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feat(mana-auth): encryption vault — phase 2 (server-side master key custody)
Adds the server side of the per-user encryption vault. Phase 1 shipped
the client foundation (no-op while every table is enabled:false). This
commit lets the client actually fetch a master key when Phase 3 flips
the registry switches.
Schema (Drizzle + raw SQL migration)
- auth.encryption_vaults: per-user wrapped MK + IV + format version +
kek_id stamp + created/rotated timestamps. PK = user_id, ON DELETE
CASCADE so account deletion wipes the vault.
- auth.encryption_vault_audit: append-only trail of init/fetch/rotate
actions with IP, user-agent, HTTP status, free-form context.
- sql/002_encryption_vaults.sql: idempotent CREATE TABLE + ENABLE +
FORCE row-level security with a `current_setting('app.current_user_id')`
policy on both tables. FORCE makes the policy apply to the table
owner too — no bypass via grants.
KEK loader (services/encryption-vault/kek.ts)
- Loads a 32-byte AES-256 KEK from the MANA_AUTH_KEK env var (base64).
- Production: missing or wrong-length input is fatal at boot.
- Development: 32-zero-byte fallback so contributors can run the
service without provisioning a secret. Logs a loud warning.
- wrapMasterKey / unwrapMasterKey use Web Crypto AES-GCM-256 over the
raw 32-byte MK with a fresh 12-byte IV per wrap. Returns base64
pair for storage.
- generateMasterKey + activeKekId helpers used by the service.
- Future migration to KMS / Vault: only loadKek() changes; the
kek_id stamp on each row tracks which KEK produced it.
EncryptionVaultService (services/encryption-vault/index.ts)
- init(userId): idempotent — returns existing MK or mints a new one.
- getMasterKey(userId): unwraps the stored MK; throws VaultNotFoundError
on no-row so the route can return 404 cleanly.
- rotate(userId): mints fresh MK, replaces wrap. Caller is on the
hook for re-encryption — destructive by design.
- withUserScope(userId, fn): wraps every read/write in a Drizzle
transaction with set_config('app.current_user_id', userId, true)
so the RLS policy admits only the matching row. Empty userId is
rejected up-front.
- writeAudit() appends a row to encryption_vault_audit on every
action including failures, so probing attempts leave a trail.
Routes (routes/encryption-vault.ts)
- POST /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/init — idempotent bootstrap
- GET /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/key — fetch the active MK
- POST /api/v1/me/encryption-vault/rotate — destructive rotation
- All return base64-encoded master key bytes plus formatVersion +
kekId. JWT-protected via the existing /api/v1/me/* middleware.
- readAuditContext() pulls X-Forwarded-For + User-Agent off the
request for the audit row.
Bootstrap (index.ts)
- loadKek() runs at top-level await before any route can fire so a
misconfigured KEK fails closed at boot, never at request time.
- encryptionVaultService is mounted under /api/v1/me/encryption-vault
so it inherits the existing JWT middleware and shows up next to the
GDPR self-service endpoints.
Tests (services/encryption-vault/kek.test.ts)
- 11 Bun-test cases covering: KEK load (happy path, wrong length,
idempotent, before-load guard), generateMasterKey randomness,
wrap/unwrap roundtrip, IV uniqueness across repeated wraps,
wrong-MK-length rejection, tampered-ciphertext rejection,
wrong-length IV rejection, wrong-KEK rejection.
- Service-level integration tests deferred — they need a real
Postgres for the RLS behaviour, set up via existing mana-sync
test pattern in CI.
Config + env
- .env.development gains MANA_AUTH_KEK= (empty → dev fallback)
with a comment explaining the production requirement.
- services/mana-auth/package.json gains "test": "bun test".
Verified: 11/11 KEK tests passing, 31/31 Phase 1 client tests still
passing, only pre-existing TS errors remain in mana-auth (auth.ts:281
forgetPassword + api-keys.ts:50 insert overload — both unrelated).
Phase 3: client wires the MemoryKeyProvider to GET /encryption-vault/key
on login, flips registry entries to enabled:true table by table, and
extends the Dexie hooks to call wrapValue/unwrapValue on configured
fields.
Phase 4: settings UI for lock state, key rotation, recovery code opt-in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
3a4c6654b5
commit
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11 changed files with 913 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -11,28 +11,51 @@ export interface Config {
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manaCreditsUrl: string;
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manaSubscriptionsUrl: string;
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synapseOidcClientSecret: string;
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/** Base64-encoded 32-byte AES-256 key encryption key (KEK). Wraps each
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* user's master key in auth.encryption_vaults. Required in production
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* — in development a deterministic dev KEK is auto-generated so the
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* service still boots, with a loud warning. */
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encryptionKek: string;
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}
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export function loadConfig(): Config {
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const env = (key: string, fallback?: string) => process.env[key] || fallback || '';
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const nodeEnv = env('NODE_ENV', 'development');
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// Encryption KEK: in production a missing/short value is fatal — the
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// vault service refuses to mint or unwrap any master keys without a
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// real KEK. In development we auto-fill with a deterministic dev key
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// so contributors can run the service without setting up a secret.
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let encryptionKek = env('MANA_AUTH_KEK');
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if (!encryptionKek) {
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if (nodeEnv === 'production') {
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throw new Error(
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'mana-auth: MANA_AUTH_KEK env var is required in production. ' +
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'Set it to a base64-encoded 32-byte random value: ' +
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'`openssl rand -base64 32`'
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);
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}
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// 32 zero bytes — deterministic, obviously not for production. The
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// vault service logs a loud warning at startup when it sees this.
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encryptionKek = 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=';
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}
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return {
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port: parseInt(env('PORT', '3001'), 10),
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databaseUrl: env(
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'DATABASE_URL',
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'postgresql://mana:devpassword@localhost:5432/mana_platform'
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),
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databaseUrl: env('DATABASE_URL', 'postgresql://mana:devpassword@localhost:5432/mana_platform'),
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syncDatabaseUrl: env(
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'SYNC_DATABASE_URL',
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'postgresql://mana:devpassword@localhost:5432/mana_sync'
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),
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baseUrl: env('BASE_URL', 'http://localhost:3001'),
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cookieDomain: env('COOKIE_DOMAIN'),
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nodeEnv: env('NODE_ENV', 'development'),
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nodeEnv,
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serviceKey: env('MANA_SERVICE_KEY', 'dev-service-key'),
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cors: { origins: env('CORS_ORIGINS', 'http://localhost:5173').split(',') },
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manaNotifyUrl: env('MANA_NOTIFY_URL', 'http://localhost:3013'),
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manaCreditsUrl: env('MANA_CREDITS_URL', 'http://localhost:3061'),
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manaSubscriptionsUrl: env('MANA_SUBSCRIPTIONS_URL', 'http://localhost:3063'),
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synapseOidcClientSecret: env('SYNAPSE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET'),
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encryptionKek,
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};
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}
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