + hydrates the page on mount.
Server side
-----------
New VaultStatus interface and getStatus(userId) method on
EncryptionVaultService — single SELECT against encryption_vaults,
no decryption, no audit logging (this gets called on every settings
page mount and we don't want to flood the audit log with read-only
metadata fetches). Returns sane defaults when the vault row doesn't
exist yet so the client can avoid a 404 dance.
GET /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/status →
{
vaultExists: boolean,
hasRecoveryWrap: boolean,
zeroKnowledge: boolean,
recoverySetAt: string | null
}
Client side
-----------
vault-client.ts gains a `getStatus()` method that bypasses the
fetchVault retry helper (status reads should be cheap and one-shot;
if they fail we let the caller fall back to defaults). Re-exports
VaultStatus + RecoveryCodeSetupResult from the crypto barrel.
settings/security/+page.svelte
------------------------------
onMount kicks off a getStatus() call. Two things change based on
the response:
1. If the server says zero_knowledge=true, jump zkSetupStep to
'enabled' so the page renders the active-state UI directly
instead of the setup flow.
2. New `hasRecoveryWrap` state tracks whether a wrap is stored,
even if ZK isn't active yet. The idle branch now has TWO
variants:
- hasRecoveryWrap=false: original "Recovery-Code einrichten"
single button (unchanged from milestone 4)
- hasRecoveryWrap=true: amber notice "you have a code stored
but ZK isn't active" with three buttons:
* "Zero-Knowledge jetzt aktivieren" (jumps straight to the
enable call)
* "Neuen Recovery-Code generieren" (rotates the wrap)
* "Recovery-Code entfernen" (with two-click confirmation,
calls DELETE /recovery-wrap)
This handles the previously-orphaned state where a user generated a
code, copied it to their password manager, but never confirmed the
final activation step. Without this branch, after a reload the
settings page would show "Setup" again and the call would fail
with "vault is already in zero-knowledge mode" — except it wouldn't,
because the vault wasn't actually in ZK yet, just had a recovery wrap
stored. Either way the state was confusing.
handleSetupRecoveryCode + handleClearRecoveryCode now keep
hasRecoveryWrap in sync after the round trip.
Fail-quiet on getStatus error: if the network/auth/server-side fetch
fails, the page stays at the idle default. The user can still run
the setup flow, and any inconsistencies surface via the usual
server-side error responses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the user-facing setup + management surface for the Phase 9
recovery code + zero-knowledge opt-in. Lives in
/settings/security between the Rotate and Honest-disclosure cards.
Three-step setup flow
---------------------
Step 1 — Generate
Single button "Recovery-Code einrichten". Disabled unless the
vault is currently unlocked. Clicks call vaultClient.setupRecoveryCode()
which mints a fresh 32-byte secret, derives the wrap key, posts
the sealed wrap to /recovery-wrap, and returns the formatted code.
Step 2 — Display + copy
Shows the formatted code (1A2B-3C4D-...) in a monospace, user-
selectable block with a 📋 Copy button. Explicit warning: "Wir
zeigen ihn dir nur ein einziges Mal." User clicks "Ich habe den
Code gesichert" to advance.
Step 3 — Confirm
User has to type (or paste) the code back into a verification
input. Comparison is case-insensitive and ignores dashes/whitespace
on both sides so format jitter doesn't punish them. Mismatch shows
a clear inline error and stays in the same step.
Step 4 — Activate
Final danger confirmation: "Wenn du jetzt aktivierst, löscht der
Server seine Kopie deines Schlüssels." Click → vaultClient.
enableZeroKnowledge() → server NULLs out wrapped_mk + wrap_iv,
state flips to 'enabled', generatedCode is wiped from the closure.
Active state
------------
After enable, the section shows a green "✅ Zero-Knowledge-Modus
aktiv" panel with a "Disable" button. Disabling needs an unlocked
vault (the cached MK bytes from the recovery-code unlock get sent
back to the server for KEK re-wrapping). Two-click confirmation
guards the destructive call.
State machine
-------------
zkSetupStep: 'idle' → 'generated' → 'confirming' → 'enabling' → 'enabled'
plus a `handleResetSetup` escape that clears the in-flight code +
input + error and drops back to 'idle' from any step.
Known limitation: the page state doesn't survive a reload — there
is no GET /encryption-vault/status endpoint yet to query the
server's current zero_knowledge flag, so on a fresh page load we
always start at 'idle' regardless of whether ZK is actually on.
A future commit will add the status endpoint + an onMount call to
hydrate zkSetupStep correctly. For now, the existing
'awaiting-recovery-code' badge from milestone 3 covers the lock-
screen path, and the dashboard sets the right initial state at
unlock time.
Status badge fix from milestone 3 (statusBadge() handling the new
'awaiting-recovery-code' variant) is reused here.
Styles
------
.zk-error — light red bordered alert for inline errors
.zk-actions — flex row of buttons (wraps on mobile)
.zk-step — bordered group with the step heading
.recovery-code — monospace, user-select:all so click+copy works
.recovery-input — monospace input for the confirm step
.btn-ghost — transparent border-less variant for "Abbrechen"
Dark-mode handling for the new surfaces is in the existing media
query block.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extends the browser-side vault client with five new methods that
mirror the server-side Phase 9 routes, plus a new
`awaiting-recovery-code` state that pauses the unlock mid-flow
when the server is in zero-knowledge mode.
VaultUnlockState gains a fourth variant
---------------------------------------
| { status: 'awaiting-recovery-code' }
This is the state the client sits in between calling unlock()
(which received a recovery blob from GET /key) and the user typing
their recovery code into the UI. The settings page status badge
got updated to render this case as "🔑 Recovery-Code erforderlich".
New closure state inside createVaultClient
------------------------------------------
- pendingRecoveryBlob: stash for the recovery wrap returned by
GET /key in zero-knowledge mode. unlockWithRecoveryCode reads
from here so the second round of input doesn't need a re-fetch.
- cachedUnwrappedMkBytes: kept ONLY when the vault was unlocked
via the recovery code path AND the user might want to disable
zero-knowledge later (which needs to hand the MK back to the
server for KEK re-wrapping). The standard unlock path leaves
this null because the server already has the KEK wrap. Wiped
on lock(), on disable success, and on any state transition
that destroys the master key.
Modified existing methods
-------------------------
- unlock(): branches on the response shape. If the server returns
a recovery blob (zero-knowledge mode), stash it via
awaitRecoveryCode() and return state='awaiting-recovery-code'.
Otherwise unwrap as before. Same fork applies to the /init
fallback path.
- rotate(): if the server somehow returned a ZK shape (it should
never — rotate is forbidden in ZK mode server-side), bail with
a server error instead of silently misinterpreting bytes.
- lock(): also clears pendingRecoveryBlob + wipes
cachedUnwrappedMkBytes.
New methods (all wired into the returned VaultClient)
-----------------------------------------------------
- setupRecoveryCode(): generates a fresh 32-byte recovery secret,
derives the wrap key, re-fetches the active master key in
extractable form, seals it, posts to /recovery-wrap, returns
the formatted recovery code for the UI to display. Wipes both
raw byte references after the seal. Caller is responsible for
clearing the formatted string from memory once the user has
confirmed they backed it up.
- clearRecoveryCode(): DELETE /recovery-wrap. Server enforces the
"not while ZK is active" rule.
- enableZeroKnowledge(): POST /zero-knowledge { enable: true }.
Maps RECOVERY_WRAP_MISSING server response to a clear "set up
a recovery code first" client error.
- disableZeroKnowledge(): POST /zero-knowledge { enable: false,
masterKey: base64 }. Reads the cached MK bytes, base64-encodes,
sends. Wipes the cache after success.
- unlockWithRecoveryCode(code): completes the flow that started
in unlock(). Parses the user-typed code (RecoveryCodeFormatError
bubbles up if the shape is wrong), derives the wrap key, runs a
single inline AES-GCM decrypt on the stashed blob (yields both
the raw bytes for the cache AND a non-extractable runtime key
for the provider), wipes raw bytes, transitions to 'unlocked'.
Generic error message on failure ("wrong recovery code or
corrupted vault") so an attacker can't distinguish wrong-code
from tampered-blob. Stays in 'awaiting-recovery-code' on
failure so the user can retry without a re-fetch.
Drive-by stale test fix
-----------------------
aes.test.ts had an assertion from Phase 1 that `tasks` and `events`
return null because they were on enabled:false. Phase 7.1 flipped
both tables on, so the assertion has been failing since that
commit. Replaced the test with a stable negative case
(non-existent table name) that doesn't shift with each rollout
phase.
Test results: 78/78 crypto tests pass after the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Six independent pre-launch tidy-ups bundled because they all touch
the same module-layer surface and the larger commit reads more
clearly than six adjacent two-line PRs.
1. database.ts schema v1–v10 collapsed into a single canonical
db.version(1). The system has no live users yet, so dropping the
versioned migration history is the cheapest moment to do it.
The post-collapse Dexie table set is provably identical to the
pre-collapse state (asserted by module-registry.test.ts).
Removed: EMOJI_TO_ICON map + v2 upgrade, v3 timeBlocks data
migration (~250 LOC of one-shot code), versions 4-10.
Also dropped the @deprecated `setApplyingServerChanges()` shim
(replaced by `beginApplyingTables()` weeks ago, no callers).
2. LocalLabel @deprecated alias renamed to TaskTag in the todo
module and all 11 consumers (board-views, ListView, DetailView,
QuickAddTask, +page.svelte). The alias was annotated @deprecated
but had eleven live consumers — exactly the worst kind of dead
code, the one that grows accidental new consumers via autocomplete
the longer it stays. Renamed to TaskTag rather than `Tag` to
avoid colliding with the `Tag` icon from `@mana/shared-icons`.
3. labelsStore backward-compat alias deleted from todo/stores —
pure dead code with zero consumers.
4. EMOJI_TO_ICON_MAP fallback in habits/queries removed. The
constant only existed as the in-memory equivalent of the v2
schema migration that was just deleted; once no record can have
the old `emoji` field, the fallback can never fire.
5. useAllEvents() in calendar/queries removed. JSDoc itself called
it out as "for backward compatibility with calendar-specific
views" — zero external consumers, only the barrel referenced it.
6. $lib/stores/tags.svelte.ts re-export shim deleted. It was a
20-line pure re-export from @mana/shared-stores with the explicit
header "for backward compatibility with existing imports".
Thirteen importers (todo/calendar/contacts/places/zitare ListView
+ DetailView, plus +layout.svelte and the calendar/contacts/tags
route +page.svelte files) rewritten to import directly.
7. SearchRegistry got `registerLazy(appId, loader)` and the eleven
per-app providers now register via dynamic `import()`. Spotlight
search is opened on demand, so the eleven provider chunks stay
out of the initial JS bundle until the user actually searches.
Sister benefit: a search filtered to a single appId only loads
that one provider.
The structural backbone for all of this — the per-module
`module.config.ts` files plus `module-registry.{ts,test.ts}` — was
committed earlier in 5d4123d2b.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Twelve `*-api.mana.how` Cloudflare hostnames (todo, calendar, contacts,
chat, storage, cards, music, picture, presi, zitare, clock, context)
plus their matching `lib/api/services/*.ts` clients still existed in
the unified web app even though the per-app HTTP backends had been
gone since the local-first migration. Their tunnel routes pointed at
ports nothing listened on, so every consumer call returned 502 — and
the corresponding `__PUBLIC_*_API_URL__` runtime variables were
silently injected into every page render.
The only live consumer was `qrExportService` (committed separately as
part of the rewrite to read directly from Dexie). Two admin / data-
management pages also imported the types but were already migrated
to the unified `adminService` / `myDataService` clients.
Removed:
- Twenty-four files deleted: the twelve `lib/api/services/*.ts`
clients plus their `*.test.ts` siblings.
- `services/index.ts` collapsed from a thirteen-symbol re-export
to just the four genuinely server-bound services
(`adminService`, `landing`, `myDataService`, `qrExportService`).
- `hooks.server.ts` no longer reads or injects any of the twelve
`__PUBLIC_*_API_URL__` runtime variables, and the CSP `connect-src`
list shrank by the same amount. Memoro server URL also removed
since the unified `memoro` module is fully local-first and never
hit the standalone server (the docker-compose service stays
defined for the mobile app).
- `routes/status/+page.server.ts` stops probing the dead per-app
health endpoints — only `auth`, `sync`, `uload-server`, `media`
and `llm` remain in the public status page.
The cloudflared tunnel ingress entries for these hostnames were also
removed in `~/.cloudflared/config.yml` on the Mac Mini (not in this
repo) so the formerly-502 responses now return 404 from the edge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`rrule@2.8.1` ships dual CJS/ESM builds but its `package.json` has no
`exports` field, so the SvelteKit Node adapter resolves it to the CJS
bundle at runtime. The named import `import { RRule } from 'rrule'`
then throws `SyntaxError: Named export 'RRule' not found` whenever
`/calendar` SSRs, which crashed every render of the route in production.
Adding `'rrule'` to `ssr.noExternal` forces Vite to bundle rrule into
the server output, where its CJS↔ESM interop layer handles the named
import correctly. The source files using rrule (`time-blocks/recurrence.ts`
and `calendar/components/CustomRecurrenceBuilder.svelte`) need no change.
Surfaced via the rebuilt `health-check.sh` ingress walk after a
postgres restart cycle pushed mana-app-web into a 500 state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundation for the zero-knowledge opt-in. New crypto/recovery.ts
provides the user-held secret half of the Phase 9 design:
- generateRecoverySecret() — 32 random bytes (256 bits) from Web
Crypto CSPRNG
- formatRecoveryCode() — renders raw bytes as 16 dash-separated
groups of 4 uppercase hex chars: "1A2B-3C4D-5E6F-..." (79 chars
total). Copy-pasteable, password-manager-friendly, no language
dependency.
- parseRecoveryCode() — tolerant inverse: strips whitespace + any
dash placement, accepts mixed case, throws RecoveryCodeFormatError
on wrong length / non-hex (no position-leaking errors)
- deriveRecoveryWrapKey() — HKDF-SHA256 with empty salt + versioned
info "mana-recovery-v1" → non-extractable AES-GCM-256 wrap key.
HKDF (not PBKDF2/scrypt) because the input already has full 256
bits of entropy — no slow KDF needed.
- wrapMasterKeyWithRecovery() — exports the master key bytes,
AES-GCM-encrypts with the recovery wrap key, returns base64
ciphertext + IV ready for the server. Wipes the raw MK reference
immediately after sealing.
- unwrapMasterKeyWithRecovery() — inverse, returns a non-extractable
CryptoKey. Throws uniformly on wrong code / tampered ciphertext —
the UI maps both to "wrong recovery code" so an attacker gets no
side-channel signal about which check failed.
Why hex over BIP-39?
- No 2048-word wordlist to bundle (~17 KB even gzipped)
- 32 random bytes have full 256 bits of entropy on their own — no
checksum word needed because there's nothing to "validate"
- Trivially copy-pasteable into any password manager, no language
dependency, no autocomplete-confusing dictionary words
- Survives autocorrect (no spaces)
22 tests in recovery.test.ts cover:
- generation (length, randomness)
- format (16 groups, uppercase, total 79 chars, wrong-length input)
- parse (roundtrip, lowercase, whitespace, missing dashes, extra
dashes, error cases, no position leakage)
- key derivation (non-extractable, deterministic, wrong-length input)
- wrap/unwrap roundtrip (with and without format/parse trip)
- failure modes (wrong code, tampered ciphertext)
- IV uniqueness (no reuse on repeated wraps)
This is the self-contained foundation. Server-side schema, vault
service extensions, vault-client wire-up and the settings UI all
build on these primitives in subsequent commits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The encryption rollout is complete. Updates the audit doc to reflect
the final state:
- Encryption-Sprints table grows to Phase 1–8 with the four new
commits (status roundup, 7.1 timeBlocks-coupled, 7.2 storeless,
8 storage/picture/music/events)
- Section 5 encrypted-tables list bumped from 14 to 25+ tables —
adds tasks, calendar.events, timeBlocks, questions, answers,
links, documents, meals, files, images, songs, mukkePlaylists,
socialEvents, eventGuests
- New "Bewusste Plaintext-Carve-Outs" subsection documents the
structural fields kept plaintext on purpose (songs.artist for
browsing aggregations, links.originalUrl for the public redirect
handler, socialEvents decrypt-before-publish, files/images
indexed columns where the index is now a no-op, etc.)
- New "Tabellen ohne Encryption (bewusst)" subsection explains why
manaLinks, boards, boardItems and the sync/system tables stay
out of the registry
- Backlog reordered: the three Phase 7 items are now done, only
Phase 9 (recovery-code opt-in for true zero-knowledge),
server-side image/file wrapping, and the boards edge case remain
- "Test-Status" line + "Best Practices" line + "Eckdaten" line all
bumped from 22 to 25+ tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the last sweep of registry entries that were stuck on
enabled:false. Each table is corrected to match the actual schema
fields, then flipped on with writers + readers wrapped.
Registry corrections + flips
----------------------------
- files: was ['name','originalName','notes'] → ['name','originalName']
LocalFile has no `notes` column. `name` IS indexed but no
.where('name') call site exists in the app, so encryption is safe
— the index just becomes a no-op for content lookups.
- images: was ['prompt','negativePrompt','revisedPrompt','notes']
→ ['prompt','negativePrompt']. Neither revisedPrompt nor notes
exists on LocalImage. `prompt` is indexed, same caveat as
files.name.
- songs: was ['title','artist','album','lyrics','notes']
→ ['title']. lyrics + notes don't exist; artist / album /
albumArtist / genre stay PLAINTEXT so the album / artist / genre
browsing views (which aggregate by those fields) don't have to
decrypt the entire library on every render.
- mukkePlaylists: kept ['name','description'], now flipped on
- socialEvents: was ['title','description','notes']
→ ['title','description','location'] (no notes column; location
is the actually sensitive third field)
- eventGuests: was ['name','email','phone','notes']
→ ['name','email','phone','note'] (singular `note`, matching the
schema)
- manaLinks: REMOVED from registry entirely. Despite the name it's
the cross-app foreign-key table — sourceAppId / sourceRecordId /
targetAppId / targetRecordId — with zero user-typed content. The
Phase 1 placeholder listed label/url/notes which don't exist.
Storage (files)
---------------
- storage/stores/files.svelte.ts: renameFile encrypts diff before
fileTable.update. Other store ops touch only metadata (favorite /
isDeleted / parent) so they stay unwrapped.
- storage/queries.ts: useAllFiles decrypts before sort
- storage/ListView.svelte (Workbench): same decrypt-before-render
- storage/views/DetailView.svelte (inline editor binds to plaintext)
- cross-app-queries.useStorageStats: decrypts only the recent slice
(totalSize stays cheap because it reads plaintext .size)
- search/providers/storage: decrypts before substring scoring
- storage/trash/+page.svelte: decrypts the visible deleted set
Picture (images)
----------------
- No client-side .add for images — they arrive purely via sync, so
no store-level encryption to add. Reads are wrapped:
- picture/queries.ts: useAllImages, useArchivedImages, allImages\$
- picture/ListView.svelte (uses prompt as alt text)
- cross-app-queries.useRecentImages (dashboard widget renders prompt)
- search/providers/picture: decrypts before substring scoring
Sync-applied plaintext rows coexist with locally-edited ciphertext
rows without issue — decryptRecord is per-row idempotent on
non-encrypted strings.
Music (songs + playlists)
-------------------------
- music/stores/library.svelte.ts: updateMetadata + insert encrypt
diffs before write
- music/stores/playlists.svelte.ts: create snapshots plaintext for
the return value before encryptRecord mutates the row, update
encrypts diff
- music/queries.ts: useAllSongs decrypts before title sort,
useAllPlaylists decrypts before name sort
- music/ListView.svelte (Workbench)
- music/views/DetailView.svelte (inline editor)
- cross-app-queries.useMusicStats decrypts only the recent slice
- search/providers/music decrypts songs + playlists before scoring
Events (social gatherings + guests)
-----------------------------------
This one needed careful handling because publishEvent is the
exception to the local-only confidentiality model — it intentionally
pushes the event content to a public RSVP page anyone with the link
can read.
- events/stores/events.svelte.ts:
- createEvent encrypts before .add
- updateEvent encrypts the diff before .update
- publishEvent + syncSnapshotIfPublished now DECRYPT the local row
before forwarding to eventsApi.publish / .updateSnapshot — the
server-side public snapshot needs plaintext, by design. The
privacy contract is: drafts and unpublished events are
encrypted at rest; the moment you publish, you accept that the
content becomes readable via the share link.
- events/stores/guests.svelte.ts: addGuest + updateGuest encrypt
diff before write. Guests are NEVER pushed to the public
snapshot, so no decrypt-before-publish path.
- events/queries.ts: useAllEvents, useUpcomingEvents, usePastEvents,
useEvent all decrypt the visible socialEvents rows before joining
with timeBlocks. useGuestsByEvent + useEventGuests decrypt the
eventGuests rows.
Phase 8 is the last big sweep. The registry is now ~25 tables on,
~3 left intentionally off (manaLinks because no user content;
boards / boardItems / dreamSymbols partially handled in earlier
phases). The "what's encrypted?" surface should look complete on
the settings/security page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Five storeless modules whose writes happen directly from view files
(no central store yet) get the same encryption treatment by wrapping
each .add/.update call site with encryptRecord and each read site
with decryptRecord(s). Registry entries are also corrected to match
the actual schemas — the previous Phase 1 placeholder names guessed
the wrong field names.
Registry corrections + flips
----------------------------
- meals: was ['description', 'notes', 'aiAnalysis'] → now
['description', 'portionSize'] (LocalMeal has neither notes nor
aiAnalysis on the schema; portionSize is a short user label same
sensitivity as description)
- documents: was ['title', 'content', 'body'] → now
['title', 'content'] (LocalDocument uses content, no body column)
- links: was ['title', 'description', 'targetUrl'] → now
['title', 'description']. originalUrl STAYS PLAINTEXT — the
public redirect handler resolves shortCode → originalUrl on every
click, encrypting it would force the redirect path to do an async
decrypt before issuing the 302
- questions: was ['title', 'body', 'notes'] → now
['title', 'description'] (LocalQuestion uses description)
- answers: was ['body'] → now ['content'] (LocalAnswer uses content)
All five tables flipped to enabled:true.
Write sites wrapped
-------------------
Each call site builds the row/diff as a typed object, runs
encryptRecord on it, then calls table.add / table.update:
- questions/views/DetailView.svelte (saveField)
- questions/[id]/+page.svelte (saveEdit + answer.add)
- questions/new/+page.svelte (initial create)
- uload/+page.svelte (createLink + saveEdit)
- uload/views/DetailView.svelte (saveField)
- context/documents/+page.svelte (handleCreateDocument)
- context/documents/[id]/+page.svelte (handleSave with encrypted diff)
- context/spaces/[id]/+page.svelte (handleCreateDocument)
- nutriphi/add/+page.svelte (handleSubmit)
Pure metadata writes (toggle pinned, toggle isActive, soft-delete via
deletedAt) are intentionally NOT wrapped — they touch zero encrypted
fields so encryptRecord would be a no-op anyway.
Read sites decrypted
--------------------
- questions/queries.ts: useAllQuestions, useAnswersByQuestion
- questions/views/DetailView.svelte (liveQuery clone)
- questions/ListView.svelte (Workbench)
- uload/queries.ts: allLinks$, useAllLinks, useLinkById
- uload/views/DetailView.svelte (liveQuery clone)
- uload/ListView.svelte
- uload/settings/+page.svelte (decrypts before serializing the
JSON export — otherwise the user would download ciphertext)
- context/queries.ts: useAllDocuments, useSpaceDocuments
- context/ListView.svelte
- cross-app-queries.useRecentDocuments (dashboard widget)
- nutriphi/queries.ts: useAllMeals
- nutriphi/ListView.svelte
The cards/dashboard widget for nutrition only reads m.nutrition (the
plaintext numeric breakdown), so it stays untouched. nutriphi/history
benefits transparently because it consumes useAllMeals which now
decrypts.
Why
---
Closes the second-tier plaintext gaps. The five tables flipped here
were on the registry from day one but stuck behind enabled:false
because no central store existed to hook into. Phase 7.2 takes the
pragmatic approach of wrapping at each call site rather than blocking
on a store extraction refactor — same end result for security, much
smaller diff. A future store consolidation pass can collapse the
duplication without changing the encryption surface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Flips three coordinated registry entries to enabled:true at once:
- tasks: title, description, subtasks, metadata
- events (calendar): title, description, location
- timeBlocks: title, description (NEW entry)
These three tables have to move together because the consumer modules
(todo, calendar) denormalize their title/description into a TimeBlock
for cheap calendar rendering. Encrypting only the source records would
still leak the same fields through the timeBlocks hub. Indexed columns
(startDate, endDate, kind, type, sourceModule/sourceId, parentBlockId,
recurrenceDate, isLive, isCompleted, dueDate, priority) all stay
plaintext — the calendar query layer needs them for range scans.
Service layer
-------------
- time-blocks/service.ts: createBlock + updateBlock now route through
encryptRecord before the Dexie write. startFromScheduled decrypts the
scheduled block first so the new logged block carries plaintext
forward instead of an already-encrypted blob (encryptRecord is
idempotent so this is also defence-in-depth). New decryptBlock helper
for callers that need plaintext outside a liveQuery.
- todo/stores/tasks.svelte.ts: createTask snapshots the plaintext task
before encryptRecord mutates it, returns the snapshot to the UI.
updateTask decrypts the existing row before forwarding task.title as
a fallback into updateBlock (would otherwise leak ciphertext to the
linked TimeBlock). updateLabels + updateSubtasks decrypt-merge-encrypt
so structured fields don't get spliced into a ciphertext blob.
- calendar/stores/events.svelte.ts: encryptRecord wrapped around all
four event-write paths (create, update, updateSingleInstance,
updateAllFuture).
Read paths
----------
Every liveQuery / one-shot read that surfaces title/description/
location through the UI now decrypts after the plaintext-metadata
filter:
- time-blocks/queries.ts: useAllTimeBlocks, timeBlocksInRange$,
timeBlocksBySource$, useLiveTimeBlock
- todo/queries.ts: useAllTasks
- calendar/queries.ts: useAllCalendarItems (decrypts both the blocks
and the joined events)
- cross-app-queries.ts: useOpenTasks, useTodayTasks, useUpcomingTasks,
useUpcomingEvents
- dashboard widgets: DayTimelineWidget, ActivityFeedWidget,
TasksTodayWidget, UpcomingEventsWidget
- search providers: todo + calendar (substring scoring needs
plaintext)
- quick-input adapters: todo + calendar (search-as-you-type)
- calendar/components/ConflictWarning, CalendarHeader (iCal export
embeds title in the file)
- calendar/views/DetailView, todo/views/DetailView (inline editor)
- api/services/qr-export (the QR snapshot would otherwise ship
ciphertext)
- triggers/suggestions (cross-matches habit titles against task /
event titles)
- todo/reminder-source (notification body uses task title)
Habits is implicitly covered: it only writes through createBlock /
updateBlock and only reads block.startDate from the timeBlock side, so
no per-store changes were needed for habits to participate.
Why
---
This closes the last big plaintext gap on the dashboard. tasks +
events + the timeBlocks hub were the highest-value targets after chat
+ contacts because they're the surfaces a casual observer of an
unlocked DB would scan first ("what's this person doing today?"). With
Phase 7.1, the answer to that query is opaque without the master key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Updates DATA_LAYER_AUDIT.md to reflect everything that landed since
the last refresh (which stopped at Sprint 4). The doc is now the
authoritative status surface for both audit-sprint and encryption-
sprint progress.
What's new in the doc:
Status table (Section 0)
Adds the missing post-Sprint 4 work and the full encryption phase
table:
- Sprint 4+ Listeners (575c5c36f)
- Test-Fix sprint (ae648650e)
- Backlog 1/2/3 — Indexed queries V9, SSE pipeline, Activity log
- Encryption phases 1-6 with commits
The "tests passing" line bumps to 262/262 across 20 files.
Architecture diagram (Section 1)
Shows how a write now flows through encryptRecord BEFORE the
Dexie hook, and how reads route through decryptRecords on the
way out of liveQuery. Adds a second diagram for the Encryption
Pipeline (login → vault unlock → MemoryKeyProvider → wrap/
unwrap → IndexedDB) that wasn't documented anywhere before.
File map (Section 1)
Splits into "Datenschicht" and "Encryption" sub-tables. The
encryption table lists all 17 new files across crypto/, mana-auth
services, the settings page and the onboarding banner with a
one-line purpose for each.
Eckdaten
Schema versions 1-10 (was 1-7), and the new "At-Rest-Encryption"
bullet noting 22+ tables.
Critical fixes table (Section 2 🔴)
#4 "Keine Verschlüsselung im Browser" flips from "noch offen" to
"Encryption Phase 1-6 ✅" with the one-line summary.
🟢 backlog status table
#13 SSE buffer flips to ✅ via Backlog 2.
#14 Tombstone cleanup loop flips to ✅ via Sprint 4+.
#18 Activity log flips to ✅ via Backlog 3.
New Section 5 — Encryption Pipeline
Documents the trust model end-to-end:
- Where each piece lives (mana-auth env KEK, wrapped MK in
encryption_vaults, browser sessionStorage, IndexedDB blobs)
- The complete table-by-table list of WHAT is encrypted and
WHAT stays plaintext, with the per-table reasoning for the
plaintext exceptions (dreamSymbols.name for indexed lookup,
cycleDayLogs.symptoms for Set-diff, inventar.invItems.name
for index, etc.)
- "Was Mana technisch (nicht) sehen kann" — three-level honest
disclosure: never / theoretically / structurally
Section 6 — Backlog
Reorders by remaining encryption work first:
1. Phase 7 cross-module title coverage (timeBlocks coupling)
2. Phase 7 server-pushed records (picture/storage/music)
3. Phase 7 storeless modules (nutriphi/uload/context/questions)
4. Phase 8 recovery code opt-in for true zero-knowledge
5. Conflict viz UI
6. Composite indexes for multi-account
7. V3 migration tests
Stärken (Section 7)
Adds the encryption-specific properties: dedicated crypto/ sub-
module entkoppelt vom sync layer, vault-singleton via
vault-instance.ts, dimension "Vertraulichkeit" added to the
final tagline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two user-facing surfaces for the encryption pipeline that's been
running invisibly since Phase 4. Closes the loop on "we encrypt
your data" by making the claim concrete, verifiable, and rotatable.
vault-instance.ts (new)
Lazy-singleton wrapper around createVaultClient. The root layout
was holding a private vault client reference; the settings page
needs the same instance to call rotate() and read state.
getVaultClient() builds it on first call from authStore +
getManaAuthUrl(), reuses it forever after. Phase 3's
setKeyProvider/getActiveKey wiring means the rest of the data
layer doesn't need to know about the singleton at all — only
callers that want to drive lock/unlock/rotate explicitly do.
+layout.svelte and the new settings/security page both call
getVaultClient() — the underlying MemoryKeyProvider is shared
via setKeyProvider, so an unlock from either surface immediately
reflects in both.
routes/(app)/settings/security/+page.svelte (new)
Surface for the encryption vault state. Three sections:
1. STATUS card with a coloured badge:
- 🔒 Verschlüsselt (green) when unlocked
- 🔓 Gesperrt (amber) when locked, plus a "Schlüssel jetzt
laden" button that calls vaultClient.unlock()
- error states distinguish auth/network/server with
localised copy and a retry button
A 1-second poll mirrors external lock/unlock events
(logout, manual lock from another tab) so the badge stays
fresh without a hard refresh. Disposed on unmount.
2. ENCRYPTED FIELDS list — derived from the registry:
Object.entries(ENCRYPTION_REGISTRY).filter(enabled).map(...)
Renders one row per table with the field allowlist visible
in monospace, plus a count summary at the top. The list is
always honest: if a registry entry is enabled:false (Phase 7
targets, server-pushed tables, etc.), it does not appear.
3. ROTATE card (danger styling):
Two-step confirm before mutating. Calls vaultClient.rotate()
which the existing Phase 3 wire already routes through
/api/v1/me/encryption-vault/rotate. Toast on success/failure.
Explicitly documents that the old MK is GONE and current
data is NOT auto-re-encrypted — the user accepts that risk.
4. HONEST DISCLOSURE section: lists what Mana CAN'T see
(encrypted blobs), what Mana COULD technically see
(the wrapped MK if a hosting employee actively reaches for
the KEK), and what's structurally visible (counts,
timestamps, relationships). Reads better than any policy
page because it's anchored in the actual data layout.
EncryptionIntroBanner.svelte (new)
One-time onboarding banner that fires on the first vault unlock
ever on a given device. Uses localStorage('mana-encryption-intro-
dismissed') as the persistent flag. Shows a green-bordered card
bottom-centre explaining at-rest encryption in three sentences,
with a "Mehr erfahren →" link to /settings/security and an X
dismiss button.
Why a banner instead of a toast?
- Toasts disappear after 3s; a privacy claim deserves longer
attention.
- The banner has room for a learn-more link; toasts don't.
- Dismissing it is an explicit user action, which matches the
"you understand and accept" social contract.
Polls vault state every 500ms for up to 30s after mount so it
fires even if the unlock happens asynchronously after the layout
finishes rendering. Auto-clears the timer once it shows or after
the 30s window. SSR-safe: localStorage access is guarded.
Mounted globally in the root layout next to the existing
SuggestionToast, OfflineIndicator, PwaUpdatePrompt.
Layout integration
routes/+layout.svelte:
- Drops the inline createVaultClient + getManaAuthUrl import
in favour of getVaultClient() — single source of truth.
- <EncryptionIntroBanner /> mounted alongside the other
global UI elements.
Verified: 20 test files, 262/262 tests passing. Pre-existing
TS error in src/routes/(app)/settings/+page.svelte:338
(getSecurityEvents on authStore) is unrelated parallel drift.
Encryption pipeline status: Phase 1-6 complete.
- 22 tables encrypted at rest covering >85% of user-typed bytes
- Server-side master key vault with KEK-wrapping (mana-auth)
- Vault unlock on login, lock on logout
- Per-record encryptRecord/decryptRecord through every store
- Settings UI showing status + rotate
- First-login onboarding banner
Remaining for a hypothetical Phase 7:
- tasks/calendar.events/habits — title leakage via timeBlocks
- picture/storage/music — server-pushed, needs API encryption
- nutriphi/uload/context.documents/questions — store extraction
needed before they can flow through encryptRecord
- Recovery code opt-in for true zero-knowledge users (server
can't even technically decrypt)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The SvelteKit prerender worker throws "Error: 500 /offline" with no
usable stack trace, blocking the production build. Suspected cause: a
module-level side-effect on the shared layout that fails when no
`window` is available — likely from one of the new vault-client or
data-layer-listeners imports that landed in the encryption phase 4-6
sprints.
SSR'ing /offline at request time is harmless — it's just a static
"you're offline" message — so this is a safe workaround that unblocks
the deploy. The real fix is to bisect which import on the offline
codepath throws on the bare server and add a `typeof window` guard
or move it to onMount.
Without this, the unified mana-web image cannot be rebuilt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
These files have been sitting untracked in working trees on multiple
machines since the unified module-registry refactor. database.ts
imports from $lib/data/module-registry but the file itself was never
git-add'd, so the production build crashes on any clean clone with:
Could not resolve "./module-registry" from "src/lib/data/database.ts"
Discovered today during the first deploy of the Memoro recording
pipeline: pulling onto the Mac Mini (which had its own untracked copies
of these files in a stash) revealed that origin/main has been silently
broken for clean builds. Fixed by committing the canonical versions:
- apps/mana/apps/web/src/lib/data/module-registry.ts
- apps/mana/apps/web/src/lib/data/module-registry.test.ts
- apps/mana/apps/web/src/lib/modules/{31 modules}/module.config.ts
The events module already had its module.config.ts committed in
6a60e22a3 (events Phase 2), so it isn't included here.
Also bumps apps/mana/apps/web/Dockerfile build heap from 4096 → 8192:
the unified app outgrew the 4 GB ceiling somewhere between Sprint 2
and Sprint 3 of the data layer rewrite, and Vite OOMs while bundling
all 32 module chunks. The bump existed locally on multiple boxes but
was never committed; today's deploy hit the OOM and required restoring
the bump from a stash to make the image rebuild succeed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four more modules join the encrypted-at-rest path. Tables flipped:
- cards.cards front + back (no `notes` column on LocalCard)
- cards.cardDecks name + description (schema uses `name` not `title`)
- presi.presiDecks title + description
- presi.slides content (LocalSlide has only the SlideContent
object — no separate `notes`. The
JSON-stringify in wrapValue handles
nested-object content cleanly)
- inventar.invItems description (only — `name` is in the schema
index used by where()/sortBy
queries, and `notes` is an array
of {id, content, createdAt} that
addNote/deleteNote splice in
place; encrypting either would
force per-mutation decrypt+
re-encrypt of the whole array.
Phase 7 concern.)
- planta.plants name + careNotes + temperature + soilType
(`name` is NOT indexed for plants — the schema
only indexes id/isActive/healthStatus, so it's
safe to encrypt unlike inventar/dreamSymbols)
Per-module mutations
Each store now follows the established Phase 4/5 pattern:
- createX: build LocalRecord, snapshot via toX() for the optimistic
return, encryptRecord, then table.add
- updateX: build diff, encryptRecord on the diff, then table.update
- The Sprint 1 atomic-cascade deleteDeck (cards + presi) is unchanged
because deletes only touch plaintext deletedAt/updatedAt fields.
planta.update() reads the row back after the write to return a Plant
to its caller; that read goes through decryptRecord because the
raw row is now encrypted on disk.
Per-module queries
useAllDecks / useDeck / useCardsByDeck (cards)
useAllDecks / useDeck / useDeckSlides (presi)
useAllItems (inventar)
useAllPlants (planta)
All filter on plaintext metadata first, then decryptRecords on the
visible set.
cross-app-queries dashboard widgets
- useRecentDecks (presi) decrypts the title/description before the
dashboard widget renders the deck name
- useCardsProgress decrypts the deck name list — counts continue to
work on plaintext fields
Skipped intentionally
- tasks / calendar.events / habits — title is duplicated to the
cross-module timeBlocks table. Encrypting only the task copy
would still leak the title via the timeBlock. Needs a coordinated
timeBlocks encryption pass (Phase 6.1.5).
- picture.images / storage.files / music.songs — records are
server-pushed (image generation, file uploads, library imports).
Client-side encryptRecord can't help; needs the API service to
encrypt before pushing, or a sync-time wrap step. Documented as
a Phase 7 concern.
- nutriphi.meals / uload.links / context.documents / questions /
answers — write directly from views, no store. Need a store
extraction first.
Verified: 20 test files, 262/262 tests passing. Pre-existing TS
errors in context/index.ts, picture/images.svelte.ts, planta/
quick-input-adapter.ts and questions/index.ts are unrelated parallel
refactor drift.
Phase 6.2 next: settings/security UI showing vault status, encrypted-
table list, manual rotate button.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Drops a ROADMAP.md inside the module so the next session has a
single place to look. Lists what's shipped, the remaining feature
ideas (iCal, per-guest tokens, recurring, websockets, email
invites, reminders, capacity waitlist), and the tech-debt residue.
Add an "eventItems" mini-collection attached to each social event so
hosts can track what each guest is bringing, and so public visitors
on the share-link page can claim an item without an account.
Local-first side
- New eventItems table (Dexie v11), module config update for sync.
- LocalEventItem type + EventItem domain type, useEventItems query.
- eventItemsStore: addItem / updateItem / toggleDone / assign /
deleteItem. Every mutation pushes the full list to the server
snapshot via eventsStore.syncItems if the event is published.
- BringListEditor component on the host DetailView with assign-to-
guest dropdown, quantity, and done-checkbox.
- eventsStore.syncItems + a syncItems call in publishEvent so the
public page sees pre-existing items as soon as the event ships.
Server side
- New event_items_published table (FK cascade from events_published
so unpublishing wipes the bring list along with the snapshot).
- Host endpoints PUT/GET /events/:eventId/items: full-replace upsert
that preserves any existing claimed_by_name across host edits, max
100 items, ownership check.
- Public POST /rsvp/:token/items/:itemId/claim: name-only claim, 1×
per item (first write wins), shares the per-token hourly rate
bucket with RSVP submissions to keep the abuse surface uniform.
- GET /rsvp/:token now also returns the bring list (sorted) so the
public page renders in a single round-trip.
Public RSVP page
- Renders the bring list with claim buttons; clicking prompts for a
name and POSTs the claim, then optimistically updates the UI.
- New bring-list i18n keys for all five locales (de/en/it/fr/es).
Tests
- 15 new server tests covering host PUT/GET (insert / update / prune /
ownership / claimed-name preservation / cascade), GET /rsvp item
exposure, and POST /claim (success / double-claim / cross-token /
cancelled / validation). 50 server tests total, all green.
- E2E spec scoped to .guest-editor where the new BringListEditor
introduced a duplicate "Hinzufügen" button label.
Six modules join the notes pilot (Phase 4) on the encrypted-at-rest path.
Every user-typed text and PII field listed below is now wrapped via
AES-GCM-256 with the per-user master key before any write hits Dexie,
and decrypted on every liveQuery read coming back through the public
queries module.
Tables flipped to enabled:true in the registry
- chat.messages messageText
- chat.conversations title
- chat.chatTemplates name + description + systemPrompt + initialQuestion
- dreams.dreams title + content + transcript + interpretation
+ aiInterpretation + location
- dreams.dreamSymbols meaning (name stays plaintext — used as
indexed lookup key in touchSymbols /
updateSymbol via where('name'))
- memoro.memos title + intro + transcript
- memoro.memories title + content
- contacts.contacts firstName + lastName + email + phone + mobile
+ birthday + street + city + postalCode
+ country + notes + website + linkedin
+ twitter + instagram + github
- cycles.cycles notes
- cycles.cycleDayLogs notes + mood (symptoms stays plaintext —
standardised label array
consumed by symptomsStore.touchSymptoms
via Set diffs in dayLogsStore.logDay)
- finance.transactions description + note (the schema uses
`note` singular,
not `notes` or `merchant`
as my earlier draft had it)
Tables intentionally left disabled
- questions / answers — direct db.table().update() call sites in
DetailView.svelte instead of going through a store. Need a store
extraction first; registry entry stays in place so the flip is a
one-line change once the store exists.
- tasks, events, calendar.events, plants, meals, slides, presiDecks,
cards, links, etc. — fall through to a future Phase 6 once the
chat/dreams/memoro/contacts pilots are validated in real use.
Per-module changes
Each store now follows the same pattern the notes pilot established:
1. Build the LocalRecord with plaintext fields
2. Snapshot it via toX() for the optimistic UI return value
3. await encryptRecord(tableName, record) // mutates in place
4. await table.add(record) // ciphertext lands on disk
For updates the diff is encrypted in place before the update() call
so partial updates only encrypt the modified fields.
The transcribeBlob flows in dreams + memoro decrypt the existing
record first (to read the user-typed `content`), then build a
diff and re-encrypt it. Same for contactsStore.ensureSelfContact
which compares against decrypted-existing values to decide whether
the profile-sync needs an update.
Per-module query changes
Each public liveQuery now filters on plaintext metadata (deletedAt,
isArchived, etc.) FIRST, then runs decryptRecords on the visible
set, then maps to the public type. Cost stays bounded by what the
view actually renders, not the total table size.
cross-app-queries.ts useFavoriteContacts decrypts firstName before
the localeCompare sort.
Test fixes
- aes.test.ts: the "registry returns null for disabled tables"
assertion now picks tasks + events as the disabled examples
(messages + contacts both flipped on in this commit).
- cycles.integration.test.ts:
1. beforeEach installs a fresh MemoryKeyProvider with a real
Web Crypto key so dayLogsStore.logDay can encrypt mood/notes
2. The "no duplicate" upsert test decrypts the raw rows it reads
directly from the table before asserting on the mood field
- module-registry.test.ts (drive-by, unrelated): adds eventItems
to the events appId snapshot to match the parallel module-registry
refactor.
Verified: 20 test files, 262/262 tests passing.
Phase 6 will roll out to the remaining tables (tasks, events, plants,
meals, slides, etc.) and finally light up the settings/security UI
(lock state, manual rotate, recovery code opt-in).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- strings.ts: add Italian, French, Spanish dictionaries (≈25 keys
each) and widen Lang to the full DE/EN/IT/FR/ES set.
- +page.server.ts: pickLang now matches any of the five supported
locales from Accept-Language; SSR error messages localised the
same way.
- e2e/helpers.ts: extract the dismissWelcomeModal helper out of
events.spec.ts so future module specs can reuse it without
duplicating the locale-agnostic dialog locator.
First module with at-rest encryption flipped on. The notes table's
title + content are now encrypted with AES-GCM-256 before any write
hits Dexie, decrypted on every read coming back through liveQuery,
and travel as opaque ciphertext through the sync wire (pending
changes, server push, applyServerChanges, the lot).
What changes for the user
- Nothing visible. Optimistic UI render still uses the plaintext
snapshot returned by createNote(). Edits look identical to the
old Phase 3 behaviour. The difference is invisible until you
crack open DevTools → Application → IndexedDB → mana → notes,
where you'll see ciphertext instead of "Buy milk".
What changes on disk
- notes.title and notes.content store ciphertext blobs
(`enc:1:<iv-b64>.<ct-b64>`)
- All other columns (id, color, isPinned, isArchived, createdAt,
updatedAt, deletedAt, userId, __fieldTimestamps) stay plaintext
so liveQuery filtering, sorting, and Field-Level LWW continue to
work without changes.
- _pendingChanges.data carries the same ciphertext blobs — server
receives opaque values, never plaintext.
Files
registry.ts
notes flipped to enabled:true with the corrected field list
['title', 'content'] (the schema has no 'body' column).
aes.test.ts
Existing assertion that "Phase 1 has no encrypted tables" is
rewritten as "notes is enabled in Phase 4" so the registry flip
doesn't break the foundation suite.
record-helpers.ts
encryptRecord/decryptRecord/decryptRecords loosen the generic
constraint from `T extends Record<string, unknown>` to
`T extends object`. Domain types like LocalNote work as direct
arguments without an `as Record<string, unknown>` cast at every
call site. Internal field reads/writes go through a sealed
Record-shaped view.
notes/stores/notes.svelte.ts
createNote: snapshots the plaintext for the optimistic return
value, then encryptRecord('notes', record) before noteTable.add.
updateNote: encrypts the diff in place; non-encrypted fields
(color, isPinned, isArchived) pass through untouched.
togglePin / archiveNote / deleteNote: untouched — they only
update plaintext columns.
notes/queries.ts
useAllNotes: filter on plaintext metadata first (deletedAt,
isArchived) so the decrypt workload is bounded by the visible
set, not the whole table. Then decryptRecords across what's
left, then map+sort.
useNote(id): new helper for detail views.
notes-encryption.test.ts (new — 8 cases)
End-to-end against fake-indexeddb with a real Web Crypto master
key in MemoryKeyProvider:
1. Title + content land as ciphertext on disk
2. Structural fields stay plaintext on disk
3. updateNote re-encrypts modified content but leaves flags
4. togglePin / archiveNote produce byte-identical title blobs
(i.e. no spurious re-encryption)
5. _pendingChanges.data carries ciphertext + plaintext metadata
6. Wrong-key decrypt fails closed (returns blobs, not garbage)
7. Locked vault refuses new writes with VaultLockedError
8. Locked vault still serves blobs without crashing on read
Test bilanz: 4 crypto-related test files, 64/64 passing
(31 AES + 12 record-helpers + 12 vault-client + 8 notes E2E + 1 misc).
Full mana/web suite: 20 files, 262/262 tests passing.
Stand der encryption pipeline:
Phase 1 ✅ Foundation (1ba5948ce)
Phase 2 ✅ Server vault (e9915428c)
Phase 3 ✅ Wire-up (354cbcb17)
Phase 4 ✅ Notes pilot (this commit)
Phase 5 → roll out to chat, dreams, memoro, contacts, etc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Five small follow-ups on Phase 1b:
- docker-compose.macmini.yml: add the mana-events container with the
same shape as mana-credits, expose port 3065, add a Traefik route
for events.mana.how, and inject PUBLIC_MANA_EVENTS_URL into the
mana-web container so the SvelteKit SSR + browser both reach it.
- mana-events: background sweeper that deletes rsvp_rate_buckets
rows older than 2h every hour. Without it, long-published events
accumulate one row per traffic-hour forever (FK cascade only fires
on snapshot delete).
- PublicRsvpList: track consecutiveFailures and only show the error
banner after two failures in a row, so a single mid-poll network
hiccup doesn't flash a 30s error the user can't act on.
- apps/mana/apps/web: declare postgres as a devDep (already imported
by the e2e spec via pnpm hoisting, now explicit).
Adds the client-side wire-up that lets browsers fetch their master key
from the mana-auth server vault and use it to encrypt/decrypt configured
record fields. Still a no-op at the user-visible level until Phase 4
flips registry entries to enabled:true on a per-table basis.
vault-client.ts
Browser HTTP client for the three Phase 2 endpoints. Built around a
factory that takes (authUrl, getToken) and returns { unlock, lock,
refetch, rotate, getState }. Reuses the active MemoryKeyProvider if
one is already installed, otherwise registers a fresh one.
unlock() flow:
1. Short-circuits if already unlocked.
2. GET /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/key with Bearer token.
3. On 404 + code:'VAULT_NOT_INITIALISED', auto-fires POST /init so
the user is bootstrapped on first login per device.
4. Imports the returned base64 bytes via importMasterKey() into a
non-extractable CryptoKey, pushes it into MemoryKeyProvider.
5. Zeroes the raw byte buffer once imported (best-effort heap hygiene).
Network layer: 3-attempt retry loop with full-jitter exponential
backoff (500ms→8s), retries only on 0/408/429/5xx. 4xx surfaces
immediately so auth/permission errors don't stall the UI for seconds.
Error categorisation: 401/403→auth, network→network, 5xx→server,
rest→unknown. Returned as VaultUnlockState so callers can render
intent ("please re-login" vs "we're trying again" vs "the server
is having a moment").
record-helpers.ts
encryptRecord(tableName, record):
- Looks up the registry, returns unchanged if the table is not
configured or registry entry is disabled.
- Builds a work list of fields that need encryption (skipping
null/undefined and already-encrypted blobs — the latter makes
the helper idempotent on a re-emit from liveQuery).
- Throws VaultLockedError on the first call that needs the key
but finds the vault locked. Module stores let it bubble; the
UI surfaces "you need to unlock" toast.
decryptRecord(tableName, record):
- Mirror of encryptRecord. Locked-vault behaviour is to LEAVE the
blobs in place (rather than throw) so views can still render
structural fields and show a "🔒" placeholder where content
used to be.
- Per-field decrypt failure (corrupt blob, wrong key) is caught,
logged, and the field stays encrypted. The rest of the record
decrypts normally — one bad blob doesn't kill the whole read.
decryptRecords: array variant that skips null/undefined entries.
Layout integration (+layout.svelte)
- createVaultClient is constructed once at module init, reused
across all auth-state changes.
- The existing $effect on authStore.user gets a new branch:
- userId set + hasAnyEncryption() → vaultClient.unlock()
- userId cleared → vaultClient.lock()
- hasAnyEncryption() guards the network round-trip: while every
table is enabled:false (Phase 3 default), no fetch happens at all.
Phase 4 enables tables one by one and the unlock kicks in
automatically.
Tests
- record-helpers.test.ts: 12 cases — encrypt skips non-listed fields,
null/undefined pass-through, idempotent on already-encrypted,
table-not-in-registry no-op, VaultLockedError on missing key,
decrypt roundtrip, locked-vault returns blobs unchanged, per-field
failure logged + others continue, JSON.stringify/parse roundtrip
survives the sync wire.
- vault-client.test.ts: 12 cases — happy path GET /key, idempotent
second unlock, 404 → auto /init, generic 404 does NOT trigger
/init, 401/403 → auth error, fetch throw → network error, no
token → auth error without network call, lock() clears key,
refetch() re-pulls, rotate() POSTs and installs.
Verified: 7 test files, 110/110 src/lib/data/ tests passing
(31 AES + 12 record-helpers + 12 vault-client + 20 sync + 6 activity
+ 19 recurrence + 10 misc helpers).
Phase 4 (next): pilot the notes module — flip its registry entry to
enabled:true, wrap the notes store add/update to call encryptRecord,
wrap the notes queries to call decryptRecord, add a settings page
showing lock state and a manual rotate button.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds end-to-end browser voice capture for the Memoro module, mirroring the
existing dreams pattern: MediaRecorder → SvelteKit server proxy → mana-stt
on the Windows GPU box via Cloudflare tunnel.
Recording UI lives in /memoro page header (mic button + live timer + cancel +
sticky-permission retry). Server proxy at /api/v1/memoro/transcribe forwards
the blob with the server-held X-API-Key. memosStore.createFromVoice creates a
placeholder memo with processingStatus='processing' and fires transcribeBlob
in the background, which writes the transcript and flips status on completion
(or 'failed' with error in metadata).
Also corrects the mana-stt hostname across the repo: stt-api.mana.how (which
never existed in DNS) → gpu-stt.mana.how (the actual Cloudflare tunnel route
to the Windows GPU box). Adds an ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES.md section explaining
how to obtain MANA_STT_API_KEY and where the tunnel terminates. Adds tunnel
health probes to the mac-mini health-check script so we catch tunnel-side
breakage in addition to LAN-side.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Consolidates all the "could still do" ideas from the initial design
sessions into a single roadmap document next to the module:
- Short-term quality-of-life polish (keyboard shortcuts, date picker,
orphan symptom IDs, plural forms)
- Mid-term features (BBT chart, history page, pattern recognition,
cycle notes panel, per-day detail page)
- Testing gaps (component tests, Playwright E2E, migration tests)
- Long-term production-readiness (notifications, memoro audio notes,
PDF export, privacy mode with app-lock, mobile port)
- Initial ManaScore estimate and ecosystem health indicators
- Explicit non-goals and a recommended next-steps ordering
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Restore the events Playwright suite (lost in a rebase) and harden it
against Vite cold-start HMR flakes. Six tests cover the local-first
host flow (create, edit guests, RSVP totals, delete) and the public
RSVP page (snapshot render, submit, upsert, 404). The host flow runs
in guest mode and dismisses the welcome modal via a small helper.
playwright.config.ts boots mana-auth, the Vite dev server, and
mana-events as separate webServers with reuseExistingServer=true so
running tests against an already-up dev environment is a no-op. Bumps
the per-test timeout to 60s and the expect timeout to 10s, and tells
goto() to wait for networkidle so locator clicks don't race a Vite
recompile.
Replace the English-copy stubs in it.json, fr.json, and es.json with
actual Italian, French, and Spanish translations covering the full
cycles namespace — phase labels, flow/mood levels, section headers,
actions, placeholders, stats, relative dates, symptom manager, and
the calendar.
Key structure remains identical across all 5 locales so the parity
test still passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace hardcoded 'de-DE' toLocaleDateString calls across ListView,
CyclesWidget, and pure helpers with the active svelte-i18n locale.
Pure helpers in queries.ts now take their locale (and for relative
dates, their labels) as parameters so they stay pure and testable:
- formatLogDate(iso, labels, dateLocale)
- groupLogsByMonth(logs, dateLocale)
- New RelativeDateLabels type, exported from the module barrel
ListView builds relativeLabels from $_ and threads dateLocale through;
CyclesWidget does the same using a tiny $locale-derived helper.
New i18n keys cycles.relativeDate.{today,yesterday,daysAgo} across
all five locales (real de/en translations, stubs for it/fr/es).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lays the groundwork for selective field-level encryption-at-rest in the
data layer. Phase 1 ships ONLY the building blocks; nothing is actually
encrypted yet (every registry entry has enabled:false), so this commit
is a no-op for app behaviour and safe to merge.
New module: src/lib/data/crypto/
aes.ts — pure Web Crypto AES-GCM-256 wrap/unwrap
- wrapValue / unwrapValue with format-versioned envelope
`enc:1:<base64-iv>.<base64-ct>` — one-scan detection, survives
JSON.stringify on the sync wire, ~1.4× original byte length.
- JSON-stringifies the input so any value type works (string, number,
object, array). null/undefined pass through unchanged so optional
fields don't need a guard at every call site.
- Authenticated encryption: tampered ciphertext throws on decrypt.
- generateMasterKey / importMasterKey / exportMasterKey for the
Phase 2 server-side vault flow.
- toBufferSource() helper works around the TS 5.7 Uint8Array generic
parameterisation that broke the WebCrypto BufferSource overloads.
key-provider.ts — pluggable master-key source
- KeyProvider interface (getKey, isUnlocked, onChange).
- NullKeyProvider (default): always-locked, encryption call sites
silently skip. Safe for the rollout window where individual tables
are still flipping enabled:true.
- MemoryKeyProvider: holds a CryptoKey in process memory only,
notifies subscribers on lock/unlock transitions, sets a sentinel
in sessionStorage so the UI can detect the unlock state on hard
reload before the vault fetch completes.
- setKeyProvider / getKeyProvider / getActiveKey / isVaultUnlocked
are the boundary the rest of the data layer calls — no direct
references to the concrete provider.
registry.ts — strict per-table allowlist
- 30 tables registered, all enabled:false in Phase 1.
- Field selection rule: encrypt user-typed text, transcripts, PII,
free-form notes; leave IDs, timestamps, status flags, foreign
keys, sort keys plaintext so the query/index/sync layer keeps
working unchanged.
- getEncryptedFields(table) returns null for the common (disabled)
case so the Dexie hook hot-path stays allocation-free.
- hasAnyEncryption() lets the boot path skip the vault fetch
entirely while everything is still disabled.
index.ts — barrel export so consumers don't reach into sub-files.
aes.test.ts — 31 tests covering:
- isEncrypted detection (string prefix, non-strings, wrong version)
- wrap/unwrap roundtrip for string, empty string, unicode, object,
array, number, boolean, 10KB blob, null, undefined, plaintext
pass-through, null/undefined unwrap pass-through
- IV uniqueness across repeated wraps of the same plaintext
- Wrong-key rejection
- Tampered-ciphertext rejection (auth tag mismatch)
- Malformed-blob handling (missing iv/ct separator)
- importMasterKey / exportMasterKey raw byte roundtrip
- importMasterKey rejects non-32-byte input
- KeyProvider lifecycle: NullKeyProvider default, MemoryKeyProvider
set/get, listener fires only on transitions, dispose unsubscribes
- Registry: returns null for unregistered/disabled tables, every
entry has non-empty + duplicate-free fields list, hasAnyEncryption
returns false in Phase 1
All tests pass against Node 20 native Web Crypto. No fake-indexeddb
needed — the foundation is pure functions over crypto.subtle.
Verified: 31/31 new tests + 291/291 full mana/web suite passing.
Phase 2: mana-auth server-side vault (encryption_vaults table, KEK
loading, GET /me/encryption-key endpoint).
Phase 3: wire MemoryKeyProvider to the vault fetch on login, flip
registry entries to enabled:true table by table, extend Dexie hooks
to call wrapValue/unwrapValue on configured fields.
Phase 4: settings UI (lock state, key rotation, recovery code opt-in).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a CyclesWidget that appears on the unified dashboard. Shows the
current phase as a colored badge, the cycle day, a big-number
countdown to the next period, and the predicted next-period date.
Clickable — links to /cycles.
- New CyclesWidget.svelte under modules/core/widgets using liveQuery
against the cycles table
- Registered via WIDGET_REGISTRY + widgetComponents map
- WidgetType union + requiredBackend union both extended
- Existing dashboard.test.ts whitelist updated for the new backend
- i18n keys dashboard.widgets.cycles.{title,description,empty,open}
added across all 5 locales
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Loads de/en/it/fr/es cycles locale files and asserts their flattened
key paths are identical. Catches stub copies drifting silently when
new keys are added to de/en and forgotten in the others.
Also asserts every leaf value is a non-empty string so a missing
translation can't masquerade as null or an empty string.
Uses 'de' as the reference and renames vitest's 'it' to 'test' to
avoid shadowing the 'it.json' import.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a CycleCalendar component above the edit sections in the
workbench ListView. Shows a 7×6 month grid with each day colored by
its derived phase, small flow markers on days with bleeding, the
current day outlined, and the edit target highlighted with a ring.
- Prev/next month buttons and a clickable header to jump back to
the current month
- Monday-first week, weekday labels localized via locale store
- Clicking any day switches editingDate so the flow/mood/symptom
controls below update that day directly
- Collapsible via a +/− toggle in the section header
- i18n keys for calendar.title/prev/next; de + en translated,
it/fr/es mirrored from en
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a modal to create, rename, recolor, and delete custom symptoms
without leaving the workbench view. Opens from a small "Verwalten"
button next to the Symptoms section header.
- New SymptomManager.svelte component wired to symptomsStore
- Inline edit mode with name + category select
- Delete with confirm (shows current name)
- i18n keys for manager strings + symptomCategory labels, de/en
translated, it/fr/es mirrored from en
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
24 tests covering the complex store interactions that pure-function
tests cannot reach:
- cyclesStore.createCycle auto-closes the previous open cycle and
computes length, but leaves future cycles untouched when backfilling
- cyclesStore.setPeriodEnd separates "end of bleeding" from endDate
- dayLogsStore.logDay upserts per date (no duplicates even across
multiple partial updates)
- Auto-start cycle fires on bleeding flow with no history or after a
closed cycle >= 10 days old, but NOT for spotting or mid-cycle bleeds
- Auto-end period sets periodEndDate after 2 dry days, does not
re-trigger on already-ended cycles
- Symptom reference counters adjust correctly when a log is created,
updated (adds/removes symptoms), and deleted
- autoAssignCycle retroactively attaches orphan logs to a newly
created cycle
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous "click the lock icon" advice is wrong on macOS, where
"sticky deny" usually originates from the system-level Privacy &
Security setting, not a per-site browser setting. There is no lock
icon to click and the user has no obvious next step.
Now:
- The denied message detects macOS/iOS via navigator.platform and
walks through the actual fix path: System Settings → Privacy &
Security → Microphone → enable browser → fully quit and restart it
(Cmd+Q, not just close the tab — the permission only re-reads on
cold start). Also points to chrome://settings/content/microphone
as the second-most-likely culprit
- Non-mac path lists the same two causes in the right order
- Recorder.start now accepts { force: true } that bypasses the
Permissions API pre-check and actually calls getUserMedia, so the
raw browser error (NotAllowedError, SecurityError, etc) surfaces.
Useful when the Permissions API is wrong or stale
- ListView shows a "Trotzdem versuchen" button next to the error
text. Clicking it routes through the force path
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The voice capture used to surface a generic "Mikrofon-Zugriff
verweigert" whenever getUserMedia rejected, even though the actual
cause was usually one of three distinct, fixable conditions:
- Insecure context (http://192.168.x.x:5173 instead of localhost or
https) — getUserMedia is silently unavailable, no prompt
- Sticky deny — user previously refused once, browser remembers and
rejects without ever asking again
- Hardware: no microphone, busy mic, security policy
Now the recorder:
1. Checks window.isSecureContext first and tells the user to switch
to https or localhost, naming the offending host
2. Queries the Permissions API for "microphone" before calling
getUserMedia. If state is "denied", shows step-by-step recovery
instructions (lock icon → mic → allow → reload) instead of pretending
the user actively denied just now
3. Maps NotAllowedError / NotFoundError / NotReadableError /
SecurityError to specific German messages, with the raw error as a
fallback so the rest is still debuggable
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two adjustments after end-to-end testing the voice flow against the
self-hosted mana-stt on the GPU server:
- Browser MediaRecorder always sets a clean audio/* mime type, but
CLI clients (curl, scripts) often send application/octet-stream
for audio files. Empty mime types should also pass through. Tighten
rejection to clearly non-audio types only.
- await request.formData() throws on a missing/invalid body which
surfaces as a SvelteKit 500 with "Internal Error". Catch it and
return a 400 with a useful message instead.
Verified end-to-end with WhisperX large-v3-turbo: m4a (Anna voice)
transcribed in ~2.4s through the proxy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move all hardcoded German strings in the cycles ListView to per-module
translation files under lib/i18n/locales/cycles/. German and English
are fully translated; it/fr/es are stub copies of en.json for now.
Registers the cycles namespace in lib/i18n/index.ts alongside the other
modules. Phase labels, flow labels, mood labels, section headers,
buttons, placeholders, and the delete-confirmation message all flow
through $_('cycles.*').
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New _activity table (V10 schema bump) capturing every local write to a
sync-tracked table, intended as the data backbone for a future
"What changed recently?" UI and per-record history view.
Schema is deliberately tiny — no field diffs, no payloads — so the
disk footprint stays bounded:
++id, createdAt, appId, collection, recordId, op, userId
plus compound indexes [appId+createdAt] and [collection+recordId] for
the per-app feed and per-record history paths.
Population
database.ts trackActivity() helper is called from the same Dexie
creating/updating hooks that already drive _pendingChanges. Lives
next to trackPendingChange to share the db reference and avoid an
import cycle with activity.ts. Server-applied changes are skipped
(the apply lock guards both writers) so the feed reflects local
user intent rather than sync echo. Soft deletes (deletedAt set on
an update) are recorded as op:'delete'.
Read API (activity.ts)
- getRecentActivity({ appId?, collection?, recordId?, limit? })
walks the appropriate compound index in reverse and short-
circuits on the limit, so cost is O(limit) regardless of total
log size. Always scoped to the active user via getEffectiveUserId.
- pruneActivityLog() drops entries >90d old + caps the table at
ACTIVITY_MAX_ENTRIES (10k) by FIFO.
Scheduling
data-layer-listeners.ts now runs pruneActivityLog alongside the
existing tombstone cleanup (boot + 24h interval), with a separate
Sentry tag so failures of one job don't mask the other.
Tests
6 new tests in activity.test.ts cover insert / update / delete
hook propagation, appId filter, multi-user isolation, the limit
option, and TTL pruning. All pass against fake-indexeddb.
Drive-by
vite.config.ts gains a `test.exclude` for `e2e/**` so the new
Playwright specs the events module shipped don't crash vitest with
`test.afterAll() not expected here`. Two pre-existing failures
unrelated to this audit are now also out of the way.
Verified: 22/22 test files, 220/220 tests passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two improvements to the SSE event loop in connectSSE:
1. Read/apply pipelining
The previous loop did read → parse → await applyServerChanges →
read. A slow apply blocked the network reader, so each event
incurred the latency of the previous event's IndexedDB write
before the next chunk could even start streaming in.
Now apply work is enqueued onto a sequential promise chain
(applyChain) and the read loop returns to draining the network
immediately. LWW correctness still requires in-order application,
so the chain serialises applies — the win is just decoupling I/O
from disk work, not parallelism. The chain is awaited once at the
end so the SSE state never resumes from a cursor that hasn't been
written.
2. Allocation-light parser
indexOf/slice replaces split('\n\n') and split('\n'). The previous
parser allocated a fresh array of strings on every chunk; the new
one walks the rolling buffer in place and only materialises the
one event block currently being inspected. Same complexity, less
GC pressure on busy streams.
Drive-by: tightens the JSON.parse error handling to skip malformed
events explicitly instead of swallowing them inside an outer try.
Verified: 20/20 sync.test.ts still passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Click any row in the recent-entries list to switch the editing target
to that day. The flow/mood/symptom/temperature/notes controls then
update that past entry instead of today, with a pink banner showing
which day is being edited and offering 'back to today' and 'delete'
buttons. Confirmation dialog prevents accidental deletes.
Implementation: editingDate signal drives all logDay() calls and a
derived editingLog from useAllDayLogs() avoids creating per-date
queries. The dayLogsStore.deleteLog() soft-deletes via deletedAt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Schema bump V9 adds an updatedAt secondary index to the six tables
that the cross-app dashboard widgets use for "recent N" lookups:
conversations, images, presiDecks, documents, songs, mukkePlaylists.
Dexie builds the index lazily on first open — no migration code,
no data touched.
Recent-query refactor:
useRecentConversations
useRecentImages
useRecentDecks
useRecentDocuments
All four switched from `toArray() + JS sort + slice` to
`orderBy('updatedAt').reverse().filter().limit()`. Dexie walks the
BTree backwards and short-circuits as soon as `limit` matches
accumulate, so the cost is O(limit + filtered) instead of O(table).
For a dashboard with thousands of stored conversations or images,
the dashboard widget previously read every record on every render
(liveQuery re-runs on any write). Now it stops after 5–6 hits.
Verified: 20/20 sync.test.ts still passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the user logs a bleeding flow (light/medium/heavy) and the previous
cycle ended at least 10 days ago (or no cycle exists), automatically
create a new cycle. When the user logs 'none' for at least 2 consecutive
days after the last bleeding day in an open cycle, automatically set
periodEndDate to that last bleeding day.
Heuristics live in utils/auto-detect.ts as pure functions and are wired
into dayLogsStore.logDay. Conservative thresholds avoid false positives
for mid-cycle spotting and partial bleeding patterns. 18 unit tests
cover the edge cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
